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1CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Study Overview 
 The number of multi-organizational collaborative ventures has been growing 
during the last several decades in the form of alliances, partnerships, consortia and 
business networks, etc. (Haagerdoon and Rajneesh, 1996; Doz and Hamel, 1998; Gulati, 
1998; O’Sullivan, 2003).  New product development, information systems, and large, 
complex projects where great amounts of resources are required, as well as different 
technologies and skills not possessed by a single organization, are usually accomplished 
through multi-organizational collaborative relationships (Singh, 1997; Kane and Esty, 
2000; Kanzanjian et al., 2000; O’Sullivan, 2003).  
 Multi-organizational collaborative relationships have been the focus of extensive 
research (Kogut, 1988; Pisano, 1990; Williamson, 1991; Folta, 1998, Gulati and Singh, 
1998), but this research has mostly related to the rationales for their deployment and to 
governance issues (Gerwin and Ferris, 2004).  The particular case of multi-organizational 
projects presents specific challenges to management because, to be successful, they 
require collaboration of diverse organizations with their own objectives regarding the 
project, and, with probably different strategic goals and priorities (Jones et al. 1998). 
However, little research has been conducted to define how the level of alignment among 
the participant organizations toward project goals in a multi-organizational project might 
affect project performance.  Hence, the purpose of this dissertation is to examine the 
2project dynamics induced by the level of alignment toward project goals among 
organizations participating in multi-organizational projects, and explore how these 
dynamics affect project performance.  The knowledge created through this dissertation 
could help the management of these organizations to assess the risk involved in that kind 
of project, and to devise actions to mitigate those risks while increasing the chances of 
project success. 
 To accomplish this purpose, previous research in the areas of goal alignment, 
multi-organizational collaboration, and project management were integrated.  This 
integration materialized in a set of propositions that attempted to explain how the level of 
goal alignment affects multi-organizational project dynamics and performance.  These 
propositions were assessed through two case studies inquiries, following a replication 
method (Yin, 2003).  The findings of these inquiries are expressed in two system 
dynamics models, representing the dynamics generated in a multi-organizational project 
by the level of goal alignment among the participating organizations at the management 
and project execution levels.  These models also aim to contribute to the understanding of 
how these dynamics affect project performance.  The model structures were validated by 
participants in the studied projects, by a panel of individuals with experience in multiple 
multi-organizational projects, and by a comparison to findings in previous research in the 
inter-organizational collaboration and project management areas.  Simulations exercises 
were conducted to assess to what extent the models are able to reproduce plausible multi-
organizational project systems’ behaviors. 
 The major finding of this study is that the level of trust and communication 
between partners was the mechanism through which the level of goal alignment affected 
3project performance in the multi-organizational projects studied.  In the first case, the 
level of goal alignment affected the level of trust and communication, and then the level 
of information exchange needed to execute interdependent tasks, and the level of 
coordination required to deploy the effort needed to deliver sub-products on time.  In the 
second case, the level of goal alignment also affected the level of trust and 
communication, and these levels along with other factors contributed to a low level of 
efficiency in the project team decision making process.  Delays in the decision making 
process affected the project team’s ability to provide feedback to the contractor about 
project issues, as well as the project team’s ability to monitor project progress and to be 
proactive toward the solution of incoming problems. 
 Other study findings, theoretical and practical contributions, limitations of the 
study as well as avenues for further research on the topic are also discussed in the present 
dissertation report. 
 
1.2    Statement of the Problem 
 In this section, the reasons to accomplish this dissertation are addressed.  Also, the 
research problem on which this study is focused is defined, as well as the unit of analysis 
on which the study was performed.  
 
1.2.1 Motivations for the Study 
 In most projects, the focus is on trying to abide to the basic priorities of time, 
cost, quality, and scope.  Conflicts and trade-offs between priorities (time, cost, quality, 
scope) are unavoidable due to resource limitations (Roseneau, 1998).  Constraints are 
4defined according to the resources available to the project and the attributes required in 
the outcome, including contracts’ specifications (Kerzner, 2003).  In many cases, 
organizations need to accomplish several projects simultaneously (Turner, 1993).  In 
those cases, project resources are limited by the necessity of sharing resources and 
negotiating priorities with other projects within the same organization (Turner and 
Speiser, 1992).  
 In the context of an organization accomplishing several multiple projects 
simultaneously -having independent existence but still getting resources from a common 
pool- projects must be integrated into the management control and reporting systems of 
the resources’ pool owner.  This might lead to conflicts over resource supply and 
management control (Payne, 1995).  
 Engwall and Jerbrant (2003) introduced the so-called “resource allocation 
syndrome”, or the condition in which management is overwhelmed with issues 
concerning the prioritization of projects, the distribution of personnel from one project to 
another, and the continuous search for slack resources.  Bias in resource allocation is 
another factor that affects multi-project management.  Repenning (2000) studied the 
allocation of resources in the context of multiple new product development  projects and 
concluded that there is a bias toward allocating resources to projects near to completion at 
the expense of new ones.  This might originate a systematic under-allocation of resources 
in projects at early development phases.  In conclusion, the assignment of priorities and 
the allocation of scarce resources in organizations accomplishing several projects 
simultaneously might generate conflicts that should be addressed by management in 
order to pursue the achievement of the organization’s objectives.  
5Goal and priority conflicts might be even worse in multi-organizational projects, 
where activities are accomplished and resources are contributed by two or more different 
and independent organizations.  In these projects, the strategic objectives of the 
participant organizations could be different (Vaaland and Hakenssen, 2003). In the 
numerous multi-organizational projects functioning to develop and operate the North Sea 
offshore oil fields (Crabtree et al.,1997; Green and Keogh, 2000), conflicts have been 
extensively reported as organizations involved in those projects attempt to maintain a 
range of complex relationships with other organizations that traditionally constituted 
direct competition, and are still competitors for other projects.  Depending upon a 
particular development, organizations might be simultaneously partners, suppliers, 
customers or competitors (Crabtree et al, 1997).  
 The situation found in the North Sea oil fields is common for multi-organizational 
projects.  Researchers have labeled this phenomenon as “Co-opetition” (Eikebrokk and 
Olsen, 2005).  Co-opetition occurs where cooperation and competition between diverse 
organizations occur simultaneously.  In these situations, some units of the involved 
organizations are cooperating in a specific project, while other units of the same 
organizations are competing in others.  In those cases, goal conflicts might take place 
anytime.  Information and effort might be withheld if the competitive side is more salient 
than the cooperative side. 
 Situations like the ones described above can lead to conflict of interest about 
project goals and priorities (Vaaland and Hakenssen, 2003).  Some participant 
organizations in multi-organizational projects might require the project to be completed 
sooner than others.  Financial capacity might not be equally distributed among the 
6participant organizations to absorb additional costs.  Participants might also have diverse 
quality requirements, leading to differences in quality standards and project scope.  
Actual or perceived opportunism or “free-riding” might occur as some participants 
perceive that they are not obtaining project benefits in a proportion commensurate with 
the effort and resources deployed (Greenlee and Cassiman, 1999). 
 Participant organizations’ business strategies might also change along the project 
timeline (Norrie and Walker, 2004).  This implies that in a certain moment the project 
goals are aligned to the organization business goals, but in the future, they might not be. 
Hence, the level of alignment toward project goals among organizations participating in 
multi-organizational projects might vary during the project life, affecting the priority the 
project has for each organization involved.  To ensure that projects keep their priority 
level within the organization, managers should ensure that projects’ goals are aligned 
with business goals (Platje et al. 1994).  
 Today, despite all the potential problems discussed above, many business 
initiatives make use of multi-organizational projects.  These initiatives include new 
product development alliances (Singh,1997; Doz and Hamel,1998; Gulati,1998; 
O’Sullivan,2003), inter-organizational information systems serving manufacturing 
networks (Sherer,1997) and supply chains (Rochie,1993;Sherer,1997), and large 
infrastructure projects such as off-shore oil exploration and production or airliner design 
and manufacturing (Green and Keogh,2000; Kane and Esty,2000).  These multi-
organizational projects are necessary, since no firm alone has the financial and 
technological capabilities required to accomplish them on their own (Doz and Hamel, 
1998; Gulati, 1998; O’Sullivan, 2003). 
7Although the deployment of multi-organizational projects has grown 
significantly, little research has been conducted as to the factors affecting multi-
organizational project performance (Gerwin and Ferris, 2004).  The literature studying 
multi-organizational relationships has focused mostly on strategic issues, such as 
rationales for deployment (Doz, 1998), the structures used (Gulati and Singh, 1998; 
Gerwin and Ferris, 2004), governance issues (Zahar and Venkatraman, 1995), 
asymmetries between partners (Harrigan, 1988), and general factors that might affect 
performance (Burgers et al., 1993; Hagerdoorn and Shackenraad, 1994).  The tactical 
aspects concerning the management of multi-organizational relationships have been 
largely ignored (Gerwin and Ferris, 2004).  For example, there are no research studies 
exploring how lack of goal alignment among participants in multi-organizational projects 
might influence project dynamics and performance.  Hence, the motivation of this 
dissertation is to fill this gap in the knowledge of multi-organizational projects.  
.
1.2.2 Research Problem Statement 
 Multi-organizational projects might present particular problems and challenges 
due to possible lack of alignment among participants toward project goals concerning 
quality, cost, schedule and scope.  Each organization involved in the project responds to 
its strategic objectives, which might vary along the project life cycle ( Norrie and Walker, 
2004).  The lack of project goal alignment might impact or create project dynamics that 
affect project performance beyond what participant organizations’ senior managers and 
project managers would expect.    Hence, the problem this dissertation studied can be 
stated as follows: to investigate how the level of goal alignment among the 
8participant organizations affects multi-organizational project dynamics and 
performance. 
 Because the system dynamics approach (Forrester, 1961; Lynneis et al., 2001) 
was used to study the research problem, the problem was divided into the following sub-
problems: 
• To build and validate a system dynamics model to represent the multi-
organizational project dynamics affected by the level of participants’ project goal 
alignment. 
• To perform simulation experiments based on the model to study the effects of the 
level of project goal alignment on project performance. 
 
1.3    Unit of Analysis 
Because the focus of this study was to investigate how the level of goal 
alignment among the participant organizations affects multi-organizational projects 
dynamics and performance, the unit of analysis is the multi-organizational project 
system. A project system is constituted by the following elements (Park and Pena-Mora, 
2003): 
 Processes ( to carry out the work and to control execution) 
 Management policies: strategic level (to fit the project’s objectives with the 
organizational objectives), tactical level (project management policies deployed to 
ensure that the project’s strategic objectives are achieved), and operational level 
(for regulating day to day project activities according to the project management 
policies).  
9 Resources: human, technological, infrastructure and materials. 
 Scope of the work: definition of what needs to be done. 
 Performance constraints: time to completion, quality, and cost. 
 These elements interact to get the work required done in a specific span of time. In 
the particular case of multi-organizational project systems, the resources required by the 
project are contributed by at least two different organizations, and these organizations 
might have their own goals for the project.  In this dissertation, the impact of the level of 
goal alignment on multi-organizational projects’ system dynamics and project 
performance was assessed. 
 
1.4 Background of the Study 
 In order to investigate the research problem, this dissertation draws on previous 
work encompassing several research traditions, namely goal alignment, inter-
organizational collaboration, project management, and system dynamics.  Because the 
main purpose of this study was to understand how the level of alignment toward project 
goals among the organizations participating in a multi-organizational project might affect 
project performance, it was required to analyze how project goals and priorities are set, 
and how the concept of alignment has been elaborated in the management literature and 
extended to the context of multi-organizational projects.  Moreover, multi-organizational 
projects are particular cases of inter-organizational collaboration, so previous research in 
this area should be useful to elaborate about the dynamics developing within that kind of 
project and how they could affect project performance.  
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Finally, a combination of case study inquiry and system dynamics modeling was 
the strategy selected to accomplish the investigation of the research problem. Hence, the 
advantages of using the system dynamics approach in the project management domain 
are discussed, as well as the basic project simulation structures that would work as 
building blocks of the model simulating multi-organizational project behaviors.  In 
addition, a review of the system dynamics applications to the study of projects dynamics 
and inter-organizational collaboration is performed. 
 As follows, an account of the previous research on the aforementioned areas 
relevant to this study is presented.  This literature review formed the base of a set of 
propositions that guided a case study inquiry.  The result of this inquiry was a system 
dynamics model attempting to explain how the level of alignment among organizations 
participating in a multi-organizational project might affect project performance (see Fig. 
1-1). 
 
Figure 1-1: Research Strategy 
 
Past Research on:   
Inter-Organizational 
Collaboration
Goal 
Alignment
Projects’ System 
Dynamics Modeling
Case Study 
Data Collection 
and Analysis
Case Study 
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Projects’ System 
Dynamics Model
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1.5 Summary 
 In this first chapter the context, background, and relevance of the study were 
discussed.  Multi-organizational projects are expected to be accomplished more and more 
in the future, because organizations need to integrate their skills and resources in a highly 
competitive environment.  The particular case of multi-organizational projects presents 
specific challenges to management because they require collaboration of diverse 
organizations with their own goals for the project.  Hence, this study focused on how the 
level of goal alignment among  partners in a multi-organizational project affects projects 
dynamics and performance.  Finally, a combination of case study inquiry and system 
dynamics modeling was wed to investigate the research question.  In the next chapter, the 
literature review on which the propositions were based that guided the case studies is 
discussed.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND STUDY 
PROPOSITIONS 
 
2.1 Chapter Overview 
 The case study data collection and analysis was guided by the assessment of the 
case study preliminary propositions.  In this study, these propositions were based on   
previous research in the areas of goal alignment, dynamic theory of inter-organizational 
collaboration, and on applications of the system dynamics methodology to the project 
management and inter-organizational collaboration domains. The literature review and 
the associated study propositions are discussed as follows. 
2.2 Alignment in the Organizational and Project Contexts 
 In this dissertation, the main interest is to find, in the context of multi-
organizational projects, how the level of project goal alignment might affect project 
performance.  Because project goal alignment is the independent variables stated in the 
research problem, it is required to discuss how alignment has been conceptualized in the 
management literature.  Alignment has been conceptualized at different levels, including 
strategic, organizational, project and team alignment (Miles and Snow, 1984; Itami, 
1987; Henderson and Venkatraman, 1993; Griffith, 1997; Skulmaski and Hartman, 1999 
Rondinelli et al, 2001).  Next, the dynamic nature of alignment as accounted by the 
literature is presented.  Researchers have described alignment as a management process 
of continuously adjusting to the environment (Sabherwal et al., 2001; Wagner, 2005).  
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Finally, the alignment concept as applied to multi-organizational projects is discussed, 
including a road map suggested by the literature review to achieve project team 
alignment in this kind of projects. 
 
2.2.1 Strategic and Operational Alignment: Fitting Environment, Strategy 
and Organization’s Resources and Structures 
 Organizational strategy research emphasizes the importance of fitting strategy 
with the organization’s environment (Ansoff, 1965; Miller and Friesen, 1983; Miles and 
Snow, 1984; Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1985).  Strategy is defined as, “the determination of 
the basic long-term goals of an organization, and the adoption of courses of action and 
the allocation of resources necessary for carrying out these goals” (Chandler, 1962, p.13). 
Organizations need to use strategy to adapt themselves to changes in their environment, 
in order to create competitive advantages in the marketplace and improve its chances for 
survival and growth (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Venkatraman and Prescott, 1990). 
Strategic fit involves aligning the organization with its environment and arranging 
resources to support that alignment (Miles and Snow, 1984).  Strategic planning becomes 
the fitting or alignment mechanism. 
 Within the organizational strategy paradigm, some researchers have proposed 
strategic fit models.  For example, Itami (1987) proposes a strategic fit model that defines 
fit as a relationship between external factors -customers, competition, and technology- 
and internal factors -such as corporate resources and the culture of the organization.  This 
definition leads to five types of strategic fit: 
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 Customer fit, meeting customer needs, adjusting to changes in customer desires, 
and capitalizing on customer interactions. 
 Competitive fit, deploying competitive weapons, protecting against counterattack, 
and avoiding direct competition. 
 Technological fit, anticipating changes in technology and applying the appropriate 
level of technology to develop new products or new operational processes in order 
to satisfy customers and make profits. 
 Resource fit, allocating and using existing resources effectively and accumulating 
resources for the future efficiently. 
 Organizational fit. Mobilizing the organization’s members, providing focus, 
matching strategy with its cultural characteristics, then creating momentum and 
sustaining forward-looking pressures for continuous improvement. 
 The idea of strategic fit has been explored extensively in the information 
technology (IT) area (Reich and Benbasat, 2000). In the literature review, I found that the 
alignment concept has been studied by IT scholars in more depth than by most other 
business-related lines of inquiry.   Information technology researchers have been very 
active studying the problem of aligning the IT strategy with the business requirements 
imposed by the environment (Hu and Huang, 2005).  In this context, alignment has been 
defined along two dimensions: (1) fit between business and IT strategy, (2) fit between an 
organization’s infrastructure and processes, and between information systems 
infrastructure and processes.  Both dimensions are thought to reflect the degree to which 
business and IT executives within an organizational unit understand and are committed to 
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the business and IT common mission, objectives, and plans (Henderson and Venkaraman, 
1993; Reich and Benbasat, 2000; Kefi and Kalika, 2005). 
 Another related idea in the IT area is the concept of co-alignment.  Co-alignment 
is defined as the condition when the several domains of strategic alignment -business 
strategy and IT strategy, IT strategy and organizational structure- are addressed 
simultaneously.  Lack of co-alignment was found associated with lower levels of 
business performance (Bergeron et al., 2004). 
 The operations management area also discusses the concept of alignment 
(Rondinelly et al., 2001; Papke-Shields and Malhotra, 2001).  Rondinelly et al. (2001) 
define alignment in terms of strategic fit and functional integration. Strategic fit 
determines the best structure or internal arrangements of the firm to execute the market 
positioning strategy.  Functional integration seeks coordination and cooperation among 
managerial functions to support the market strategy.  Papke-Shields and Malhotra (2001) 
conceptualize alignment as the degree of understanding and agreement between top 
management and the manufacturing function on the goals for the organization and the 
manufacturing function, and on how manufacturing can support the strategic direction of 
the firm. 
 In the literature reviewed above, alignment has been conceptualized in two 
dimensions. The first dimension is strategic, defined as fit between strategy and 
environment.  The second dimension is operational, defined as fit between strategy and 
the resources needed to accomplish it.  Operational alignment entails the development of 
consensus regarding goals and coordination among the organization’s members to 
accomplish those goals.  The coordination effort includes the proper allocation of 
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resources and the congruence of the operations infrastructure/management processes with 
the operations/infrastructure strategy.  
 
2.2.2 The Dynamic Nature of Alignment  
 Another aspect discussed in the alignment literature is its dynamic nature.  From 
this viewpoint, alignment is a process of managing constant change and not just a state to 
be achieved (Wagner et al., 2005).  Sabherwal et al. (2001) suggest that alignment 
evolves in patterns which can continue for a long span of time.  However, abrupt and 
significant changes in the organization environment might interrupt the alignment 
process, inducing significant changes in the organizations’ strategies and management 
processes.  
 In the IT field, researchers have also explored the dynamics of alignment, 
presenting these dynamics in terms of management processes.  For example, Wagner et 
al. (2005) defined alignment as an organizational capability displayed in specific 
management processes, acting on a changing environment, adapting organizations 
internal structures, and processes and skills to the external domain.  Alignment as a 
process depends on smoothly functioning relations between IT and business units to share 
knowledge and adjust attitudes.  Other researchers have found that organizations struggle 
to fit IT and business strategies, and sometimes go through potentially problematic paths, 
when the business strategy changes, and one or more of the IT strategy components fails 
to change appropriately.  In those cases, alignment needs to emerge through a process of 
incremental adaptation and learning (Hirschleim et al., 2001).  Finally, the concept of 
alignment as a management process was also suggested by Peak et al. (2005) and 
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Sledgianoski and Luftman (2005).  This management process is aimed toward the good 
use of IT resources in meeting the corporation's business objectives.  This process 
comprises corporate planning activities which would produce the divisional strategies and 
goals that will be used to align IT within the company. 
 In the literature reviewed above, alignment is not regarded as a static concept but 
rather as a dynamic one.  Alignment is described as the management process of adapting 
the organization to a continually changing environment.  Products of the alignment 
process are sets of goals on which the organization should focus to accomplish their 
business strategy. 
 
2.2.3 Project Goal Alignment in the Context of Multi-Organizational 
Projects 
To support the business strategy, the project goals developed by an organization 
needs to be defined in congruence with the business goals (Norrie and Walker, 2004). 
The project goals also should be updated as the business goals change as a consequence 
of changes in the organization’s environment (Dooley et. al., 2003; Norrie and Walker, 
2004).  Therefore, in the case of multi-organizational projects, every participant 
organization has its own goals for the project derived from their strategic and operational 
alignment processes. 
 Skulmaski and Hartman (1999) define project goal alignment as the process of 
ensuring that key project stakeholders share a common understanding of project goals. 
This process requires that the key stakeholder expectations and objectives should be 
considered, documented, and prioritized.  In the case of multi-organizational projects, 
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each organization brings its own goals for the project.  Hence, the goal alignment process 
is required to fit these diverse goals into a common set of project goals.  Because these 
goals are the result of each organization’s strategic and operational alignment processes 
aimed to adapt the organizations’ strategies to the environment, changes in the 
organizations environments might require changes in their goals for the project (Dooley, 
2003).  The project goal alignment process should procure a new fit between the new 
project goals required by each participant organization.  This process might be repeated 
several times along the project life cycle (Norrie and Walker, 2004).  Skulmaski and 
Hartman (1999) refer to cost, quality, time to completion, and scope as the basic, general 
project goals.  Hence, for this study’s purpose, goal alignment is operationalized as the 
extent to which the level of cost, quality, time to completion, and scope priorities are the 
same for the organizations participating in the project. Project performance is also 
assessed based on these priorities. 
 
2.2.4   Project Team Alignment 
 Skulmaski and Hartman (1999) also suggested that, while providing a set of 
common project goals supported by the participants, project goal alignment drives 
participant behavior regarding the effort displayed for the achievement of project goals. 
Hence, a consequence of the project goal alignment process is project team alignment, 
defined as “the condition where project participants work within acceptable tolerances to 
develop and meet a uniformly defined and understood set of project objectives” (Griffith, 
1997, p.38).  Extending this concept to a multi-organizational project, in this study 
project team alignment is defined as the degree to which the participants in a multi-
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organizational project deploy effort to achieve the project goals in the amount and quality 
expected according to the project plan.  
 
2.2.5 Road Map to Project Team Alignment in Multi-Organizational Projects 
 The relationships found in the literature between the concepts of strategic, 
operational, project goal, and project team alignment suggest the framework shown in 
Fig. 2-1.  The figure depicts the simplest form of a multi-organizational project, limited 
to only two organizations.  A brief description of the framework is presented as follows: 
 Strategic alignment is the process of fitting the organization to its environment.  A 
product of strategic alignment is the business strategy, which includes a set of 
strategic goals that the organization needs to pursue. 
 Operational alignment is the process of fitting lower level organizational units’ 
goals with the organization’s strategic goals.  Products of operational alignment 
are the goals assigned to current and future projects  
 In multi-organizational projects, every participant organization brings its own 
goals for the project, and then a project goal alignment process should take place 
to fit all these potentially disparate goals into a common set of project goals. 
 Finally, the degree to which the efforts of all team members fit in the pursuit of 
the achievement of the project goals (project team alignment) will depend on the 
degree to which the project team members perceive that the project goals fit with 
their organization’s goals for the project. 
 Two considerations will be made regarding this road map.  First, because the 
organization’s environment might change, the presented road map is dynamic.  Changes 
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in the environment would require adjustment, or re-alignment processes, at all levels -
strategic, organizational and project.  Second, because this dissertation’s purpose was to 
investigate how performance within a multi-organizational project is affected by the level 
of project goal alignment and project team alignment, the focus was on the organizations’ 
goals for the project, project goal alignment, and project team alignment concepts -
elements in gray in the diagram.  The strategic and organizational alignment concepts 
were discussed to explain how each organization’s goals for the project are formed, and 
that they might vary along the project life cycle.  
 
Figure 2-1:  Project Team Alignment in a Multi-Organizational Context. 
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From the literature review associated with the concept of alignment in the context 
of multi-organizational projects as discussed above, the following study propositions 
concerning how the level of goal alignment might affect project performance are 
advanced: 
Proposition 1: Participating organizations in a multi-organizational project bring 
their own goals to the project, according to their strategic and operational 
alignment.  
Proposition 2: Because organizations need to adjust to changes in their strategic 
environment, participants’ goals for the project might change during the project 
life cycle. 
Proposition 3: These changes in project goals might create a situation in which 
the schedule, quality, scope, and cost goals for the project are not the same for all 
the participants, regardless of what they had previously negotiated at the 
beginning of the project. In other words, the level of goal alignment among the 
participants might vary along the project life cycle.  
 
2.3   Inter-organizational Collaboration 
 Multi-organizational projects are a particular case of inter-organizational 
collaboration.  Therefore, previous research on the processes associated with inter-
organizational collaboration might contribute to explain the dynamics involved in multi-
organizational projects.  
 Wood and Gray (1991,p.146) suggest that inter-organizational collaboration is 
present when, “a group of autonomous stakeholders of a problem domain engage in an 
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interactive process using shared  rules, norms and structures to act or to decide to act on 
issues related to that domain.” In the case of multi-organizational projects, individual 
organizations engage in interactive processes to accomplish a project, combining 
resources and expertise not possessed by a single organization, developing a 
“collaborative advantage”, which might help them to achieve organizational objectives 
that otherwise could not be achieved.  According to Gray and Wood (1991), there are 
three main issues basic for understanding the inter-organizational collaboration 
phenomena: (1) the conditions that make collaboration possible, (2) the processes through 
which collaboration takes place, and (3) the outcomes of collaboration.  Because the 
interest here is how the level of goal alignment affects the project dynamics and project 
performance, the focus of the literature review is on the last two issues.  
 
2.3.1 The Dynamics of Collaboration          
 In the past, research on the formation of collaborative structures has been more 
extensive than research on collaborative processes and on the collaborative structures’ 
evolution (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Arino and de la Torre, 1998). The transaction 
cost, agency, and game theory perspectives have been employed by economists to explain 
why and how organizations decide to participate in inter-organizational arrangements and 
form transaction governance structures (Armour and Teece, 1978 ; Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Kogut, 1988; Williamson, 1991).  Organizational scientists have also studied 
factors that facilitate the formation of an inter-organizational collaborative structure, such 
as partner interdependence, common values, positive expectations about outcomes, size 
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and structure of the collaboration, and decision making mechanisms (Gray, 1985; Roberts 
and Bradley, 1991; Wood and Gray, 1991; Chung, Singh and Lee, 2000).  
 The approaches to the inter-organizational collaboration problem discussed above 
are rather static; and they do not address the dynamics involved in the collaboration 
processes.  However, some scholars have contributed to development of an evolutionary 
model of collaborative structures.  These structures evolve according to the development 
of feedback loops, repeatedly checking and rechecking collaboration outcomes with 
participants’ expectations (Ring and Van den Ven, 1994; Doz, 1996; Arino and de la 
Torre, 1998).  Ring and Van de Ven (1994) propose an inter-organizational collaboration 
model where collaboration evolves following a sequence of negotiation, commitment, 
and execution stages.  Each stage is comprised of a number of interactions, the outcomes 
of which are assessed by participants, setting new conditions for the next interaction.  
Doz (1996) suggests a framework for the evolution of collaboration in strategic alliances 
in which learning processes play a mediation role between collaboration initial conditions 
and outcomes.  Partners learn from their interactions and reassess the collaborative 
processes by their efficiency and other partners by their fairness and adaptability.  
 Arino and de la Torre (1998) integrated these two frameworks and introduced a 
model describing the evolution of inter-organizational relationships.  In this model, the 
collaborative relationships’ initial conditions are the product of preliminary negotiation 
and commitment stages.  These initial conditions are accepted by the participant 
organizations because they satisfy their own objectives for participating in the 
collaborative effort, generating value superior to other arrangement alternatives.  The 
expected value of the collaborative arrangement depends on the current organization 
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strategy, the expectation about future environment factors, the organizations’ expected 
contributions, and the behavior expected from partners.  The expected partners’ behaviors 
will depend on prior experiences and the quality of the relationship between senior 
management of the involved organizations, including the extent to which they trust each 
other.  If the collaborative arrangement’s expected value is greater than the one provided 
by other alternatives, then the participants will be willing to deploy their contributions 
and collaborate.  But the collaboration initial conditions are subject to change, leading to 
change in the collaboration’s expected value for the participants, and the perceived equity 
and reciprocity of the relationship.  Once changes occur -whether external such as market 
or technological changes, or internal such as changes in senior management- the affected 
partners would attempt to reinstate balance in the collaboration.  This can be made 
adjusting the level of contributions or the outcomes distribution scheme.  
 Arino and de la Torre contrasted their model with the behavior of an international 
joint venture in the cosmetics and cleaning products industry, in which several internal 
and external changes occurred.  They conclude that both initial conditions and external 
changes contribute to shape the evolution of an alliance.  The quality of the relationship 
between the participant organizations is both an antecedent and a consequence of the 
collaborative effort.  It is an antecedent as the quality of relationship provides the initial 
trust and goodwill -the product of previous experiences- required to positively evaluate 
the collaboration expected outcomes.  It is a consequence as the collaboration’s outcomes 
are compared with the outcomes expected.  If the actual outcomes are superior to the 
outcomes expected, the quality of relationships will increase, thereby improving the 
expectations about future outcomes and reinforcing the parties’ willingness to 
25
collaborate.  On the other hand, if the outcomes are inferior to the outcomes expected, the 
quality of relationships will decrease, thereby reducing the parties’ willingness to 
collaborate.  This is a feedback loop which can contribute in a positive or negative way to 
build the relational quality in a cumulative way, especially in later stages of the 
collaborative effort. 
 
2.3.2 The Role of Trust 
 Core to the construct of relational quality among participants in a collaborative 
relationship is the concept of trust. A significant part of the sociology, economics, 
psychology and organizational sciences, literature dealing with inter and intra-
organizational collaborations has focused on trust, and trust is regarded as  required to 
sustain and nurture these relationships (Sheppard and Sherman, 1998; Vangen and 
Huxman, 2003). Trust is associated with the notion of interdependence between partners 
in collaborative situations (Dasgupta, 1988).  Therefore, trust can be understood in terms 
of partners’ ability to form positive expectations concerning the collaboration objectives 
and the other partner’s behaviors regarding these objectives.  A basic condition for trust 
formation is that these expectations can be formed and fulfilled (Gulati, 1995; Rousseau 
et al. 1998). 
 The concept of risk is associated with the notion of trust (Ring, 1997; Das and 
Teng, 1998; Rousseau et al., 1998).  In this context, risk is defined as the perceived 
probability that a partner acts opportunistically (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). Also 
associated with trust is the notion of vulnerability (Mishra, 1996), related to the fact that a 
partner depends on other partners to achieve the desired objectives.  Hence, trust could be 
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defined as the willingness of a partner to accept the risk of being vulnerable to other 
partners’ opportunistic behavior.  
 Rousseau et al. (1998) identify three forms of trust (1) calculative -depending on 
the ability to assess trustworthiness based on past experiences or other sources of 
information- (2) identity or knowledge-based -derived from knowledge of partners and 
emotional attachment developed along repeated interactions- and (3) institutional -based 
on factors such as organizational culture or legal frameworks.  The authors propose that 
calculative trust plays a more important role during the initial stages of collaborative 
relationships.  Partners assess the trustworthiness of other partners during the early 
interactions and from past experiences, or from the partner’s reputation.  After a certain 
number of interactions, partners start to confirm -or disconfirm- their expectation about 
other partners’ behaviors.  Then, knowledge-based trust starts to replace calculative trust. 
 As a conclusion, the previous discussion suggests that trust building involves a 
feedback loop, or cyclical process.  Every time partners work together to achieve a 
certain objective, they take a risk from expectations about the anticipated outcomes and 
the’ behaviors.  Each time expectations about outcomes and behaviors are met, the 
trusting attitudes are reinforced, increasing partners’ willingness to accept the risks 
involved in the collaboration and the positive expectations about future interactions. 
 Based on the previous discussion concerning the dynamics of collaborative 
efforts, the role of trust, and on the concept of project team alignment as presented in the 
section 2.2.4, the following propositions are advanced regarding how the level of goal 
alignment might affect multi-organizational projects performance: 
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Proposition 4: The effort and resources invested in the project by the participants 
depend on their expectations of partners’ behavior (trust) and project outcomes. 
These expected project outcomes are the participant’s own goals for the project.  
Proposition 5: If the expectations are fulfilled, participants will go on investing 
effort and resources in the project and generating positive expectations about their 
behavior and project outcomes in their partners, thereby reinforcing trust and the 
likelihood of obtaining the desired project outcomes. 
Proposition 6: If, on the other hand, the expectations regarding partners’ 
behaviors and project outcomes are not fulfilled, participants might reduce their 
effort and resources invested in the project, not fulfilling their partners’ 
expectations about their behavior and project outcomes, thereby destroying trust 
and the likelihood of obtaining the desired project outcomes. 
Proposition 7: The initial level of trust is based on previous knowledge about 
partner’s behavior and on the perception of the risk involved in the failure of the 
partner in behaving according to the expected. 
 
2.4 The System Dynamics Approach as a Framework to Study 
Project Management Issues 
 Traditional methods for modeling and understanding projects emphasized detailed 
models of the project components to provide tactical advice about scheduling and 
controlling project activities.  Models became increasingly sophisticated using network-
based tools -such as PERT/CPM combined with simulation processes like Monte Carlo.  
These models are based on the premise that a project can be decomposed into elements 
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that repeated themselves in diverse projects of the same kind, then making possible the 
generation of reasonable statistical estimates of the duration and cost of each element.  
All this traditional modeling effort is based on the underlying assumption that getting 
deeper into the detail level of more accurate models would lead to a better understanding 
of the project development process (Rodrigues and Bowers, 1996).  
 However, this sophistication implies a concentration on details that ignores many 
of the largest and not quantified factors associated with project failure (Davidson and 
Huot, 1991).  These factors involve complex interactions between variables such as 
perceived progress, staff level, perceived productivity, progress rate, quality, and rework 
The traditional approaches to project management analyze projects from a static 
perspective and tend to decompose them into functions or factors, in order to allow 
project managers to deal with the complexity derived from the interactions and feedback 
loops. The traditional approach also tends to ignore possible iterations in project 
processes or incorporate them in activity duration estimates and precedence relationships 
(Ford and Sterman, 1998).  Even more important, the traditional tools consider projects as 
a unique phenomenon, which hinders efforts to learn from past project experiences, 
prevents systematic learning, and the dissemination of project management knowledge 
across project managers’ generations (Lyneis et al., 2001).  A new approach, based on 
system dynamics theory, would provide a holistic view of the project and its context, 
focusing on behavioral trends and their relations with management strategies, generating 
models to explain project performance. 
 The system dynamics approach, introduced by Forrester (1961) is a method for 
analyzing and modeling the behavior of complex social systems, where a holistic view is 
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important and feedback loops are critical to understanding the fundamental 
interrelationships.  For example, in a relatively simple project case, project behavior can 
be modeled through variables such as progress rate, resource level, schedule slippage, 
and perceived progress.  Higher resource levels lead to a greater progress rate, which 
increases the perceived progress.  To balance the cycle, a perceived schedule slippage is 
counterbalanced with an increment in the level of resources.  This simple model can be 
easily complicated with the incorporation of external disruptive factors such as budget 
restrictions, low staff motivation, and changes in the scope of work, etc. (Lyneis et al., 
2001).      
 Once the key feedback loops in the model and the potential disruptive factors are 
identified, quantitative estimates of the different outcomes can be performed from 
correlations with past experiences, or from discussions with project team members.  
There are several software packages in the market to help with this task -for example, 
VensimTM, PowerSimTM, and ITHINKTM. Common outputs of these software packages 
are graphics that feedback dynamics, leading to a greater understanding of the system and 
supporting experimentation to explore possible consequences of management actions. 
 Hence, the application of system dynamics to project management has been 
motivated by the following factors (Rodrigues and Bowers, 1996): 
 A concern for the whole project rather than just in the project elements. 
 The need to examine the non-linear aspects of the project interrelationships 
described by the balancing of reinforcing feedback loops. 
 The need to capture the mental models derived from project managers -and all 
project participants- past experiences. 
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 The need for developing -using the captured experiences and project management 
theory-  a flexible modeling option to support experimentation of diverse 
management options and predict possible outcomes. 
 Both system dynamics and the traditional approach to project management 
examine the same basic issues but from different perspectives.  One of the most 
fundamental differences between the two approaches is the model of project work.  The 
traditional approach views the project work as the sum of a set of work activities, 
scheduled with precedence relationships and resources requirements.  In the system 
dynamics approach, the project work is represented by a continuous flow of units of work 
that change from the state of “to be done” to the final state of “done” as resources are 
allocated to the project.  No specific consideration is given to about who does the work 
and when. 
 The power of the system dynamics approach is based on its ability to incorporate 
subjective factors, such as quality, productivity, and motivations, which can have an 
important influence on the whole projects, and are represented explicitly through causal 
feedback loops.  Therefore, even though a system dynamics model does not provide a 
breakdown of the project activities’ cost or duration, it does explicitly include the indirect 
causes that are often responsible for overrun and overspend (Rodrigues and Bowers, 
1996). 
 Most systems dynamics project modeling software generates graphic outputs that 
facilitate simulation and discussion exercises with the participation of the project team 
members, customers and senior management.  This can result in a better understanding of 
the effects of subjective variables on the project dynamics, and in an improvement in the 
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communication among the project team members, because the system dynamics approach 
encourages people to make their mental models explicit and then share their 
understanding of the project (Rodrigues and Bowers, 1996). 
 In conclusion, system dynamics offers a different view of a project, producing a 
better understanding of the important underlying influences. Then, system dynamics 
seems to be complimentary to the traditional project modeling techniques.  The 
integration of both approaches might be obtained through more sophisticated network 
models including feedback processes and modeling of activities.  Moreover, this 
integration can be done through a more detailed system dynamics model differentiating 
the major stages of a project as distinct activities, or through the assimilation of main 
lessons derived from system dynamics analysis in a set of rules to be used in estimating 
activity duration and cost in conventional networks ( Rodrigues and Bowers, 1996).  
 For the particular purpose of this study, the system dynamics approach permits 
the visualization of the diverse causal relationships between alignment and other 
variables interacting in multi-organizational project systems, such as the level of effort 
displayed, work quality, trust among partners, and project scope.  This visualization can 
contribute to a better understanding of the process dynamics -including feedback loops 
and non-linear relationships- which develop along a project’s life.  These dynamics lead 
to diverse levels of project performance.  The system dynamics approach will allow the 
development of a general model for multi-organizational project performance, not 
associated with particular activity networks, project phases, businesses or industrial 
sectors, making the model applicable to a broad range of multi-organizational projects. 
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2.4.1   Basic Project System Feedback Structures 
 Ford (1995) extracted from several previously validated project dynamics models 
the basic project system feedback structures that are presented below.  These feedback 
structures describe the fundamental dynamics within a project and constitute the building 
blocks of most project system dynamics models.  
 
The Rework Structure 
 The rework structure depicts how work is accomplished along the project life, 
incorporating the quality control activity.  The “work to be done” stock is transformed 
through progress (or task performing) into work to be checked by quality control and, 
depending upon the quality of the work, it becomes either good work (approved) or bad 
work (rejected).  The good work is work completed (work done) and reduces the amount 
of work to be done; the bad work needs rework and, after this process, it becomes again 
work to be checked, where it is separated by quality control in good and bad work, 
repeating the cycle the number of times it is required until all the work is approved and 
the work to be done stock is completely depleted (project completion).  The quality level 
drives the proportion of good and bad work. The level of work that remains to be done, 
and the time available until the deadline influence the schedule pressure.  A higher level 
of schedule pressure might induce a reduction in the quality standards, thus lowering the 
quality level.  Lower quality implies more work that needs rework, reducing the amount 
of work done, increasing the schedule pressure in a reinforcing feedback loop. The 
rework structure is illustrated below in Fig. 2-2.   
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Figure 2-2:  The Rework Structure. 
 
The Labor Structure 
 The effort deployed to generate progress in completing project tasks is a result of 
the head count and labor intensity, which are driven by  the schedule pressure (pressure to 
complete the project on schedule).  The effort deployed to complete the project is 
translated into progress and then into work done, which reduces the time required to 
completion.  The time required to complete the project is compared with the time 
available.  A negative difference (perceived project slippage) would reinforce a higher 
schedule pressure, inducing higher labor intensity and head count in a balancing cycle.  A 
graphic depicting the labor feedback structure is presented in Fig. 2-3. 
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.
Figure 2-3:  The Labor Structure 
 
The Quality Structure 
 The quality standard (degree to which high quality is pursued in project 
outcomes) drives quality (degree to which tasks outcomes fulfill project requirements). 
Quality is the antecedent of the proportion of good work and bad work generated.  Bad 
work generates rework -delaying the work completion- and good work increases the 
amount of work done.  The level of work to be done, compared with the time available 
until deadline, increases or decreases the perceived schedule slippage.  An increasing 
perceived schedule slippage might lead to a pressure to reduce the quality standard, in 
order to accelerate the progress and reduce the slippage, but creating a cycle reinforcing 
quality deterioration of work performed, increasing the level of rework required and then 
reducing the level of work done.  
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Figure 2-4:  The Quality Structure 
On the other hand, a decreasing perceived schedule slippage would lead to a 
decreasing pressure to reduce quality standards, thereby reinforcing quality.  The quality 
structure is presented in Fig. 2-4. 
 
The Scope Structure 
 The amount of work to be done compared to the amount of time available leads to 
a perceived schedule slippage and then to a higher pressure to reduce scope in order to 
catch up with the schedule.  This pressure might cause a schedule reduction if it can 
overcome the resistance to reduce scope associated with project team commitment to 
project objectives. 
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Figure 2-5:  The Scope Structure 
 
A reduction of work to be done increases the proportion of work done, thereby 
reducing, in a balancing feedback cycle, the perceived schedule slippage and the pressure 
to reduce scope.  The graphical representation of this structure is presented in Fig. 2-5. 
 
The Schedule Structure 
The time remaining at a given moment to the project deadline is compared to the 
expected required time to finish the project.  If the perception is that there is not enough 
time to complete the project before the deadline, schedule pressure is generated.  
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Figure 2-6: The Schedule Structure 
 
The higher the schedule pressure, the higher the drive to postpone the deadline, but 
resistance to slip the deadline -produced by the relative importance of the schedule goal- 
should be overcome.  If the deadline is postponed, the time to deadline will be increased, 
reducing the schedule pressure.  This balancing feedback loop structure is depicted in 
Fig. 2-6. 
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The Basework Structure 
 Basework is work performed for the first time.  An enlargement of the project 
scope or an increase in the upstream work increases the total basework available to 
complete, but project constraints might reduce that availability.  
 
Figure 2-7: The Basework Feedback Structure 
 
The more basework available to complete, the higher the basework completion 
rate will be and the more basework that will be completed. This basework completed 
reduces the stock of basework available but not completed, and also might increase the 
total basework available to complete -that basework completed can be required to 
perform subsequent tasks. The basework structure is depicted in Fig.2-7. 
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Because the feedback structures discussed above have been validated in different 
project contexts and have shown their ability to describe project dynamics (Ford, 1995), 
an assumption, was made that the basic project feedback, represent properly the basic 
project dynamics.  Therefore, the following proposition is advanced: 
Proposition 8: Variations of the level of goal alignment will affect project dynamics, as 
described by Ford (1995), through variation in the level of effort and resources invested 
in the project by the participant organizations. 
 
2.4.2 Brief Review of Past System Dynamics Applications to Project 
Management and Inter-organizational Collaboration 
The first system dynamics project management application was developed by 
Roberts (1964) to study the dynamics within R&D projects, but the first groundbreaking 
application was developed by Pugh-Roberts/PA Consulting during the 1970’s for Ingalls 
Shipbuilding.  The application was designed to resolve a cost/overrun dispute with the 
US Navy.  Until the year 2001, Pugh- Roberts/PA Consulting has applied system 
dynamics in more than 30 contract disputes, with a value beyond $4 billion (Lyneis et al., 
2001).  Moreover, Pugh-Roberts/PA Consulting alone has applied system dynamics 
modeling in a proactive way to more than 75 different projects in diverse areas, with 
reported savings for the customers of $5 billion (Lyneis et al., 2001).  
 In the academic field, system dynamics modeling of projects has focused on 
explicitly displaying and integrating the influences of processes, resources, scope, and 
targets on performance (Ford and Sterman, 1998).  The works of Richardson and Pugh 
(1981), Cooper (1980) and Homer et al. (1993) have applied system dynamics to model 
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project resources and study the effects of resource management on project performance. 
Models for particular project management applications or cases have also been developed 
For instance; Abdel-Hamid (1984) built a system dynamics model of software 
development in which task progress is driven by the level of work force deployment and 
work force productivity.  The Abdel-Hamid model, like the one developed by Richardson 
and Pugh, incorporates the influence of schedule targets on performance, and also the 
distinction between initial completion and rework.  
 Rodrigues and Williams (1998) approach the problem of assessing the impact of 
client behavior in project performance using system dynamics, including modeling the 
effects of schedule restrictions, high demand on progress reports, and delays in approving 
documents and changes.  Lyneis et al. (2001) developed a comprehensive, strategic 
project management model incorporating much of the knowledge and experiences 
derived from the previous models discussed above, to assist project planning -including 
the initial schedule and budget, organization structure, and processes design- determining 
measurement and reward systems, assessing risks, and learning from past projects.  This 
model was successfully applied to the case of the Peace Shield Air Defense project, 
helping to support the bidding process, and identifying potential risks and the potential 
benefits and shortcomings of management policies to be implemented.  
 Ford and Sterman (1998a) elaborated a model that describes the dynamics 
involved in a product development project, which explicitly integrates four performance 
drivers -processes, structure, resources, targets and scope- in a multi-phase project 
network.  The model aims to study the role of dynamic concurrence and inter-phase 
coordination on project performance.  The model was built on the basis of previous 
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model structures, adapted to their particular objective, and then calibrated against a real-
life, multi-phase new product development project, to determine the quantitative 
parameters required to predict project behavior.  The behavior “predicted” by the model 
was found to be similar to a large extent to the real project. 
 Concerning applications to the inter-organizational collaboration problem, Black 
et al. (2003) studied the dynamics of multi-organizational collaboration in the context of 
information systems development, with an emphasis on factors such as trust, knowledge 
sharing and collaboration.  The model attempted to simulate the dynamics associated 
with the collaborative work accomplished by New York State and homeless services 
provider agencies, who were engaged in the process of developing specifications for an 
inter-organizational information system.  The model consists of three main components: 
(1) a basic project model -similar to those previously developed in the project 
management area- to represent the dynamics of doing work, (2) the participants’ stock of 
knowledge about their work and the partner’s work -and the resulting trust and 
engagement required to continue with the collaborative effort- and (3) the influence of 
facilitation efforts. In this model, the participants’ engagement or willingness to 
collaborate is a function of their sense of project progress -which depends on the 
perception of work done correctly and the sense of how hard the participants have 
worked to achieve project goals- and on the level of trust in the other participants. 
 A model related to the Black et al. model is the one developed by Luna et al. 
(2004) as a part of the same New York State University research program. The model 
attempted to simulate the dynamics associated with the development of trust among 
participants in inter-organizational collaborations.  The model represents a dyadic 
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situation in which participants in an inter-organizational collaboration observe the 
partner’s behavior and develop a certain level of trust through their interactions.  The 
model is based on the trust generation mechanisms suggested by Rousseau et al. (1998) 
discussed above: calculative, knowledge-based, and identification-based.  Based also on 
the Rousseau (1998) work and on field data, the model assumes that the calculative 
mechanism explains more of the trust development during the early stages of the 
collaborative relationship, evolving later to a knowledge-based trust development.  Trust 
is learned and reinforced (or reduced) as a product of the knowledge of partners’ past 
behaviors. 
 Supported by these three assumptions, the model defines trust as the weighted 
average of two perceived probabilities: calculative -based on the relationship between the 
perceived desirability of the collaboration to the risk involved and the participant attitude 
to risk- and the perception of partner’s trustworthiness -based on previous information 
and information obtained during the interactions. The weighting factor applied is the 
level of knowledge about the partner behavior and intentions. The higher the level of 
knowledge, the more the relative weight of the probability assigned to the partner’s 
trustworthiness.  The most important contribution derived from this model is that trust 
formation in collaborative contexts appears to be path dependent.  Trust development 
patterns tend to remain on the same trend along the duration of the collaborative effort 
with certain fluctuations.  Hence, the initial stages of the trust development seem to be 
crucial for the level of trust achieved during the collaboration. 
 Black et al. (2003) suggest the exploration of the diversity of dynamics possible 
when the collaborative effort produces a range of asymmetric benefits and costs for each 
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participant in the collaborative effort as an avenue for further research.  In this 
dissertation, that research avenue will be pursued from the perspective of multi-
organizational projects, where possible lack of goal alignment might create perceptions 
that the project outcomes are not producing the benefit expected by some or all 
participants involved. 
 
2.5 Summary 
 
Because a multi-organizational project is a particular case of collaborative effort, 
past research on goal alignment and inter-organizational collaboration was reviewed to 
identify theoretical propositions that could help to understand how the level of goal 
alignment affects multi-organizational projects performance.  In that review, trust among 
partners emerged as potentially significant factor affecting inter-organizational 
collaboration performance.  These propositions guided the case study research and then 
the conceptualization of the multi-organizational project system dynamics model, and 
constituted a preliminary description of the dynamic behavior of the multi-organizational 
project systems, or system’s “reference mode” (Pfahl and Lebsanft, 2000; Sterman, 
2000).  The assessment of these propositions was the focus of the case study as discussed 
in the next section concerning the dissertation’s research methodology.  
 Literature concerning project system dynamics models was also reviewed, because 
system dynamics was the approach selected for modeling the effect of goal alignment on 
multi-organizational project performance. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Chapter Overview 
 
A combination of case study inquiry and system dynamics methodology was 
selected to investigate the research question on which this dissertation is focused. 
Therefore, a significant part of the methodology discussed below entails the case study 
inquiry and the process of building a multi-organizational project system model.  This 
methodology also includes experimentation with the model, to study how the project 
dynamics induced by the level of goal alignment among the participants in a multi-
organizational project affects project performance.  
 This chapter starts with a brief account of how system dynamics proponents have 
conceptualized the model building process in previous research.  Because the proposed 
methodology is mostly based on qualitative data, this account includes a discussion about 
the importance, collection and use of qualitative data for model building.  Last, the 
specific methodology that was used to investigate the dissertation’s research problem is 
discussed.  
 
3.2   The System Dynamics Model Building Process 
 Since Jay Forrester introduced the system dynamics approach in the early 1960s; 
its proponents have developed procedures for the model building process (Richardson 
and Pugh, 1981; Roberts et al., 1983; Wolstenholme 1990; Sterman, 2000).  These and 
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other proponents have also suggested diverse arrangements of the activities involved in 
the model building process.  While in those arrangements vary in the number and 
denomination of the process stages, the activities included in those stages are mostly the 
same (Luna and Andersen, 2003).  In order to describe the model building process, the 
modeling stages proposed by Randers (1980), namely conceptualization, formulation, 
validation and implementation are used (see Fig. 3-1). 
 The conceptualization stage includes: problem definition and system 
conceptualization (Randers, 1980).  Problem definition is the verbal description and 
delimitation of the system to be studied, including a characterization of the variables 
involved.  System conceptualization is the verbal description of the system’s feedback 
loops that are assumed to cause the system’s variables behaviors.  Usually, these verbal 
descriptions are translated into influence diagrams showing the relationships between the 
system variables.  These descriptions are located primarily in the system participants’ 
mental models and also in the system documentation or written database.  Hence, it is 
required at the conceptualization stage to devise methods to get access to the system 
participants’ mental models (Richardson and Pugh, 1981; Forrester, 1994; Sterman, 
2000). 
 The formulation stage entails the definition of a detailed model structure, system 
parameters, and of the mathematical relationships between the variables.  Therefore, this 
stage is basically focused on collecting and analyzing a system’s quantitative data, such 
as numerical records of diverse system parameters, which would help to estimate the 
shape of the relationships between the system variables (Randers, 1980).  Nonetheless, 
qualitative concepts also might be formulated, especially in systems where “soft” 
46
variables such as customer satisfaction, trust, engagement, etc. are present (Luna and 
Andersen, 2003).  Richardson and Pugh (1981) propose that modelers working with 
qualitative concepts should define them explicitly, create units and measurement scales, 
and handle them consistently across the model.  
 
Figure 3-1:  The System Dynamics Modeling Process Stages 
 
Randers (1980) describes the validation stage as the process of reviewing whether 
the mechanisms included in the model actually generate the model variables behavior 
(reference mode), and if the assumptions made about relationships between the variables 
included in the model are reasonable.  However, validation of system dynamics models 
has been the subject of critics due to its reliance on subjective, informal and qualitative 
procedures (Barlas, 1996; Zellner, 1980). Part of the criticism originated in the fact that 
system dynamics models are causal-descriptive, constituted by a set of propositions about 
how the real systems actually operate.  In these cases, conventional statistical tests 
applied to determine the accuracy of the system’s outputs behaviors are not sufficient to 
determine the model validity. What is really important is the validity of the structure of 
the model (Barlas, 1996). 
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A system dynamics model is a theory about system functioning, and should not 
only predict its behavior, but also explain how this behavior is developed.  In other 
words, system dynamics models are not built for mere forecasting purposes, but also for 
explanatory purposes.  From statistical point of view, the testing of these models is 
extremely complicated, if not impossible, because each proposed causal link is a 
hypothesis and all these hypotheses are interrelated, generating problems of 
autocorrelation and multi-collinearity (Barlas, 1996). 
 However, there are several tests that can be used to assess the validity of a model. 
Structure-oriented tests assess the validity of the model structure.  Once the model 
structure has been validated, behavior oriented tests can be applied to assess the degree to 
which the model reproduces the model behavior.  These two categories are briefly 
described below. 
 
Structure-Oriented Tests 
 Tests included in this category are of two types: (1) direct structure tests and (2) 
structure-oriented behavior tests (Barlas, 1996).  Direct structure tests assess the validity 
of the model structure by comparing each element of the model with existing knowledge 
of the real system.  These tests can be theoretical or empirical.  The theoretical tests 
compare model structure with the knowledge existing in the literature.  Empirical tests 
compare model structure with information obtained from the real system.  Forrester and 
Senge (1980) describe the following direct-structure empirical tests:  
 Structure confirmation test: comparing the equations of the model with the 
relationships existing in the real system. 
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 Parameter confirmation test: compares the parameters of the model with 
knowledge of the real system. 
 Direct extreme-condition tests: assessing the validity of model equations under 
extreme conditions by comparing the model behavior with that expected from the 
real system behavior under these conditions.  
 Dimensional consistency test: checking both sides of each model equations for 
dimensional consistency. 
 The structure-oriented behavioral tests assess the validity of the model structure 
indirectly, applying behavior tests on the model-generated behaviors’ patterns (Barlas, 
1996). These tests are:  
 Indirect extreme conditions test: assigning extreme values to certain parameters 
and comparing the results of the simulation with the behavior of the real system 
under the same circumstances. 
 Behavior sensitivity test: determining the parameters to which the model is 
sensitive, running a simulation, and analyzing if the real system would behave in 
the same way  
 Turing test: a shuffled collection of real and simulated system behaviors are 
presented to experts and to see if the can distinguish between the real and 
simulated behavior. If these behaviors are statistically undistinguishable, the 
model passes the test.  
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Behavior-Oriented Test 
 Once confidence in the validity of the structure of the model has been built, some 
tests can be applied to assess how accurately the model can reproduce the real system 
behavior patterns.  The focus is on pattern prediction, not on variables’ values at certain 
points (Barlas, 1996).  A technique to validate system dynamics models used in project 
management applications is to “calibrate” the model parameters against the data of a past 
project and then simulate the project behavior.  The simulation outputs are then compared 
with the past project actual patterns behavior, to assess to what extent the model is able to 
reproduce them (Ford and Sterman, 1998).  
 The last stage in the modeling process is the implementation stage, which Randers 
(1980) conceptualizes as the transfer of the study insights to the model’s users and the 
application of the model to system analysis and policy formulation. In the case of 
academic research, I consider that the implementation stage should include two basic 
activities.  The first activity is to perform experiments with the model in order to find 
how certain variables of interest affect the system’s dynamics and variables’ behavior.  
The second activity is the elaboration of a proper model documentation, which will help 
future researchers to build on the results of the study to conduct future research or to 
attempt to replicate the study in other contexts. 
 
3.3 Collecting and Using Qualitative Data for System Dynamics 
Model Building 
 System dynamics models are mathematical representations of the dynamic 
relationships between the components of a system.  However, it is widely accepted that 
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most of the information available for the model building process, as described in the 
previous section, is qualitative in nature (Forrester, 1994; Luna and Andersen, 2003). 
Forrester suggests that these qualitative data are located in two databases: in a written 
database (system documentation) and in a mental database (the system actors' minds). 
Moreover, Forrester states that the most important information source for the modeler is 
the system actors’ mental database. This assessment by Forrester is shared by most 
system dynamics scholars (Richardson and Pugh, 1981; Roberts et al. 1983; 
Wolstenholme, 1990; Sterman, 2000). 
 However, there is not a similar agreement on how to collect the data residing in 
the mental databases or on how to use this data (Vennix, 1996; Luna and Andersen, 
2003).  The problems derived from the quantification of qualitative variables have led 
some researchers to adopt an only qualitative approach to system dynamics 
(Wolstenholme, 1990).  Others consider that the results of simulations based on models 
that include quantified qualitative variables might be misleading, and these researchers 
discard the inclusion of all soft variables in the models (Coyle, 2000).  On the other hand, 
it is generally accepted that, as discussed above, qualitative data play a main role in the 
conceptualization stage, while quantitative data play a more significant role in the 
formulation stage (Coyle, 2000; Sterman, 2000).  
 Amid the debate about the appropriateness of the use of qualitative data in system 
dynamics modeling, Sterman (2002) proposes that not considering qualitative variables in 
a model because no numerical data is available to measure them is probably worse than 
using judgment to estimate their value.  “Omitting concepts because we have no 
numerical data is a sure route to narrow model boundaries, biased results, and policy 
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resistance. Of course, we must evaluate the sensitivity of our results to uncertainty in 
assumptions … modelers who follow these principles owe no apology to those who 
would judge model validity by historical fit and statistical test alone” (Sterman, 2002, 
p.523). 
 However, Sterman (2002) also argues for the use of statistical methods to 
estimate model parameters and evaluate the ability of the model to replicate historical 
data, whenever numerical data is available.  In conclusion, Sterman argues that 
quantitative data should be used when available to measure rigorously defined variables, 
but variables relevant to explain the system dynamics should not be discarded simply 
because numerical data is not available to measure them. 
 More recently, Luna and Andersen (2003) made an extensive account of methods 
used to collect and analyze qualitative data for model building, including the estimation 
of system parameters when no numerical data is available.  For collecting the qualitative 
data residing in systems actors’ mental models, the most used methods, as cited by Luna 
and Andersen, are interviews, focus groups, Delphi groups, observation, and participant 
observation.  Interviews are among the most important tools for data collection in social 
sciences, allowing direct interaction between the researcher and the respondents.  The 
role of the researcher in an interview is to guide the dialogue toward the study line of 
inquiry, but allowing the interviewee to tell stories, provide examples, or clarify points. 
Focus groups are group interviews in which group members interact among themselves, 
exchanging opinions about the subject studied.  Delphi groups are similar to focus 
groups, but with repeated iterations of the intervention while providing feedback to the 
group, in order to obtain group consensus.  Observation entails capturing information 
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about the social structure, processes, and culture, etc. of a certain group, without direct 
participation of the researcher in the environment dynamics.  Finally, in the participant 
observation method, the researcher interacts with the studied situation to collect the 
required data. 
 Regarding the methods to analyze qualitative data, Luna and Andersen discussed 
several methods, including hermeneutics/discourse analysis, grounded theory, 
ethnographic decision models, and content analysis.  Hermeneutics/discourse analysis 
consists in finding meaning in a textual database, and connecting this meaning to the 
cultural context. Grounded theory is a set of techniques to identify themes or concepts in 
texts, linking them to generate meaningful theories about the system observed.  An 
ethnographic decision model entails building decision trees describing decision 
alternatives and the processes to make the decisions.  Finally, content analysis consists in 
defining codes to classify contents and then applying them systematically to a group of 
texts.  These methods can be used alone or combined to analyze the data collected from 
the system actors’ mental models and from other system documentation. 
 As mentioned above, in some cases there is not numerical data available to 
estimate system parameters or the shape of the relationships among system variables 
(Richardson and Pugh, 1981).  Qualitative methods have been used to approach this 
problem.  The Delphi method can be successful in eliciting parameters from a group of 
system experts (Luna and Andersen, 2003).  The modeler can ask the experts about their 
estimation for a certain parameter.  After collecting the individual judgments, the modeler 
provides a summary feedback to the experts, who should rethink their initial judgment 
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based on the received feedback.  The process is repeated until consensus is reached 
concerning an estimate for the parameter. 
 Ford and Sterman (1998b) propose a method for defining the probable shape of 
unknown relationships between system variables.  This approach consists in asking 
experts to create graphic depictions of the relationships in two stages.  First, they are 
asked to think of certain “anchoring points” or distinctive points like maximums or 
minimums.  Then, the experts should think how these points are connected.  Ford and 
Sterman argue that this two-step method contributes to improved knowledge elicitation 
by reducing the cognitive processing required in each stage, and that the two stage 
method slows the elicitation process, giving more time for thinking and revision. 
 In the following section, the research methodology that was used to investigate 
the research problem is presented. This methodology includes some of the techniques 
discussed in this section to collect and analyze the qualitative data required to build the 
multi-organizational project system dynamics model.   
 
3.4    Study Research Methodology 
 The research methodology employed in this study combined the case study 
empirical inquiry with the system dynamics approach (see Fig.3-2).  The strategy 
consisted in analyzing multi-organizational projects’ cases in which variations of the 
level of goal alignment had taken place, in order to formulate a theory expressed in the 
form of a system dynamics model that describes how the level of goal alignment affect 
project performance.  The case data collection and analysis was guided by the assessment 
of the case study preliminary propositions as formulated in the previous chapter.  An 
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assessment of the validity of the theory developed was performed by participants in the 
studied projects and by individuals with experience in other multi-organizational projects, 
to evaluate the extent to which the theory developed is generalizable. Simulation 
experiments were performed to assess to what extent the model elaborated reproduced 
plausible multi-organizational projects behaviors according to the cases data, and to 
explore the effect of possible moderating factors. 
 
Figure 3-2: The Proposed Research Methodology 
3.4.1 Rationale for the Approach 
 
The case study and system dynamics modeling approach was suitable for this 
research because:  
 “A case study is an empirical research approach that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within a real life context when the boundaries between the context 
and the phenomenon are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2003, p.13). Multi-
organizational projects are contemporary phenomena -many of them are currently 
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being executed, and many have been executed in the recent past.  Therefore, it is 
likely that there are still individuals involved in that kind of project and available 
for interviewing, as well as project documentation available.  Multi-organizational 
projects are phenomena that develop within the context of the participant 
organizations and their own strategic and operational circumstances, and it can be 
difficult to define the borders between the project and its context due to the 
mutual relationships that affect one and the other. 
 The research question on which this study focused was a “how” question. In other 
words, the purpose of the research was to develop an explanation about how the 
level of alignment affects multi-organizational projects performance.  Case 
studies are suitable for that kind of explanatory questions because they permit a 
researcher to deal with cause-effect links that should be traced along a certain 
span of time, rather than the simple frequency or incidence of certain variables 
(Yin, 2003).  
 The case study approach is preferred when relevant behaviors cannot be 
manipulated, in other words, when the research question is not suitable of being 
investigated through experiments or quasi-experiments (Yin, 2003).  As 
mentioned above, multi-organizational projects are complex phenomena subject 
to the influence of variables related to the participant organizations’ contexts. 
These influences are varied and disparate in nature, and very difficult to control or 
to simulate outside of the real-life context. 
 Case study research usually provides context-rich stories relevant to the 
practitioner (Luna, 2004).  Because case studies collect data from real-life 
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settings, their findings and lessons learned might be very useful to practitioners 
dealing with similar situations. 
 However, when compared with more established research strategies, case studies 
have been criticized for the following motives:  
 Case studies can be more susceptible to problems associated with bias, lack of 
systematic procedures, inclusion of non-sustainable evidence, and researcher’s 
sloppiness in general, mostly because case studies lack a rigorous and reliable 
methodology (Yin, 2003). 
 Because the case study strategy collects data from a single case or only a few 
cases, it gives little support for the generalization of their findings to other 
contexts (Yin, 2003). 
 Case study outcomes are, in many cases, long and unreadable documents (Yin, 
2003). When presented in a traditional report way, many case studies lose value 
for practitioners and even for researchers. 
 It is difficult to replicate a case study, arriving at similar findings or conclusions 
in subsequent research (Luna, 2004) 
 Because in most cases control of variables is not possible while conducting case 
studies, it is difficult to make controlled deductions (Luna, 2004).  In many cases 
is not possible to assess the contribution of specific variables to the system 
studied outcomes.  
 To overcome the case study limitations as described above, some researchers have 
combined the case study strategy with simulation modeling in their research designs.  For 
example, Black (2002) and Luna (2004) employed a combination of case study and 
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system dynamics modeling to study the dynamics of collaboration in the healthcare/new 
product development and multi-organizational information systems settings.  The 
combination of the system dynamics and case study approaches can contribute to 
overcome some of the case study limitations: 
 Simulation models can preserve the richness of knowledge contained in the case 
study findings (Luna, 2004), providing a structured way to describe the complex 
interrelationships among the case study’s variables. 
 Case study research strategies supersede the static view of quantitative research 
on social phenomena, concentrating on analyzing the dynamics present in single 
settings (Eisenhardt, 2002).  These dynamics could be properly depicted through a 
system dynamics model. 
 The data collected through case study research can be in many cases mostly 
verbal, with some ambiguity embedded.  However, the mathematical nature of the 
system dynamics method forces the researcher to be specific and precise in 
defining the causal dynamic mechanisms that translate a verbal theory and 
empirical data collected into a model. (Hanneman and Patrick, 1997) 
 Like experiments, case studies are generalizable to theoretical propositions and 
not to populations.  A case study does not represent a sample, and in doing a case 
study the goal is to expand and generalize theories and not to enumerate 
frequencies (Yin, 2003).  The system dynamics model derived from a case study 
can be applied to similar phenomena in other contexts to assess the 
generalizability of the theory developed about the system’s behavior (Luna, 
2004). 
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 Simulation models can be useful to extend what is learned from case studies 
(McCaffrey et al., 1985). System dynamics can help to perform simulation 
experiments to analyze the impact of changes in relevant variables and provides 
explicit cause-effect relationships drawn from the analysis of qualitative data 
(Luna, 2004).  Hence, the use of system dynamics may help to control and 
manipulate system’s variables that in real life cannot be controlled, and might 
help to assess their individual impact on the system’s outcomes.  This feature 
might contribute to some extent address the case study limitation concerning the 
lack of control of variables in real-life settings. 
 A holistic perspective of a studied system is an advantage of case studies 
(Gummenson, 2000), as well as of the system dynamics approach. Both 
approaches attempt to understand the analyzed system as a whole, with all the 
variables interacting among them, in order to develop a comprehensive theory, 
rather than a segmented one, of how the system operates. 
 
3.4.2 Research Methodology Description 
 The research methodology entailed the completion of the following activities: 
 Preparation of the case study protocol 
 Cases selection 
 Data collection 
 Data analysis and modeling process. 
 Model validation. 
 Simulation experiments. 
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 Model documentation. 
 
Preparation of the Case Study Protocol 
 In order to guide the research effort and increase the study reliability, a case 
study protocol was prepared, so future researchers can follow the procedure to replicate 
the study (Yin, 2003).  The protocol contained the following parts:  
 Introduction: case study question, theoretical framework and propositions  
 Criteria for the selection of the case. 
 Data collection procedures, including interviews protocols and criteria to 
use documentation related to the case. 
 Data analysis strategy and techniques. 
 Description of the case database, including how the data was collected, 
classified and stored for better accessibility.   
 
Case Selection 
 Case selection was based on two criteria.  The first criterion is accessibility, or the 
degree to which individuals involved in the case, as well as the project documentation 
were available for interviewing and examination, respectively. The second criterion is 
akin to the concept of theoretical sampling suggested by Eisenhardt (2002), establishing 
that the case selected should be the one with more potential to provide data related to the 
research question. In this case, this criterion was defined as follows: 
 Significant variations of the project goal alignment level have been reported. 
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 The project lasted long enough (more than a year), so that to make the dynamics 
induced by variations in the level of goal alignment were apparent.  Shorter 
project durations might not have allowed these dynamics to fully develop. 
 Cases in which the relationship between the organizations participating in the 
project is a collaborative relationship were preferred. In other words, cases were 
favored for selection when the organizations involved were partners, not clients 
and contractors. Because a client–contractor relationship is a hierarchical one 
governed by contracts, the possible impact of lack of alignment toward project 
goals might be significantly reduced. 
 To find the potential cases, I relied on four basic sources: 
• Businesses and organizations connected with the Industrial Engineering and 
Management Department at Oklahoma State University. 
• Part-time students of the Master of Science in Engineering and Technology 
Management program at Oklahoma State University. 
• Personal contacts. 
• Professional organizations. 
 A brief description of the project was requested from the authorized organization’s 
officials to assess to what extent potential multi-organizational projects cases met the 
criteria established above.  Due to particular circumstances associated with the research 
subject, it was not easy to find multi-organizational projects cases to analyze.  More than 
40 individuals with experience in multi-organizational projects were contacted through 
the Oklahoma State University Master of Science in Engineering and Technology 
Management program and through personal contacts within several industries and project 
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management consulting firms.  Only two were willing to contribute with specific cases. 
Most individuals wanted to discuss their experiences with multi-organizational projects in 
a “generic” way, but not their specific experiences in particular projects.  It seemed that 
even though complete confidentiality was assured, they did not want to take the risk that 
their opinions about certain organizations or individuals might become public.  In most 
cases, those organizations or individuals are, or could be, potential partners or customers 
in new businesses, and the interviewees did not want to hurt their relationship with them. 
 
Data Collection 
 To collect the data required to answer the research question, I had intended to use 
two sources of evidence: interviews with individuals involved in the project and project 
documentation review. The data collection process was guided by the study line of 
inquiry (Yin, 2003).  Hence, the data collection process was oriented to assess the 
validity of the study propositions. 
 In the dissertation proposal, I anticipated that four to eight individuals directly 
involved in the multi-organizational project studied were going to be interviewed.  These 
individuals should be from at least two different organizations, preferably with different 
roles in the project -project sponsors, project managers, project engineers- to introduce 
different perspectives that might enrich the data collected.  Moreover, the interviewees 
should have worked on the project for at least 50% of its duration.  However, within the 
cases I was able to use for the study, I faced limitations for the data collection effort.  
First, for reasons stated above, individuals coming from the different organizations were 
very concern about the confidentiality of the data, and I had a hard time to convince them 
62
to participate.  In one case, two of the organizations involved prohibited their employees 
from participating in the study.  Then, I was only able to interview three individuals from 
the other organization involved, and one from a project contractor.  In the other case, I 
was able to interview individuals from all partners involved -three from one partner, and 
one for each of the other two. 
 To make sure that all the interviews were conducted in a way that addressed the 
pursued line of inquiry and that the data collected through them is comparable, an 
interview protocol was prepared.  The interviews were conducted as a fluid conversation 
rather than as a structured survey (Yin, 2003).  Questions were designed to elicit the 
interviewees’ recollections and opinions that might support or question the study 
propositions, and were open-ended to allow the interviewees to extend on points they 
consider relevant to the issues discussed.  During the conversation, questions were asked 
in a non-leading way to minimize possible bias (Yin, 2003).  For example, “how” 
questions were preferred over “why” questions, in order to avoid provoking defensive 
responses.  Moreover, the “how” questions were formulated in a neutral way, not leading 
to confirmation or rejection of the study proposition.  The interview protocols are shown 
in the appendix A.  Finally, during the interview, questions were asked about other 
people who might have potentially relevant information for the case, or about documents 
that might support the points made during the interview.  The interviews lasted between 
one and two hours.  They were recorded with the permission of the interviewees, and a 
guarantee of confidentiality was provided. Transcripts of the interviews were elaborated 
and compared to the original recordings to ensure their accuracy. In some cases, the 
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interviewees were contacted later again during the data analysis phase for clarification of 
certain points or when contradictory data was found. 
 In case studies, it is always recommended to use different sources of evidence for 
triangulation (Yin, 2003).  In this study, besides conducting the interviews, 
documentation related to the project studied was required to conduct the triangulation 
strategy. This documentation entailed project reports, meetings minutes, communications, 
memoranda, etc.  However, that documentation was not accessible for confidentiality 
reasons.  Hence, performing a triangulation strategy with interviews and the analysis of 
written documentation was not possible.  In order to get more data and different sources 
of evidence to elaborate the model, I applied a replication strategy using two cases for 
study instead of the one I stated I was going to use in the dissertation proposal, (Yin, 
2003)   
 
Data Analysis and Modeling Process  
 Yin (2003) suggests that potential difficulties in the data analysis process which 
might rise while conducting case studies can be reduced if a general strategy for 
analyzing the data -such as the assessment of theoretical propositions, definition of rival 
explanations or elaboration of descriptive frameworks-is used.  The application of a 
certain strategy for data analysis leads to the selection of a particular analytic technique -
like pattern matching, explanation building, time-series analysis, logic models, and cross-
cases’ synthesis.  For example, if the assessment of theoretical propositions is the data 
analysis strategy selected, and these propositions constitute a predicted pattern of case 
outcomes, pattern matching should be the analytic technique to be selected.  If the pattern 
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based on the data collected matches the pattern found in the study propositions, then the 
potential validity of the case study propositions is enhanced. 
 It is important to select the strategy for data analysis and the analytic technique 
before the data collection process.  Data collection should be guided by the data analysis 
strategy, defining what data should be collected and how it should be organized.  
Otherwise, the data analysis process will be very difficult to accomplish (Yin, 2003). 
 In this study, preliminary propositions were elaborated based on previous research 
on goal alignment, collaboration theory, and system dynamics applications to project 
management.  The case propositions reflected a hypothesized basic pattern of behavior of 
a multi-organizational project system under the influence of the level of project goal 
alignment among the participant organizations.  Hence, the general strategy selected to 
analyze the data was the assessment of these case propositions.  
 Because the study propositions defined a pattern of system behavior or reference 
mode, the pattern matching analytic technique was used.  Therefore, the analysis of the 
case empirical data was oriented to support or challenge the multi-organizational 
projects’ system behavior affected by the level of goal alignment, as defined by the study 
propositions.  Content analysis was performed to classify the data collected according to 
their link to the study propositions.  Then, the cause-effect links that constituted the 
pattern described by the study propositions were confirmed, modified, extended or 
eliminated according to the evidence obtained through the data collection and analysis 
processes.  Moreover, new cause–effect links were added to the reference mode. The 
cause-effect links defined as a result of the case data analysis, along with the basic project 
feedback structures as described in Chapter 2, constitute the multi-organizational project 
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system dynamics model that depicts the explanations developed while conducting the 
case study. 
 Because replication strategy was adopted, a cross-case analysis was performed 
based on the degree to which the data collected for each case supported or challenged the 
study propositions.  The cross-case analysis allowed identifying patterns across the cases’ 
data (Yin, 2003). When data collected for both cases supported or challenged a certain 
proposition, it provided more confidence on the derived conclusions. 
 
Model Validation 
 During the analysis of the case data, the preliminary dynamic structure as 
described in the study propositions was contrasted with the empirical data collected from 
the projects studied.  In other words, the model’s structures that resulted from the case 
data analysis were to some degree validated for these particular cases.  However, once the 
new model was completed, a questionnaire was sent to the same individuals in order to 
assess the model.  The questionnaire contained verbalized statements and graphics 
describing the basic model feedback structures (Appendix B).  The questionnaire asked 
subjects to assess the extent to which the model structure reflected their experiences in 
the project.  If the data collected uncovered significant discrepancies between the model 
structure and the interviewee’s experiences, follow-up contacts were performed to clarify 
the points.  Minor discrepancies were also reported and their possible impacts on the 
model were analyzed.               
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Direct extreme-condition tests were carried out as described in Chapter 6 to 
increase the confidence in the model structure.  The results of these tests were analyzed 
and reported. 
 In the dissertation proposal, I suggested the use of a second case to evaluate the 
validity of the model developed in other multi-organizational project.  However, as I 
mentioned above, I contacted a group of individuals with experience in multi-
organizational projects in diverse sectors who were willing to cooperate with the study, 
but not willing to discuss a particular case.  I used their experiences to assess the possible 
applicability of the theory developed in other multi-organizational projects.  The second 
case was used as a replication to provide additional data to elaborate the preliminary 
model, and was used for comparison in order to enhance the confidence on the findings. 
 The model’s assessment by the panel of experts was conducted using the same 
questionnaire protocol employed for the assessment of the model by the participants in 
the cases, but including the two models developed (see Appendix B). Before sending the 
questionnaires, I requested the experts to send me evidence of their experience with 
multi-organizational projects. I included in the panel only individuals who had 
participated in more than two multi-organizational projects. The panel was asked to 
compare their experiences within multi-organizational projects to the verbalized model 
structures. The data collected were analyzed to show significant matches and 
discrepancies between the model structure and the experts’ experiences. Several 
discrepancies were reported and their probable causes and impact on the model’s 
structure and behavior were analyzed. These discrepancies might constitute alternative 
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explanations about how the level of goal alignment affects project performance in multi-
organizational projects, and would constitute the subject of further research. 
 Finally, the model’s structure was assessed from the perspective of previous 
related research findings -for example, findings in multi-organizational collaboration, 
alliances’ behavior, and system dynamics applications concerning project dynamics and 
collaboration.  Coincidences and discrepancies were analyzed to assess the degree to 
which past research findings supported or challenged the proposed model’s structure. 
 
Simulation Experiments 
 To understand how the level of goal alignment affected multi-organizational 
projects dynamics and performance, simulation experiments with the system dynamics 
model were conducted to analyze the impact of variations in certain variables.  The 
system dynamics modeling software allowed conducting controlled experiments or 
sensitivity analysis that permitted certain model variables to vary while keeping others 
constant.  The logic of these experiments was to select sets of variables to be manipulated 
- for example, setting those variables in high-low modes, in a combinatory way-, and then 
assessing the impact of these manipulations on the model outputs.  After all variables of 
theoretical interest were manipulated, an assessment was made of the model behavior and 
the degree to which it resembled plausible project system behaviors based on the cases  
 The rationale for the experiments’ design, including the criteria for selection and 
combination of the variables to be manipulated, is discussed in Chapter 6 of this 
dissertation.  An analysis of the experiments’ outcomes from a perspective concerning to 
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the impact of goal alignment in multi-organizational project dynamics and performance is 
also incorporated. 
 
Model Documentation  
 Model documentation entails making available for future researchers the case 
study protocol as previously described, the model’s mathematical formulation, and the 
evidence of support for every cause-effect link in the model.  Hence, the data collected 
during the case study was organized and displayed to show the link between every model 
feedback structure and the data.  Chapter 5 is dedicated to model’s description 
 
3.4.3   Research Methodology Limitations  
 Limitations of the proposed research methodology are discussed below: 
 The case study research strategy has been criticized for the limited 
generalizability of the study’s’ findings.  However, a significant part of this 
criticism is based on the application of the “sampling” logic to case studies, while 
what is applicable to case studies is the “replication” logic (Yin, 2003). The 
sampling logic applied in survey studies is based on the definition of a population 
from which, through a statistical procedure, a sample is selected. From the data 
collected in this sample, statistical inferences about the population characteristics 
can be made.  In case studies, this logic is not applicable. For example, in this 
particular case, it is impossible to define a “population of multi-organizational 
projects” to be sampled.  Conversely, “replication” logic views every case study 
like an “experiment,” which can be replicated to assess the validity of the findings 
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in similar or contrasting contexts.  In a case study, a theory is developed about the 
observed phenomena. The generalizability of this theory is tested through 
replications of the study.  This is called analytic generalization, in contrast to the 
statistical generalization associated with surveys studies (Yin, 2003).  In this 
research, an explanation about how the level of goal alignment affected project 
performance was developed -through a first case study- and expressed in a system 
dynamics model.  If, the theory developed is still useful to explain how the level 
of goal alignment affected multi-organizational projects performance in a second 
case, then there is an indication that the theory has a potential for generalizability. 
Moreover, this potential can be increased with the accomplishment of more case 
studies on different multi-organizational projects. On each case new lessons can 
be learned and the system dynamics model can be improved, again increasing its 
potential generalizability. 
 Difficulties were faced while finding cases that met the case selection criteria, and 
in gaining accessibility to individuals and data within the cases. The 
accomplishment of the study required having access to eight different 
organizations.  Lack of time for interviews and confidentiality issues hindered the 
data collection effort. To encourage participation, the research effort was 
presented as a learning opportunity for the organizations and individuals involved. 
In addition, copies of the dissertation final report, a presentation of the findings, 
and a discussion of the implication of the findings for each organization was 
offered to the participating organizations.  Another problem observed during the 
data analysis was the divergence between the data collected from the individuals 
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with different roles in the project.  Project managers had the tendency to report 
higher levels of team processes and a more positive view of project outcomes than 
other project team members.  This problem has been reported in other studies 
(McComb et al., 1999; Larson and LaFasto, 1989). This problem might have 
introduced some bias in the analysis.  
 The use of theoretical propositions to guide the data collection and analysis might 
limit the possibilities of finding alternative explanations to the studied phenomena 
(Luna, 2004).  The use of theory to guide a case study might cause the researcher 
to see only evidence that confirms that theory (Walsham, 1995).  The researcher 
should be aware of this and question why some data are used and other data are 
not.  The researcher should always look for alternative explanations to the studied 
phenomena. 
 
3.5 Summary 
 A combination of case study inquiry with system dynamics modeling was the 
methodology selected to investigate the study research question.  The case study inquiry 
is best suited to answer “how” research questions, as the one on which this research was 
focused. System dynamics modeling provides a tool to present the research findings in a 
way that allows performing experiments to analyze the factors involved and their possible 
interactions.  Hence, the principles of case studies research and system dynamics 
modeling were described in this chapter.  Limitations of the methodology adopted and 
problems encountered during the data collection and analysis were also discussed, as well 
as the strategies used to overcome them. 
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CHAPTER 4: CASES DESCRIPTIONS AND ANALYSIS 
 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
 In this chapter, a description of the cases based on the data collected is presented. 
These descriptions encompass a brief discussion of the contexts in which the cases were 
embedded and the project dynamics induced by the level of goal alignment between 
partners. Because some of the information presented in the descriptions  are considered 
sensitive by the parties involved, and in order to preserve the required level of 
confidentiality, no organization or individual are mentioned by its real name, and no 
observations or opinions advanced by the subjects are literally transcribed. 
 In addition, this chapter includes an analysis of the cases’ data. That analysis was 
performed as described in the research methodology section. The cases’ data were 
contrasted to the study propositions, in order to check if the data collected supported or 
challenged them.  Data analysis also included the discussion of how the level of goal 
alignment affected the typical project dynamics as described by Ford (1995) and 
presented in the literature review chapter.  The results of the cases’ data analysis provided 
the base for the development of the system dynamics model that represented the multi-
organizational project system dynamics. 
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4.2 Case 1 Description 
The first case studied (case 1) is a project accomplished by major aerospace 
company (Partner 1) that the Department of Defense contracted with to develop an 
aviation control system, including hardware and software elements.  Partner 1 hired an 
advanced research organization (Partner 2) to incorporate state-of-the-art technology into 
the system.  In addition, because of a customer requirement, Partner 1 also hired a 
military organization that is also an end user of the system developed (Partner 3). 
 Therefore, under the contract, Partner 3 is also an end user of the product to be 
developed.  Moreover, Partner 3 was starting to perform some of the Partner 2’s specialty 
jobs and Partner 2 has started to perceive Partner 3 as a potential competitor.  These 
particular roles, structures, and relationships between partners impacted the level of goal 
alignment, with consequences to the execution of the project (see Fig.4-1) 
 There was no misalignment among partners concerning the overall cost and 
schedule goals.  Partner 1, as the leader of the project, set the cost and schedule goals 
according to the contract signed.  All parties understood that the project should be 
completed within a specified period of time and agreed with that deadline.  However, a 
lack of common understanding -like the number and nature of the task and subtasks 
required for the completion of the scope- generated disagreements on project costs and 
required funding.  Sometimes, partners did not understand the scope and therefore 
underestimated the resources required, thereby not having the resources required to 
perform certain tasks at the time required.  Not enough time and effort was put into 
requirements definition, and then only overall, not specific, goals were defined. 
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Figure 4-1: Partners’ Roles, Relationships and Priorities’ Levels in Case 1  
 
Moreover, in some cases, partners did not agree as to the time required to 
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schedule, schedule was sacrificed for scope.  Nonetheless, sometimes Partner 3, as an end 
user, wanted to go beyond the specified scope to satisfy to the largest extent possible its 
requirements for the project.  This scope pressure was a consequence of defining 
requirements at a high level, leading to a certain degree of ambiguity and lack of a clear 
or shared interpretation of the project requirements. 
 On the other hand, there was a perception among Partner 3’s project team 
members that some features were taken out of the final product in order to avoid 
addressing some quality issues and to prevent further delays.  These features would be 
added in future versions of the product.  Also, it was hard to understand for some project 
team members that the introduction of some certain features in the final product would 
require an amount of time and resources that was beyond the project’s budget.  This 
situation led to unfulfilled expectations and some degree of frustration among some 
Partner 3’s project team members, who would have liked to see all the features included 
in the product as soon as possible.  On the other hand, Partner 2 was pressing to include 
scope not directly related to end user needs, but favored the development of certain 
technologies that Partner 2 had an interest in .  This also contributed to Partner 3 level of 
frustration.  
 There was a significant misalignment concerning the project quality goals.  Partner 
3’s project team members wanted to maximize quality for the end user, with less regard 
for the cost or schedule goals.  On the other hand, Partner 1 was interested in delivering a 
product with the quality specified by the customer, but also considering cost and 
schedule.  Partner 1 wanted to maximize profits and to continue doing business with the 
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project owner.  Partner 2 was interested in delivering a quality product according to the 
customer’s defined requirements. 
 Hence, there was neither a common understanding of quality, nor any common 
criteria for the quality-cost-schedule trade-off.  Because Partner 3 was going to be a final 
user of the product, for that organization quality was more important than project cost or 
schedule.  For Partners 1 and 2, cost and schedule goals had the same level of priority as 
quality.  Moreover, there was not a set of common quality standards defined.  For 
example, there were not common standards about how many comments should be 
included in software line, how to include them, or about the revision procedures to 
follow.  Quality actions had different meanings for the participant organizations.  
Therefore, clear definitions of these quality actions and documented standards were 
required.  But the rush to start the project activities prevented the project team from 
preparing those quality definitions and standards.  Partner 2, therefore, pursued only the 
quality objectives as specified in the contract; and because there was a lack of clear 
requirements at a workable level of detail, those quality objectives were subject to some 
degree of interpretation.  Conversely, Partner 3 wanted to exert all the effort required to 
pursue maximum quality according to the end user needs, despite of what was specified 
in the contract. 
 The lack of goal alignment between Partners 2 and 3 regarding the quality goals 
generated low morale among their project team members.  The perception of  unfulfilled 
expectations regarding quality and scope by Partner 3 increased the level of animosity 
between Partners 2 and 3’s project team members, thereby reducing the level of trust and 
communication.  Comments from a partner about quality issues in the work performed 
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for another partner, caused the affected partner to comment on work performed by the 
other, creating a dynamic of mutual criticism that generated bitterness and reduced 
mutual trust.  Also, a perceived low capacity to perform certain tasks affected the level of 
trust between partners. 
 An additional problem related to trust and communication that was present 
during project execution was lack of respect.  Partner 3’s project team members 
perceived Partner 2 as not completely trustworthy.  Partner 2 was perceived as not having 
the same commitment to quality, and not providing the required quality checks.  On the 
other hand, Partner 2 sometimes perceived Partner 3 to be somewhat less technically 
skilled in certain areas.  These perceptions sometimes influenced the way partners were 
treated –for example, tone of voice and emails.  Hence, perceived lack of respect led to 
low levels of trust.  Lack of trust reduced the level of communication.  
 The level of trust affected both the frequency and content of communication 
between Partners 2 and 3.  When trust was low there was not much communication, and 
when communications occurred, it did not have much useful content.  Team members 
started to think about the possible reactions of partners to the communications and 
hesitated about what to say.  In addition, Partner 2 seemed to restrain the flow of 
information, because Partner 2 saw Partner 3 as a possible future competitor.  Partner 2 
thought that if Partner 3 gained certain know-how, Partner 2’s services might not be 
needed in the future.  Partner 2 hesitated in several occasions to supply required 
information to Partner 3.  This led to a perceived lack of transparency in communications 
between Partners 2 and 3, although Partner 3 had been warned by Partner 1 about the 
limitations in the information to be provided by Partner 2.  The perceived lack of 
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transparency in communications affected the level of trust.  Despite those limitations, 
Partner 1 tried to keep the level of trust and communications high by involving every 
party in all communications, in order to reduce the perceived secrecy or lack of 
transparency.  Hence, the level of communications between Partner 1 and Partner 2 and 
between Partner 1 and Partner 3 was good along the project execution. 
 Other factors were mentioned as affecting the level of trust and communications. 
In a positive way, the fact that Partners 2 and 3’s project team members knew each other 
well from past projects contributed to increase somewhat the level of trust and 
communication.  In contrast, sometimes preconceived notions about a partner hindered 
communications.  Lack of co-location was also mentioned as a factor affecting 
communications between the project team members belonging to the different 
participating organizations.  In some cases, people misunderstood messages -due to 
different speech or email taken in a way that the sender did not intend.  Non-verbal 
signals were also important.  Lack of personal contact influenced the level of trust.  The 
fact that the parties were not co-located to some extent prevented the project team 
members from different organizations to develop a working relationship.  Lack of co-
location also affected the frequency of communications.  Project team members did not 
communicate on daily basis.  Communications took place in average every three days. 
This caused some project team members to not have been properly informed about what 
other team members were doing. 
 There were some cultural issues.  Partner 2 is a R&D organization, and Partner 1 
was a production oriented organization.  Partner 2 was therefore driven by technical 
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accuracy, and the Partner 1 was driven by reducing time to completion.  Partner 1 was 
also driven by accuracy, but time to completion was their main priority. 
 Communication issues introduced schedule slippage, because documentation that 
partners had to deliver to other partners did not arrive on time.  This caused the recipient 
partners to delay the execution of the associated tasks.  Sometimes the delays in receiving 
input from other partners led to working with preliminary information, which was 
changed later, thereby introducing rework, and producing schedule slippage, schedule 
pressure and more quality problems.  Communication problems also affected the 
accuracy of the content of the information exchanged and product quality.  Finally, the 
low level of communication impacted the understanding of inter-organizational working 
processes, affecting the deployment of resources on a timely basis.  Partners often did not 
exactly know when sub-products were required by other partners. 
. The participating organizations conducted mutual project reviews.  The level of 
animosity generated by the lack of perceived quality and scope goal alignment sometimes 
led to conflicts in the reviews and, in many cases, the pointing out of non-significant 
issues.  When a partner called attention to some defects, the affected partner would 
answer focusing on non-significant problems in the other partner’s work.  Pride and 
jealousy were significant factors in these dynamics.  In some cases these conflicts went 
out of proportion, causing delays. Review conflicts also took effort and time from 
productive work, negatively impacting the progress in project tasks.  The project is still 
work in progress.  The product has been hold back for about a year. 
 Summarizing, the factors discussed during the interviews that affected goal 
alignment and project performance were: (1) the lack of clearly defined and documented 
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project requirements, (2) and the lack of effective conflict resolution mechanisms.  The 
pressure to start the project prevented management from defining project objectives at a 
detailed level, reducing the ambiguity and misinterpretation of the requirements.  Lack of 
clear requirements affected the level of alignment, because it was not apparent what 
objectives toward which the participant organizations should be aligned.  This, in turn, 
allowed Partner 3 to push for more scope and higher quality.  Lack of clear goals also 
affected the definition of resources required to accomplish the goals.  An example of that 
was the development of inspection procedures, which were being performed without 
clearly defined requirements.  An agreement on inspection procedures could not be 
reached, so Partner 1 had to define what areas had to be inspected, and to what extent.  
Additionally, there was not a master schedule that showed to all the participating 
organizations a complete view of the project and how their efforts were interrelated.  
 On the other hand, Partner 1 defined a mechanism that allowed a partner to bring 
their own ideas, and if these ideas are accepted by all the participant organizations and 
the customer, then their implementation was approved.  The rejection of ideas seemed to 
have had little effect on day to day operations.  However, issues emerged because there 
were problems with the interpretation of the requirements as defined in the contract.  
 
4.3 Case 2 Description 
 
The second case analyzed involved the design and construction of an offshore oil 
production facility project.  In this project two medium-sized oil production companies 
were associated with a large gas transportation and distribution organization. The 
production organizations were responsible for the oil production, and the gas 
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transportation organization was responsible for sending the oil production onshore.  An 
engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) contractor -which was not a member 
of the association- was hired to design, purchase the materials and build the facility, 
under the supervision of a project team constituted by members assigned by the partners 
(see Fig. 4-2). However, all communication between the project team and the EPC 
contractor were conducted through one of the production partners. 
 
Figure4-2: Partners’ Roles, Relationships and Priorities’ levels in Case 2           
 
The project entailed the development of a series of oil fields and oil transportation 
facilities.  In the contract agreement, the transportation organization revenues were 
constituted by a fixed fee for the first field and by a percentage of the oil-produced 
revenues in future fields.  The production organizations obtained their revenue from the 
sale of oil produced.  
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In an environment of rising oil prices, these contractual agreements induced 
misalignment among partners regarding the project cost and schedule goals.  The 
production organizations were interested in completing the project as soon as possible to 
take advantage of the high prices, and they were willing to pay an extra price to get the 
facility producing as soon as possible.   On the other hand, the transportation organization 
did not have an oil prices incentive.  Hence the transportation organization was not as 
willing as the production organizations were to assume more costs in order to get the 
facility producing earlier.  Indeed, the transportation organization was more willing to 
accelerate the development of the future fields than the first field, because it did not have 
any price incentive in the first field 
 The contract agreement dictated penalties for not meeting the project deadline, so 
initially the participant organizations were aligned toward schedule goals.  However, 
conflicts appeared when the producing partners tried to accelerate the project to capture 
high oil prices at the expense of assuming higher costs. 
 One example of the participant organizations’ misalignment regarding the cost 
and schedule goals was the decision to purchase and additional mooring line.  The 
mooring line connects the floating production system to the seafloor.  Mooring line 
installations can be difficult and the oil producing organizations recommended 
purchasing additional lines in the event that problems were encountered.  This was 
essentially an insurance strategy against a negative impact on the production schedule if a 
mooring problem occurred.  A statistical analysis was performed based on several 
scenarios involving possible mooring problems.  The analysis concluded that the 
additional mooring line should be purchased.  However, from the transportation 
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organization’s point of view, it made more sense to defer the additional mooring line 
purchase and accept the risk of a potential production delay. 
 The transportation organization’s focus on minimizing costs affected its behavior 
in the project, and the perception that project team members had about its intentions in 
the project.  Sometimes the transportation company’s employees felt that caring mainly 
for costs-doing only the minimum required by contract or to avoid penalties-interfered 
with otherwise sound project decisions.  Moreover, the production organizations’ project 
team members perceived that the transportation organization would not cooperate with 
problem solving strategies if higher costs were involved.  
 Regarding the project quality goals, there was an agreement about the use of 
industry standards for design and construction.  Hence, there was alignment among the 
participant organizations concerning quality goals. 
 In general, there was alignment concerning the project scope among the 
participant organizations.  Nonetheless, disagreement was observed concerning the 
technical features that could support a swift start of oil production-as favored by the 
production organizations-and the pursuing of other features that would support the long-
term operability of the facilities-as favored by the transportation organization which 
would own the installations.  These disagreements led to some change requests during the 
design and construction phases that had to be discussed by the project team, causing 
delays to the project schedule. 
 An additional issue involved the way in which the contract agreement was 
negotiated.  The production organizations had a decision to make as to whether they 
would take full responsibility for the project or bring in a transportation partner.  The 
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transportation organization was not the production organizations’ first choice for the 
project, but the first choice failed and then the transportation organization was asked to 
participate and entered into the project without much preparation.  The final negotiation 
period only lasted two weeks, and not enough time was spent in developing a mutual 
understanding the project, and the schedule and tasks.  The project management team was 
not involved in the negotiation of the contract terms, and only participated in solving 
particular issues.  
 Goal conflict problems were detected early in the way the contract was framed. 
The transportation company had no incentives in the short run, only penalties.  Despite 
these contractual conditions, the transportation organization’s senior management 
decided that a project of this magnitude was needed at that moment.  The fee structure 
did not provide any incentive for the transportation organization to speed up the project. 
The rush to get into the project and start producing oil caused the participating 
organizations to dedicate less time than what was required to plan; they then 
underestimated the risk and the consequences of failure.  
 Another aspect of the contract agreement was that the transportation organization 
would pay for the project costs upfront, and the production organizations would then use 
oil production revenues to pay the transportation organization.  Furthermore, even though 
the transportation organization was paying for the facilities construction, one of the 
production organizations was the one who was in direct contact with the EPC contractor. 
This led to a perception of the transportation organization’s project team members that, 
although the transportation organization was investing significant resources in the 
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project, it was considered by the production organizations as a vendor or financing entity 
rather than as a partner. 
 The low level of alignment concerning cost and schedule goals affected working 
relationships between the participant organizations.  The goal conflicts that emerged 
made the production organizations wonder about the transportation organization 
intentions for the project and vice versa, thereby affecting the level of trust.  Trust 
deteriorated to a very low level during the project execution.  Trust affected the level of 
communication. Communication between the production organizations and the 
transportation organization became very guarded and cautious, reducing transparency.  
The perceived low transparency in communication influenced negatively the level of 
trust, creating a reinforcing cycle of diminishing trust and limited communications.  
 Other external factors affected the level of trust among partners.  There were some 
concerns about the financial capabilities of one of the participant organizations. There 
were also questions about that organization’s ability to continue with the project. Also, 
the project in question was the first time the participating organizations had worked 
together.  Hence, the only time they had for developing a working relationship was 
during the contract negotiation process, which lasted a relatively short period of time, and 
had very limited project team member participation. 
 The trust and communication issues often led to little or no timely communication, 
affecting the process of finding workable solutions for critical issues that needed to be 
solved.  As a consequence, the project team analysis, problem solving and decision 
making capabilities were limited and the frequency of required changes increased.  There 
was no aggressive decision making done by either party.  The lack of goal alignment 
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helped to create an atmosphere of the “other group is responsible” because no participant 
organization had both project management and funding responsibility.  Therefore, neither 
group took full accountability or responsibility.   
 The project team faced several problems during the project execution-including 
supply chain disruptions, and vendors failing to deliver equipments or materials.  
Moreover, there were some very significant delays due to offshore construction issues, 
welding problems at foreign yards, and other construction-related issues.  Adjustments 
had to be done to bring the project back on track.  In making adjustments a significant 
level of communication and coordination was required, and because that level was not 
there, the impact on the project was amplified. 
 When a problem was identified, including changes requests, it created a lot of 
finger pointing and haggling over contract terms, because of the lack of cost and schedule 
goal alignment.  There were not common criteria for making the trade offs required to 
solve the problems.  Problem solving, therefore, required the involvement of higher 
levels of management and distracted the project team from actively managing the work 
and instead focused their attention on recreating events that led to issues.  This prevented 
the deployment of resources allocation strategies that might have avoided schedule 
problems.  A cycle was created in which less time was spent monitoring the work and 
actively managing the schedule, leading to the accumulation of more issues to be 
resolved and to significant delays in decision making, and in communication with 
contractors. 
 Therefore, the alignment and trust issues did not directly cause the project delays 
or quality problems, but, rather, these problems combined with those issues and resulted 
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in very difficult and lengthy decisions that required the involvement of many levels of 
management.  The result was less effective decision making and problem solving that 
consumed a significant amount of time that could have been used to prevent the problems 
instead of dealing with them after they occurred.  
 Moreover, the organizations did not assign to the project team the people with the 
experience required for this kind of project.  The participant organizations did not have 
experience in this kind of project, so they did not know the amount and quality of human 
resources required.  That fact, combined with the high amount time and resources 
invested in decision making and problem solving diverted resources away from the 
supervision of contractors.  The quality of certain works, therefore, was not sufficiently 
supervised by the project management team and some rework was required to meet 
project requirements. 
 The lack of goal alignment concerning the cost and schedule goals induced a strict 
interpretation of the contract terms, reducing the room for compromise in decision 
making.  In addition, senior management was required to participate when the problem 
was significant and its solution involved compromising some of the organizations’ goals 
for the project. However, senior management, in particular the transportation 
organization senior management, was not very involved in the project. Senior 
management, therefore, was not completely aware of the magnitude of the risk and the 
complexity of the project -it was a new business and geographical area.  These facts, 
added to the issue that there were not designated project sponsors, led to additional delays 
in decision making.  Preventive actions required from sponsors-such as communications 
with other executives to discuss resources allocations, changing priorities, and getting 
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more support from the organization-were not taken on timely basis.  Senior management 
intervened numerous times to solve the issues created by misalignment, but with limited 
effectiveness. 
 Other factors that affected project performance mentioned during the interviews 
were: 
• The placement of the project team members in different geographical locations, 
which, despite the telecommunication facilities, affected the level of 
communications.  Sometimes the project team members waited until the periodic 
face-to-face meetings to discuss some issues, introducing delays in the 
communication and coordination processes. 
• The incorporation of personnel without the required level of experience.  In an 
attempt to catch up with the schedule, several individuals were added to the 
project team in order to increase work progress.  However, those individuals had 
to be trained and supervised, consuming additional effort from the project team 
members.  The productivity level dropped after the incorporation of the new 
personnel. 
• The schedule imposed to the EPC contractor was not realistic.  The push to meet 
the schedule requirements led to several quality problems, especially with 
subcontractors, that required rework and induced more delays. 
 The project finished a year late, which translated into liquidation damages being 
paid by the participating organizations.  On the other hand, the facilities are operating as 
expected. 
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4.4 Cases Data Analysis 
 
As discussed in the research methodology chapter, cases’ data analysis was guided 
by the assessment of the study propositions.  Hence, cases’ data were analyzed 
contrasting it with the study propositions, and looking for patterns across the cases’ data.  
The results of that analysis are presented in the following table: 
 
Proposition Case 1 Case 2 
1) Each participant organization 
in a multi-organizational project 
will bring their own goals to the 
project 
Partners project goals: 
Partner 1: maximize profits, 
deliver the required quality on 
schedule, obtain future business 
Partner 2: maximize profits, 
obtain future business, deliver 
the required quality on schedule, 
minimize the sharing of 
proprietary technology, develop 
new technologies 
Partner 3: maximize quality for 
the end user 
 
Partners project goals: 
Production organizations: in an environment 
of rising oil prices, contractual agreements 
induced a misalignment among partners 
regarding project cost and schedule goals. 
The production organizations were 
interested in completing the project as soon 
as possible to take advantage of the high 
prices, and they were willing to pay an extra 
price to get the facility producing as soon as 
possible. 
 
Transportation organization: the 
transportation organization did not have that 
oil prices’ incentive. Hence, the 
transportation organization was not as 
willing as the production organizations to 
assume more cost in order to get the facility 
producing earlier.  
 
2) Since organizations need to 
adjust to changes in their 
strategic environment, 
participants’ goals for the project 
might change along the project 
life time 
Partner 2 tried to develop new 
technologies during the project 
using project funds. 
Partner 3 wanted to improve the 
quality standards during the 
project according to their 
knowledge of the user needs.  
 
Production organizations: rising oil prices 
made the production organizations to give 
schedule goals a higher priority,  
Transportation organization: it did not have 
any incentive to assign a higher priority to 
schedule goal over cost goal. 
Table 4-1:  Cross-Cases’ Analysis Table  
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Proposition Case 1 Case 2 
3) These changes in project goals 
might create a situation in which 
the goals for the project regarding 
time, quality, scope, and cost are 
not the same for all the 
participants, regardless of what 
they had previously negotiated at 
the beginning of the project. In 
other words, the level of goal 
alignment among the participants 
might vary along the project life 
cycle 
There is no common understanding 
of quality. For Partner 3, quality is 
more important than cost or 
schedule, because Partner 3 is also 
the final user, potentially affected by 
quality issues. These issues changed 
as Partner 3 compared the final 
product with the final user 
requirements. For Partners 1 and 2, 
schedule and cost were as important 
as quality. 
 Only overall goals were defined, 
which led to some scope 
misinterpretation.  
Partner 2 tried to work on things not 
related to the end user needs, but 
rather with their own research 
interests (scope misalignment) 
Conflicts appeared when the 
production organizations tried to 
accelerate the project to capture the 
high oil prices, at expense of assuming 
higher costs. 
In general, there was alignment 
concerning the project scope among 
the participant organizations. 
Nonetheless, certain disagreement was 
observed concerning the pursuing of 
technical features that could support 
the oil production start swiftly (as 
favored by the production 
organizations), and the pursuing of 
other features that would support the 
long-term operability of the facilities 
(as favored by the transportation 
organization, which will own the 
installations).  
 
4) The effort and resources 
invested in the project by the 
participants will depend on their 
expectations of Partners’ behavior 
(trust) and project outcomes (these 
expected project outcomes are the 
participant’s own goals for the 
project). 
Partner 3’s did not perceive its 
quality and scope expectations as 
fulfilled. However, effort and 
resources were not restrained if 
expectations were not perceived as 
fulfilled. All partners wanted to go 
on doing business with the other 
partners. 
 
Transportation organization cost 
expectations was not perceived as 
fulfilled. 
However, effort and resources were not 
restrained if expectations were not 
fulfilled. 
5) If the expectations are fulfilled, 
participants will go on investing 
effort and resources in the project 
and generating positive 
expectations about their behavior 
and project outcomes in their 
Partners, in a feedback loop 
reinforcing trust and the 
likelihood of obtaining the desired 
project outcomes 
Trust is generated through open 
communication. Partner 3 was 
informed that Partner 2 would only 
provide the information strictly 
required by Partner 3 to perform 
project tasks, because Partner 2 
would not reveal their proprietary 
technology.  
 
The goal conflicts that emerged 
made the production organizations 
wonder about the transportation 
organization intentions for the 
project and vice versa, thereby 
affecting the level of trust. Trust 
deteriorated to a very low level 
during the project execution. 
Table 4-1: Cross-Cases’ Analysis Table (Continued) 
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Proposition Case 1 Case 2 
6) If, on the other hand, the 
expectations regarding Partners’ 
behaviors and project outcomes 
are not fulfilled, participants 
might reduce their effort and 
resources invested in the project, 
not fulfilling their Partners’ 
expectations about their behavior 
and project outcomes, in a 
reinforcing loop destroying trust 
and the likelihood of obtaining the 
desired project outcomes 
Because Partner 3 did not perceive 
Partner 2 as having the same level of 
commitment to quality, the level of 
respect and then trust was low 
.Quality misalignment has led to 
discussions and mutual criticism, 
sometimes not focusing on the 
important issues, then increasing 
animosity, and  reducing the 
perceived level of transparency in 
communication and level of trust. The 
fact that Partners did not work with 
the same quality standards affected 
the level of trust concerning the 
reliability of the work generated by 
the partner. 
Partner 2 was more willing to reduce 
scope to fix schedule slippage. This 
affected the level of trust, because 
Partner 3 felt that Partner 2 was not 
standing by what they promised. 
At times in the project, some partners’ 
expectations were not fulfilled. 
Partners did not understand the level 
of resources required to implement 
certain product features. Not fulfilled 
expectations affected the level of 
communication. 
The low level of alignment 
concerning cost and schedule goals 
affected working relationships 
between the participant organizations. 
The goal conflict made the production 
organizations to question the 
transportation organization intentions 
for the project and vice versa, thereby 
affecting the level of trust. Trust 
deteriorated to a very low level during 
the project execution and affected the 
level of communication. 
Communication between the 
production organizations and the 
transportation organization became 
very guarded and cautious, reducing 
transparency.  The perceived low 
transparency in communication 
influenced negatively the level of 
trust, creating a reinforcing cycle of 
diminishing trust and limited 
communication.  
 
7) The initial level of trust is 
based on the previous knowledge 
about Partner’s behavior and on 
the perception of the risk involved 
in the failure of the Partner in 
behaving according to the 
expected. 
Sometimes, pre-conceived notions 
about partners coming from previous 
projects, affected the level of 
communication. 
Sometimes knowledge of a person 
facilitated the communication, and 
other times that knowledge hindered 
it. 
Partners’ organizations knew each 
other very well, influencing positively 
the level of trust. 
External factors affected the level of 
trust among partners. There were 
some concerns about the financial 
capabilities of one of the participants.  
The project in question was the first 
opportunity for the participating 
organizations to work together. The 
only time the project team had for 
developing a working relationship 
was during the contract negotiation 
process, but the participation of 
project team members was very 
limited. 
Table 4-1:  Cross-Cases’ Analysis Table (Continued) 
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Proposition Case 1 Case 2 
8) Variations of the level of 
goal alignment will affect 
project dynamics and 
performance through the 
variation of the level of effort 
and resources invested in the 
project by the participant 
organizations 
The lack of alignment regarding 
quality goals led to disagreement in 
the level of inspection, and then to 
mistakes that required rework. 
 Low trust reduced the level of 
communication, increasing the delays 
in reviews, leading to schedule 
slippage. 
The low level of communication 
impacted the understating of schedule 
requirements. What other partners 
meant by “quick” was not clear, 
creating ambiguity about when sub-
products were required. When the 
meaning of quick was finally 
understood, it created schedule 
pressure, overtime and rework. 
Sometimes the lack of 
communication and lack of 
understanding of processes 
interdependence between partners 
affected the timeliness of resources 
deployment. 
The low level of communication 
affected partners when working in 
parallel on the same sub-products, 
and problems of incongruence were 
discovered later, or when partners 
were working on tasks different from 
what was expected. 
The trust and communication issues often 
led to little or no timely communication, 
affecting the process of finding workable 
solutions for critical issues that needed to 
be resolved. As a consequence, the project 
team analysis, problem solving and 
decision making capabilities were limited. 
When a problem was identified it created a 
lot of finger pointing and haggling over 
contract terms, because, due to the lack of 
cost and schedule goal alignment, there 
were not common criteria for making the 
trade offs required to solve the problems. 
This required the involvement of higher 
levels of management and distracted the 
project team from actively managing the 
work.  Hence, a cycle was created where 
less time was spent monitoring the work 
and actively managing the schedule, 
leading to the accumulation of more issues 
to be resolved and significant delays in 
decision making and in  the 
communication with contractors. 
 
Table 4-1: Cross-Cases’ Analysis Table (Continued) 
 
Concerning propositions 1 and 2, the data suggest that in both cases partners 
brought different goals to the project, despite the fact that project goals were defined in 
the project or alliance contract.  In case 1, partners seemed to have different 
interpretations of project goals.  For example, Partner 3 interpreted that quality and scope 
goals can be stretched to fulfill changing user requirements.  On the other hand, Partners 
1 and 2 interpreted the quality and scope goals in a strict way, according to what is 
written in the contract, and then balanced those goals with the cost objectives in order to 
preserve project profitability.  
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In case 2, partners negotiated a contract in a certain business environment in which 
goal alignment was possible, but once the environment changed the premises on which 
that goal alignment was sustained fell apart.  High variations in crude oil prices led oil 
production partners to press for a shorter completion time, while the transportation 
partner did not want to incur in higher costs to stretch the project schedule.  This situation 
matches with proposition 2, which states that partners’ goals might change as they own 
strategic environments change.  As a conclusion, cases data support propositions 1 and 2. 
 Proposition 3 states that changes in partners’ goals for the project might create a 
situation in which the level of goal alignment among partners vary, because goals might 
vary in a different direction or intensity for each partner.  If conflicting goals cannot be 
renegotiated in a way that satisfies partners’ goals for the project, the level of goal 
alignment would be reduced.  Situations described in cases 1 and 2 relates to this 
statement.  In case 1, the changes in Partner 1’s quality and scope goals dictated by its 
position as final user of the product could not be aligned with Partners 1 and 2 cost and 
schedule goals. On the other hand, Partner 2’s management introduced a goal concerning 
the use of project time to improve Partner 2’s proprietary technologies.  That goal was 
not shared by Partners 1 and 3, who wanted to focus resources on achieving project’s 
scope, quality and schedule goals. 
 In case 2, the change in oil prices led to a change in the production organizations’ 
goals for the project.  The negotiated schedule goal defined a date for operations start up, 
but production partners wanted to put that date forward, in order to take advantage of the 
higher oil prices, even though they will have to invest more resources to do so. 
Conversely, the transportation organization would not benefit from an early start of oil 
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production, and due to its financial situation it was not in a good position for allocating 
more resources to the project.  Hence, the rise in oil prices induced a reduction in the 
level of goal alignment among project partners, since the level of priority assigned to 
schedule and cost goals varied in a different way for the parties involved in the project. 
This analysis of the data collected in cases 1 and 2 suggests that proposition 3 is also 
supported. 
 Proposition 4 states that the level of effort deployed by an organization 
participating in a multi-organizational project would depend on its expectations 
concerning other partners’ behaviors-level of trust-and about project outcomes, as 
compared to the organization own goals for the project.  Neither case 1 nor case 2 data 
collected support for this proposition.  Partners involved in the studied multi-
organizational projects did not vary the amount of resources allocated to the project 
according to their expectations of partners’ behaviors or project outcomes.  In the studied 
cases, partners were obliged by contractual terms to allocate certain amount of resources 
to the project effort.  Moreover, they perceived that if they fail to fulfill their contractual 
obligations, future business with their partners would be compromised.  A possible 
explanation to the discrepancy between what was stated in the proposition and what was 
observed in the cases data lies on the fact that the relationships between partners were 
regulated by contracts which partners should abide to.  In the collaborative relationships 
described in the literature review chapter the deployment of resources was more 
“voluntary”, because the governance structure of the alliances o joint ventures studied 
was more market than hierarchy oriented (Williamson, 1991).  Hence, in those cases 
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partners would contribute to the collaborative effort only if they perceive that the 
outcomes would be aligned to their own objectives. 
 Another reason that could explain why partners in the cases studied did not vary 
their effort deployed according to the expected project outcomes was the fact that all 
partners operate in the same markets-defense for case 1 and energy for case 2-and they 
did not want to compromise their reputation, which would probably affected future 
business. 
 Propositions 5 and 6 suggest the development of a feedback loop in which, while 
partners’ expectations are fulfilled concerning partners’ behaviors and project outcomes, 
they would be willing to allocate more resources to the project, then satisfying other 
partners’ expectations concerning their behaviors, and increasing the probability of 
obtaining better project outcomes.  This would lead to a reinforcement of the positive 
expectations about partners’ behavior - higher level of trust- and about project outcomes. 
 This feedback loop could also operate in the opposite direction.  The perception 
that other partners are not contributing to the collaborative effort as expected, or that the 
project outcomes diverge from partners’ goals for the project, might lead partners to 
allocate fewer resources in the project, sending them to projects perceived as more 
profitable.  That could lead to a reinforcement of negative expectations about partners’ 
behaviors, as well as about project outcomes.  
 As discussed above, no evidence was found in the cases’ data supporting the 
reduction of effort deployed as a result of low level of trust on partners or of not fulfilled 
expectations concerning project outcomes.  On the other hand, evidence was found in 
both cases that perceptions that partners were not supporting the same project goals -
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quality and scope goals in case 1 and cost and schedule goals in case- led to conflicts, 
mutual animosity and to poor communication.  Lower levels of communication prevented 
partners to know and understand other partners’ motivations and constraints for the 
project, which reduced the level of trust and partners’ willingness to share information, 
lowering even more the level of communication, in a reinforcing cycle of deteriorating 
trust and communication.  
 Proposition 7 says that the initial level of trust between partners is determined to a 
large extent by previous knowledge and perceptions about partners’ behaviors and the 
risk involved in partners’ potential failure to behave as expected.  Cases’ data support the 
fact that past experiences (case 1) and second- hand information -like in case 2, where 
information was circulating among energy market players about the dire financial 
situation of one of the partners-contributed to the formation of the initial trust on 
partners’ willingness and capabilities to work for the achievement of project goals. 
Moreover, case 2 participants attributed the low level of initial trust and communication 
to the fact that the studied project was the first time they were going to work together, 
they did not have enough participation in the project negotiations phase to form an idea 
of partners’ intentions and capabilities.  However, case 1’s data point out that having 
experience working together might contribute to the formation of preconceptions that 
hinder instead of helping communication.  Partners might expect negative reactions to 
certain communication and then decide not to share the information or to make it more 
“palatable” for the other partner. 
 Finally, proposition 8 states that variations of the level of goal alignment will 
affect project dynamics and performance through the variation of the level of effort and 
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resources invested in the project by the participant organizations.  Again, no evidence 
was found in the cases data that support the statement.  However, both cases’ data 
support the fact that the level of goal alignment affects project dynamics and performance 
through variations in the level of trust and communication between partners.  Despite the 
fact that in the cases studied trust and communication mechanisms operated in a different 
way -that is because the projects were also structured in different ways, in case 1 the 
project tasks were executed by the project team, while in case 2 the project team only 
managed the project, which was executed by an EPC contractor- these mechanisms 
affected project dynamics and performance in both cases.  Because advancing in 
understanding how the level of goal alignment affects project dynamics and performance 
in multi-organizational projects is the main objective of this research effort, a detailed 
analysis of how the level of goal alignment affects projects’ system dynamics and project 
performance as observed in cases 1 and 2’s data is presented below.  
 
4.4.1 Analysis of the Effect of Goal Alignment on Case 1 Project Dynamics 
and Performance 
 In Fig.4-3 an influence diagram is presented to illustrate in a holistic way the 
dynamics observed in the case 1’s data collected.  For simplicity and clarity, only the 
causal relationships observed explaining how the level of goal alignment affects project 
performance are shown.  In this diagram, the level of goal alignment between partners is 
translated into the degree of agreement on design and problems solving criteria.  In this 
particular case, the diverse degrees of priority given to quality and scope goals induced 
different reactions in partners to the levels of quality and scope reduction in the project, 
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including the perceptions of the degree to which their quality and scope goals were 
considered when the project team performed required goals trade-offs.  If partners 
perceived that their goals had not been accomplished -as is the case of Partner 3 in case 
1- mutual animosity and conflicts start to stifle the relationships between partners, 
reducing the level of communication and trust.  Low level of communication affected the 
knowledge that partners had about other partners’ objectives for the project, their 
requirements and constraints, and then affected the level of trust.  In addition, the level of 
trust affected the degree to which partners were willing to share their objectives, 
requirements and constraints with other partners, creating a reinforcing cycle between 
communication and trust. 
 Low levels of communication and increasing conflicts among partners affected 
the exchange of information.  Delays in information exchange induced partners to work 
with preliminary or wrongful information, leading to quality problems and rework.  
Moreover, a low level of communication affected the understanding of partners’ 
requirements -not knowing exactly when sub- products are required to be processed by 
partners- leading to a deficient activities and resources’ planning -resources were not 
allocated to activities with higher priority, then reducing the level of effort applied to 
these activities.  The level of effort applied to high priority activities was also affected by 
the level of effort allocated to review partners’ work.  The level of trust in partners 
determined in part the amount of effort deployed to review the work performed by these 
partners.  
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Figure 4-3: General View of Case 1 Dynamics Generated by the Level of Goal 
Alignment 
 
Both the level of quality and effort deployed affected progress.   When progress 
was below what was expected, schedule pressure developed, leading to more quality 
problems -work is rushed and less time is assigned to quality assurance activities- or to 
scope reduction to cope with schedule slippage.  Reductions in quality or scope expected 
induced more conflicts between partners –due to the low alignment concerning the 
affected goals- leading to lower levels of communication, in a reinforcing feedback cycle 
leading to lower levels of trust, quality and scope.  These dynamics are described with 
more detail below. 
 The Fig. 4-4 shows how the level of goal alignment between partners affected 
the quality structure in case 1.  The solid lines depict the relationships between the system 
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variables as present in the quality feedback structure.  The dotted lines show the effect of 
the level of goal alignment on the dynamics described by that structure. The level of 
quality goal alignment determined the level of agreement on quality standards between 
partners, which defined the level of mutual trust between them -Partners 2 and 3 in case 1 
disagreed in the quality standards, leading to a low level of trust on other partners’ 
intentions for the project. The level of trust determined in part the level of 
communication.  A lower level of communication led to quality problems while working 
in a concurrent way, since changes might not be timely communicated, and partners 
worked with wrong, non-updated information.  Moreover, low levels of communication 
led to delays in information release, and partners worked with preliminary information 
that in some cases changed later, generating incongruence in product design.  
 Quality problems led to less work completed and thereby to perceived schedule 
slippage and schedule pressure.  Schedule pressure led to reduced quality standards, 
producing a negative reaction in Partner 3, which perceived that its quality goals were not 
being considered by the other partners, deteriorating even more the relationship and the 
level of communication, in a reinforcing cycle of reducing communication, trust, quality, 
and scope. 
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Figure4-4:  Effect of the Level of Goal Alignment on the Case 1 Quality Structure  
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Figure 4-5:  Effect of the Level of Goal Alignment on the Case 1 Effort Structure  
 
The effect of the level of goal alignment on the case 1 effort feedback structure is 
shown in Fig 4-5.  The project dynamics observed in case 1 that affected the effort 
structure are represented by the dotted lines.  Again, the level of goal alignment affected 
the degree of agreement on quality standards among Partners 2 and 3, affecting the level 
of trust and communication.  The level of communication between Partners 2 and 3 
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tasks which outputs affected the execution of tasks executed by other partners.  The level 
of trust also affected the amount of effort allocated to the review of other partners’ work.  
The lower the level of trust, the higher the effort allocated to that review, taking it from 
the effort available for basework.  
 The resulting level of effort available for basework affected the level of progress. 
Lower than expected work completed led to a perceived schedule slippage, schedule 
pressure and then to the deployment of more effort. 
 Moreover, when resources were not available to deploy more effort, higher 
schedule pressure led sometimes to relax the quality standards in order to accomplish the 
schedule objectives.  In these cases, Partner 3 perceived that its quality and scope goals 
were not being considered, leading to less trust and communication, thereby reducing the 
level of coordination required for effort deployment, and increasing the level of effort 
allocated to review partners’ work.  As a consequence, the level of effort dedicated to 
basework was reduced, affecting progress, in a reinforcing feedback cycle.  
 The effect of the level of goal alignment on the scope feedback structure is similar 
to the effect on the quality structure (see Fig. 4-6).  The level of scope goal alignment led 
to a level of agreement on scope trade-offs -the degree to which partners are willing to 
reduce scope to favor the accomplishment of other project goals.  That level of agreement 
influenced the level of trust -partners considered that they could trust each other because 
they perceived that they shared the same objectives- and the level of trust contributed to 
the achievement of a certain level of communication between partners. As described in 
the analysis of the effect of goal alignment on the quality structure, the level of 
communication affected the level of quality, thereby the level of rework and the level of 
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work completed.  The level of communication also determined the level of coordinated 
effort deployed.  In addition, the level of trust affected the level of effort deployed by 
partners to review other partners’ work, which reduced the effort dedicated to execute 
basework.  The resulting effort also contributed to determine the amount of work 
completed.  
 When the work completed was less than the expected according to the project plan, 
schedule pressure developed.  Partners who assigned low priority to the scope goal 
attempted to reduce scope to cope with the schedule pressure, leading to conflicts with 
partners that assigned a higher level of priority to the scope goal.  In case 1, Partner 3 
perceived that Partner 2 wanted to reduce scope in order to avoid delaying the project due 
to quality problems.  That created a conflict between Partners 2 and 3, because scope was 
more important than schedule for Partner 3.  The conflict reduced the level of 
communication and trust, which led to more problems concerning quality and effort 
allocation, reducing the work completed and generating additional schedule pressure.  
The described dynamic contributed to the fact that the project was behind schedule.  
 The schedule, rework, and basework structures were also affected by the level of 
alignment, but that impact was mediated by the effects on the quality, effort, and scope 
structure.  The effects described in this section are the base of the structure of the system 
dynamics model that attempts to represent the multi-organizational project dynamics as 
observed in case 1.  In the next section, the effect of the level of goal alignment on case 2 
project dynamics is discussed. 
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Figure 4-6:  The Effect of the Level of Goal Alignment on the Case 1 Scope Structure 
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4.4.2 Analysis of the Effect of Goal Alignment on Case 2 Project Dynamics 
and Performance 
 
Figure 4-7: General View of Case 2 Dynamics Generated by the Level of Goal 
Alignment 
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project.  Partners did not want to give information that they perceive could be used 
against their interest.  Low levels of communication, added to the need to involve higher 
levels of management -who have to decide about trade offs, due to the conflicting goals- 
to the low level of knowledge about the project that the involved senior managers had, 
and to a low level of flexibility in contract interpretation -the low level of alignment 
made more difficult to find satisfactory compromises and solutions outside the contracts- 
delayed the project team decision making process.  
 Delays in project team decision making led to delays in the delivery of 
instructions to the contractor, reducing the progress rate.  Moreover, delays in decision 
making reduced the rate at which project problems were solved, thereby generating the 
accumulation of problems to be solved.  The accumulation of problems to be solved 
diverted time and attention from the project team effort to monitor project progress, 
reducing project team ability to anticipate problems and to procure the deployment of 
effort in order to correct deviations form the original project plan.  The deviations from 
the project plan, or schedule slippage, created new problems to solve that accumulated, 
generating a reinforcing cycle that created more delays.  A more detailed description of 
these dynamics are presented below, where the way in which the level of goal alignment 
affected the typical project feedback structures will be discussed. 
 The Fig. 4-8 shows how the level of goal alignment between partners affected the 
rework-progress structure in case 2.  The dotted lines show that effect.  The level of goal 
alignment determined the level of agreement on design and problem solving criteria 
among partners, which defined the level of mutual trust and communication between 
them. In case 2, the level of alignment concerning cost and schedule was low, because the 
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Figure 4-8:  The Effect of the Level of Goal Alignment on the Case 2 Rework Structure 
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aware of the project issues- and to the lack of flexibility in the application of the contract 
terms led to delays in the project team decision making process. 
 The delays in project team decision making generated an accumulation of problems 
to solve.  That accumulation distracted project team’s time and effort from proactively 
monitoring project progress and from providing feedback to the EPC contractor, causing 
delays in project progress -the contractor had to wait for project team decisions to 
perform certain tasks.  These delays created more problems to solve, and a reinforcing 
cycle was developed which delayed project completion for a year. 
 The lack of time available for monitoring project progress affected the project 
team ability to foresee incoming schedule and quality problems, thereby affecting the 
team ability to influence contractor’s work planning, and the level of additional effort 
deployed to mitigate the effects of these problems (see Fig. 4-9).  In the cases when the 
contractor did not deploy the actions required to cope with the schedule or quality 
problems, project progress was affected, generating more problems to solve, in a 
reinforcing cycle similar to the one described in the previous section.  
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Figure 4-9: The Effect of the Level of Goal Alignment on the Case 2 Effort Structure    
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not fulfilled.  Conversely, both cases’ data analysis indicated that the level of goal 
alignment affected project dynamics and performance through its effect on the level of 
trust and communication between partners.  However, the trust and communication 
mechanism operated in a different way in the cases studied because the projects were 
structured in disparate ways -in case 1 the project team executed the project, and in case 2 
the project team only managed the project.  For case 1, the level of trust and 
communication affected quality and coordination for the deployment of effort -when 
tasks execution required information exchange- as well as the level of effort used to 
review other partners’ work.  These effects affected project dynamics and performance.  
In case 2, the level of trust and communication affected the project team decision making 
process and its ability to monitor progress and to react to problems, inducing delays in the 
work executed by the contractor.  The project dynamics discussed in this chapter are the 
base of the models developed to simulate how the level of goal alignment affected project 
performance in the cases studied, which is described in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5: MODELS DESCRIPTION 
 
5.1 Chapter Overview 
 
As discussed in previous sections, the data collected for the study cases was 
translated into system dynamics models in order to provide a structured way to describe 
the complex interrelationships among the cases study’s variables.  The data collected 
through the case research was verbal, with some ambiguity included.  System dynamics 
modeling contributes to offset that ambiguity, forcing the researcher to be specific and 
precise in defining the causal dynamics mechanisms and basic assumptions that translate 
a verbal theory into a simulation model (Hanneman and Patrick, 1997). 
 In addition, the system dynamics models derived from case studies can be applied 
to similar phenomena in other contexts to assess the generalizability of the theory 
developed about the system behavior (Luna, 2004).  System dynamics can also help to 
perform simulation experiments to analyze the impact of changes in relevant variables.  
Hence, the use of system dynamics models may help to “control” and manipulate system 
variables that in real life cannot be controlled to assess their individual impact on the 
system’s outcomes, allowing the “testing” of the effects of management policies on the 
system before they are implemented.  Last but not the least, the system dynamics models 
can become a repository of the participants’ experiences and knowledge about the multi-
organizational project systems, displayed in an explicit way, facilitating the knowledge 
transfer to individuals interested in multi-organizational projects dynamics.  That 
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repository can evolve and improve with the addition of new experiences by new users in 
different contexts. 
 The models to be described are based on typical structures extracted from 
previously validated project system models, and from the data collected through the cases 
studied.  The models’ descriptions start with the definition of the models’ boundaries and 
the level of aggregation used.  Then, a detailed description of the models is provided by 
depicting the inner details of the structure of the models’ sectors.  In the models’ 
descriptions, the assumptions incorporated are clearly established, as well as the 
connections between the model structures and the case data collected. The models were 
developed using the ITHINK™ simulation software.  
 
5.2 Case 1 Model  
5.2.1 Case 1 Model Boundaries, Assumptions and Level of Aggregation 
 The models’ scope and focus are depicted in the models’ boundaries (Ford, 
1995).  The model boundary has been set by the elements of the project system 
mentioned in the data collected.  The model boundary is the border of the single multi-
organizational project studied in the case.  Although the relationships of the studied 
project with other projects executed by the participant organizations might have had an 
impact on project performance in other contexts, the case data collected did not reflect 
that impact.  Hence, the focus of the model structure is on variables operating within the 
project, and not contextual factors, which leads to the following assumptions:  
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• The project is executed in an environment of stable organizations.  No major 
technological or organizational changes occur outside the project during the 
simulation period that might affect project team performance -for example, 
new management policies, process improvement, and new technologies. 
• The average skill level of the project team members is constant along the 
simulation period. 
• The organizational contexts and competing projects do not impose resource 
constraints on the studied project-no restriction on resource supply or resource 
reallocation to other projects was reported in the case study. 
• The participants’ goals for the project, the initial levels of trust and 
communication among the organizations participating in the project, the 
project’s goals, and the level of task interdependence -degree to which 
partners require other partners’ work as input for their own work and have to 
coordinate effort- are context given variables that affect project dynamics and 
performance; but they are not affected by the project dynamics.  Hence, those 
variables are excluded from the inner works of the model and are used only as 
input variables. These context variables are denominated “exogenous 
variables” in the system dynamics literature.  
 In the Fig. 5-1, the variables included in the case 1 model structure (endogenous 
variables), excluded or contextual (exogenous variables), and ignored variables are 
depicted. 
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The level of aggregation of the model was defined on the basis of two criteria:  
First, to serve the model purpose of describing the dynamics within the studied multi-
organizational projects and how these dynamics affect project performance 
 
Figure5-1: Endogenous, Exogenous and Ignored Variables for Case 1 Model. Adapted 
from Ford (1995) 
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affected by the dynamics associated with the level of goal alignment.  Other important 
aggregation assumptions are listed below: 
• Project tasks -including base work, rework, quality assurance, testing, etc.- are of 
similar size and complexity, therefore can be aggregated in a “work to be done” 
stock. 
• Tasks can be either flawed or correct, but not partially flawed.  The tasks that 
require repairs of all kind can be aggregated in a single stock (rework). 
• The use of all types of resources is aggregated in the variable effort. 
 The boundary and level of aggregation focus the model on the variables and 
dynamics associated with the data collected during the case study research.  The internal 
structure of the model that attempts to simulate the behavior of the multi-organizational 
project system as described in case 1 is presented in the following section. 
 
5.2.2 Case 1 Model Description 
 In order to facilitate its description, the case 1 model is disaggregated in six 
sectors: progress-rework, schedule, quality, trust-communication, effort, and scope.  The 
progress-rework sector is where project work is performed, as well as the rework of 
flawed tasks.  The schedule sector simulates how the actual work done is compared to the 
work that, according to the project plan, had to be completed at a certain point, with a 
negative difference resulting in a certain level of schedule pressure.  The quality sector 
simulates how the level of quality -defined as the probability that the products contain 
errors or deviate from specifications- is affected by the level of priority given to quality 
by each partner, the level of communication, and the schedule pressure.  The trust-
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communication sector describes how the level of trust and communication among 
partners is affected by the initial level of communication and trust, and by the perceived 
level of alignment.  The effort sector describes how the total effort is distributed into 
effort for progress and rework, additional effort, and effort for reviewing other partners’ 
work.  Finally, the scope sector describes to what extent the scope might be reduced to 
cope with schedule pressure.  Before proceeding to describe in detail each sector, it is 
convenient to explain how the exogenous variables affect the model sectors, and then 
how the sectors interact among them to produce the dynamics present in the studied 
multi-organizational projects. 
 The relationships between the exogenous or input variables and the model 
sectors are presented in the Fig.5-2.  Exogenous variables are depicted in grey boxes.  As 
stated above, these variables influence the variables within the model, but are not 
influenced by model outputs.  In the present case, the level of priority assigned to quality 
by each partner influences the level of quality of their products within the project, and the 
perception that the other partners have about their compromise with quality.  The 
differences among those perceptions lead to a perceived level of goal alignment-in this 
particular case, toward the project quality goals.  The perceived level of alignment among 
partners in the project affects the level of trust and communications between them.  The 
level of trust and communication is also affected by the level of trust and potential 
communication at the beginning of the project, defined by previous interactions between 
the participant organizations, and by the organizations’ involved cultures, management 
policies and infrastructure-for example, the fact that the project team is collocated or not, 
as mentioned in the case interviews. 
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The level of interdependence between partners is defined by two factors: the 
degree to which partners require other partners’ work as input for their own work, and the 
degree to which partners need to coordinate efforts to accomplish certain project tasks.  
The level of interdependence influences the progress-rework sector.  The higher the level 
of interdependence among partners, the higher the impact of communication problems on 
the execution of project tasks that require the participation of more then one partner.  The 
level of interdependence among partners also influences the effort sector.  The higher the 
level of coordination required for effort deployment, the higher the effect of 
communication problems on the level of coordinated effort deployed on time (Gladstein, 
1984).  
 The effort planned to be performed by each organization and the level of effort 
that partners need to coordinate are inputs for the effort sector.  Finally, the expected 
work that has to be completed at a certain point of the project execution is an input of the 
schedule sector.  The expected work completed at a certain point of the project is 
compared with the work actually done to define if there is schedule slippage or not. 
 The desegregation of the model in sectors is an artificial one performed only for 
explanatory purposes.  The sectors can be seen as subsystems that interact to produce the 
dynamics that characterize the multi-organizational project as described in the first study 
case.  Those interactions are depicted in Fig.5-3.  The low level of communication affects 
the progress rework sector in two ways.  First, the level of communication affects the 
speed at which information or products flow between partners.  When the input required 
by partners from other partners does not arrive on time, it creates delays in task 
execution. 
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Figure 5-2:  Effect of Exogenous Variables on Case 1 Model  
 
Second, a low level of communication affects the tasks’ execution when partners 
are working in parallel on the same tasks, creating problems of incongruence, or when 
partners are working on tasks different from what was expected.  
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Figure 5-3: Interactions between Case 1 Model Sectors  
 
The level of communication affects the effort sector.  The lack of communication 
and understanding of inter-organizational work processes and of other partners’ 
requirements affects the timeliness of resources’ deployment.  Moreover, the level of 
trust affects the allocation of resources to the other partners’ review activities.  A lower 
level of trust might induce the assignment of more resources to the review of other 
partners’ activities due to a lack of confidence in partners’ capabilities or intentions.  The 
level of communication also affects the quality sector.  A low level of communication 
causes partners to work without reliable and updated information from other partners, 
affecting the quality of the products.  
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The effort sector assigns resources to basework; rework and other partners’ review 
tasks, then affecting the progress-rework sector.  The level of schedule pressure affects 
the effort sector, inducing the deployment of additional effort to cope with schedule 
slippage.  The level of schedule pressure also makes the project team work with 
preliminary information, to work faster, and to diminish the time dedicated to revision 
before delivering the products, then affecting quality.  The level of schedule pressure can 
also affect the scope of the project (work to be done).  In some cases the schedule 
pressure might lead to a reduction of the scope in order to cope with a perceived schedule 
slippage.  Less work to be done reduces the perceived gap between the work expected to 
be completed at a certain point of the project execution and the actual work completed, 
then reducing the schedule pressure.  
 On the other hand, the progress rework sector affects the schedule sectors because 
the amount of work completed affects the level of perceived schedule slippage, and then 
the level of schedule pressure.  Moreover, the progress-rework sector has an effect on the 
effort sector, because the levels of rework and other partners’ work to be reviewed 
influence the decision of allocating effort to do rework or review other partners’ work.  
 Finally, the level of quality has an effect on the progress-rework sector.  The level 
of quality defines the percentage of products that requires rework.  In the following 
section, the case 1 model’s sectors are described in further detail, including an exposition 
of all the assumptions and links of the sector structure with the data collected in the case 
studied. 
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Case 1 Model Progress- Rework Sector 
 The Progress- Rework sector is the backbone of the model.  This sector simulates 
the rate at which tasks are performed, the proportion of tasks that are flawed and require 
rework and the rate at which rework is performed.  For simplicity purposes, only two 
organizations are included in this model.  Each organization has its own progress-rework 
cycle.  Hence, the progress-rework sector is constituted by two progress-rework cycles, 
and the elements required in connecting both cycles.  
 Each progress-rework cycle is constituted by a stock of work to be performed (work 
to be done), a flow of basework performed ( progress) , a stock of work potential flaws 
(work with potential errors), a flow of flawed work ( badwork), a flow of work without 
flaws (goodwork), a flow of rework performed (rework rate) , a stock of work completed 
( work done), a flow of work out of the work to be done stock, simulating a reduction of 
the project scope ( scope reduction rate), and a stock of reduced scope ( scope reduced).  
 The stock of work to be done is depleted by the execution of work (progress); and 
the flow of work executed is determined by the following equation: 
 
progress= (work_to_be_done_1/dur_prog)*(1-frac_to_be_coord)+ 
(work_to_be_done_/dur_prog)*frac_to_be_coord*comm. (1) 
Where: 
dur progress= average duration of tasks. 
comm = level of communication between partners 
frac_to_be_coord= fraction of the work to be done that need to be coordinated with the Partner. 
 
The rate at which the work that has to be coordinated with partners is executed is 
affected by the level of communication between partners.  Poor communication leads to 
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poor coordination, according to the case data.  In the case studied, poor communication 
made the information transmission slower, adding to the fact that the project team 
members were working at different locations.  In some cases, due to poor coordination, 
partners did not work on  the tasks they were suppose to be working on, generating 
delays in the execution of other partners’ tasks that require the referred tasks as inputs. 
 The duration of task execution is defined by the level of effort deployed to perform 
them (effort).  However, the duration of basework tasks is not assumed to be proportional 
to the allocation of more effort to those activities -the allocation of effort is discussed 
while describing the effort sector.  After a certain amount of effort (resources) has been 
allocated to certain activities, the effect of additional resources on task duration is 
reduced by productivity constraints imposed by limitations of the system.  Moreover, if 
additional effort is deployed through overtime, fatigue can significantly impact 
productivity (Reichelt and Lyneis; 1999).  Hence, the relationship between effort and task 
duration is assumed to be an exponential decay (see model documentation in the 
appendix C), with a rate of diminishing duration that is reduced as more effort is added. 
 The basework completed goes to the stock of work with potential errors (work pot 
errors).  As the work progresses, products without flaws go to the stock of work 
completed, and the products in which errors are discovered go to the rework stock.  The 
fraction of products that do not require rework (goodwork) is defined by the quality level 
(quality).  Hence, the flow of products that do not require rework is simulated by the 
following equation: 
 
goodwork=(work_pot_errors/dur_prog)*quality (2) 
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And the flow of products that require rework is simulated as follows: 
 
badwork= (work_pot_errors/dur_prog)*(1-quality) (3) 
 
Rework is performed at a rate simulated by the following equation: 
 
rework rate=rework/dur_rework (4) 
 
The duration of the rework tasks’ execution is defined by the level of effort 
deployed to perform them (effort rew).  Again, the duration of basework tasks is not 
assumed to be proportional to the allocation of more effort to those activities.  The shape 
of the relationship is also assumed to be exponential decay, just like in the case of 
basework tasks.  The flow of reworked tasks will return to the stock of work with 
potential errors, because mistakes could also be made while performing rework. 
 The scope of the project (stock of work to be done) can be reduced as a reaction to 
the perception that the current scope can not be achieved within the deadline (schedule 
pressure).  The scope reduction is simulated by a flow from the stock of work to be done 
to a stock of scope reduced.  The flow rate is determined by the level of schedule pressure 
(sch press) and the priority assigned to the schedule goal (scope pri).  The higher the 
schedule pressure, the higher the tendency to reduce scope to fix the perceived schedule 
slippage.  On the other hand, that tendency is offset by the level of priority assigned to 
the scope goal.  Hence the flow rate to the scope reduced stock (scope red rate) is 
simulated by the following equation: 
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scope red rate= (1-scope_pri)*sch_press  (5) 
Because two organizations are considered in the model, two parallel progress-
rework cycles are included.  However, because there is a certain level of interdependence 
between the two organizations while working on project tasks, the interconnections 
between the two progress-rework cycles need to be simulated.  The first interconnection 
is considered in the simulation of flow of basework executed.  That interconnection deals 
with the fact that to perform a certain fraction of the project tasks, partners need input 
from other partners.  Hence, the level of communication between partners affects work 
execution for that fraction of tasks, as reflected in the equations that simulate the flow of 
basework completed.  The second type of interconnection considered in this model, as 
reflected in the data collected, is the use by a partner of work completed by the other 
partner as input for the tasks’ execution.  From the stock of work with potential errors, a 
flow of basework completed goes to a stock of work to be used by partners.  The flow is 
simulated by the following equation: 
 
work 12= (work_pot_errors 1/inftrandur)*work_1_used_by 2  (6) 
Where 
 work 12: flow of work performed by partner 1 to be used by  partner 2 
 work_pot_errors 1: stock of work performed by 1 with potential errors 
 inftrandur: average duration of information transmission between partners 
 work_1_used_by 2: fraction of work performed by 1 to be used by 2   
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The fraction of work performed by one partner to be used by the other is given by 
the requirements and the planning of the project.  The duration of the information 
transmission between partners is a function of the level of communication, which is 
discussed in the description of the trust-communication sector.  
 The fraction of work completed by Partner 1 that is going to be used by Partner 2 
is reviewed by Partner 2.  Work without flaws goes from the work to be used by Partner 2 
stock to the Partner 2’s work to be done stock, because it will be processed by Partner 2.
Flawed work goes to the work reviewed by 2 with errors (rework 12) stock.  The 
proportion of work with and without flaws is defined by the level of the Partner 1’s 
quality.  The flow of flawless work (goodwork12) is then simulated by the following 
equation: 
 
goodwork 12= (work 1_to_be_used_by_2/durrev 12)*quality 1 (7) 
Where: 
durrev 12: average duration of the reviewing by 1 of work performed by 2.
Similarly, the flow of work performed by 1 with errors and reviewed by 2 
(badwork 12) is simulated by the following equation: 
 
badwork 12 = (work1_to_be_used_by_2/durrev 12)*(1-quality 1) (8) 
 
Finally, from the stock of work reviewed by 2 with errors (rework 12), the flawed 
work is sent back to Partner 1’s rework stock, because Partner 1 needs to do rework on it.  
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The flow from the stock of work reviewed by 2 with errors to Partner 1’s rework stock 
(rew 12 trans) is simulated by the equation:  
 
rew 12 trans= rework 12/inftrandur (9) 
 
The model includes similar structures for work performed by the Partner 2 to be 
used by Partner 1.  A representation of the progress-rework sector is depicted in Fig. 5-4. 
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Case 1 Model Alignment Sector 
 The variables related to the level of goal alignment are grouped in a sector, despite 
the fact that they are variables exogenous to the model.  These variables are not included 
in the inner works of the model, and not affected by the model dynamics.  However, they 
affect the model’s endogenous variables.   
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align
Alignment
Figure 5-5:  Case 1 Model Alignment Sector         
 
For the purposes of this research, goal alignment has been defined as the degree to 
which participant organizations in multi-organizational projects agree on the level of 
priority of the quality, scope, cost and schedule goals.  According to the data collected for 
the case study, cost and schedule goals were clearly defined by the project contract and 
accepted by all participants.  Then, the level of goal alignment toward those goals had no 
impact on project dynamics.  On the other hand, as discussed in the case description, 
there were discrepancies among project participants regarding the level of priority 
assigned to the project’s quality and scope goals.  These discrepancies are represented in 
the model by the differences between the level of priority assigned by each participant in 
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the project to the quality and scope goals (see Fig.5-5).  Therefore, the level of goal 
alignment in this model is described by the following equation:  
 
align=1-((ABS(prior_qualprior_qual_2))*weight_qual_pri+((ABS(scope_pri1scope_pri2))*(1-
weight_qual_pri)))  (10) 
Where:   
prior_qual1= level of priority assigned to the quality goal by Partner 1 
prior_qual_2= level of priority assigned to the quality goal by Partner 2 
scope_pri1= level of priority assigned to the scope goal by Partner 1 
scope_pri2= level of priority assigned to the scope goal by Partner 2 
weight_qual_pri= relative weight in the project of the quality goal with respect to the scope goal. 
 
This equation can be generalized to more goals assigning the relative weights in 
the project for each goal. 
 
Case 1 Model Trust-Communication Sector  
 The data collected from the case study shows a mutual relationship between trust 
and communication, with trust leading to a more open -and frequent- communication, 
because partners perceive that other partners would not make an improper use of the 
information provided.  
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Figure5-6:  Case 1 Model Trust-Communication Sector 
 
Moreover, the case’s data shows that a high level of communication also leads to a 
high level of trust, because all partners are more aware of the other partners’ intentions, 
requirements and constraints concerning the project. 
 To simulate the level of trust in a certain moment between two partners in the 
studied multi-organizational project, the adaptation of the following equation proposed 
by Luna et al. (2004) is used.   
 
trust in 1= 2’s knowledge about 1* 2’s perception of 1’s trustworthiness+(1-2’s knowledge 
about 1)* calculative trust  (11) 
 
In this equation, the calculative component of trust in 1 is conceptualized as a 
function of the perception of risk of being involved in a collaborative relationship with 1, 
the interest of 2 in getting involved with 1 and the 2’s attitude toward risk.  This 
component has a higher weight in the equation when the 2’s knowledge of 1 is low.  As 
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the relationship progresses, the more 2 knows about 1, the higher the weight will be of 
2’s perceptions about 1’s trustworthiness in the equation.  In other words, as experiences 
accumulate in the collaborative relationship, partners rely less on the initial conditions 
that led to the relationship for trusting in the partner, and more on their own perceptions 
of other partners’ behaviors. 
 In the case of the studied multi-organizational project (see Fig.5-6), the initial 
conditions are given by a certain level of trust product of previous interactions between 
partners, leading to certain perceptions of partners’ attitudes, values and technical 
capabilities.  The other component of the trust equation is given by the perception of the 
level of alignment between partners toward the project goals -in this case, quality and 
scope.  The higher the level of perceived alignment, the more partners will be confident 
about the actions of other partners toward the achievement of project goals.  As in the 
equation proposed by Luna et al., at the beginning of the project the initial level of trust 
would have a higher weight on the level of trust between partners.  As the project 
progresses and the knowledge about other partners’ requirements and objectives for the 
project increases, the weight of the perception of goal alignment in trust formation also 
increases.  Hence the trust equation adapted for the studied multi-organizational project is 
a follows:  
 
trust in 1= initialtrustin1* (1- knowabout1) +knowabout1*align (12) 
Where: 
initialtrustin1= level of trust in Partner 1 at the beginning of the project 
knowabout1= accumulated knowledge about 1 during the project 
align= level of goal alignment 
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This equation simulates the level of trust in one partner by other partner at any moment in 
the project. 
 As shown in the case data, the level of trust among participants in the multi-
organizational project affected the level of communication -frequency and quality of 
content.  Therefore, the level of communication is simulated by the following equation: 
 
comm= inicomm*trustin1*trustin2  (13) 
Where: 
comm= level of communication between Partners 1 and 2  
potcomm= potential level of communication between Partners 1 and 2 
trustin1= level of trust in 1 by 2 
trustin2= level of trust in 2 by 1 
 
The potential level of communication is assumed to be given by contextual factors 
not related to the level of goal alignment, such as infrastructure, organizations cultures, 
and management styles and policies.  That potential is then affected by the levels of trust 
among partners.  The resulting level of communication affects the speed at which project 
information is transmitted to partners (inftrandur).  The rate at which knowledge about 
partners is accumulated (know1form) is also assumed to be proportional to the level of 
communication.  The higher the level of communication, the faster partners would know 
about other partners’ requirements and objectives for the project. 
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Case 1 Model Schedule Sector 
 In the schedule sector, the work actually done at any point of the project is 
compared with the work that had to be already completed according to the project plan at 
that point in order to meet the required deadlines.  If the work actually completed is less 
than what was expected, project team members would perceive a schedule slippage.  The 
perceived schedule slippage leads to schedule pressure on project team members, or the 
pressure to work more and faster in order to reduce the schedule slippage (Reichelt and 
Lyneis, 1999; Lyneis et al. 2001).  As the case data revealed, the schedule pressure might 
be relived by reducing scope to the level that it is perceived to be achieved in the time 
available according to the deadline (see Fig. 5-7) 
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Figure 5-7:  Case 1 Model Schedule Sector   
 
Hence, the level of schedule pressure on the project team members belonging to a 
participant organization in the studied multi-organizational project is simulated by the 
following equation:  
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schpress1= (IF(sch_slipp1)<=0THEN(0)ELSE(sch_slipp1))*(1-effscopered_1) (14) 
 
Where: 
sch_slipp1= schedule slippage perceived by project team member belonging to Partner 1 
effscopered_1=effect of the scope reduction on project team members belonging to  Partner 1. 
 
The same equation is used for the other partner included in the model. An 
important assumption is that schedule pressure responds only to perceived schedule 
slippage and to scope reductions.  That assumption is sustainable for the studied case 
according to the data collected, but might need to be revised in other contexts. 
 
Case 1 Model Quality Sector 
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Figure 5-8: Case 1 Quality Sector 
 
The level of quality of the project products completed by the project team 
members is defined as the probability that the products fulfill user’s requirements and do 
not require rework.  The potential quality (iniqual) given by factors, such as project team 
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members’ skills and experience, technology used, etc. is also affected by the priority 
given by each participant organization to the quality goal, the level of communication 
among partners -effect moderated by the fraction of work that need to be coordinated 
between partners- and the level of schedule pressure.  According to the data collected in 
the case, the priority given to the project quality goals affected the quality standards used 
and the effort deployed to assure quality.  The level of communications among partners 
also affected the level of quality.  When information needed by a partner from other 
partners to execute the tasks did not arrive on time or never arrives at all, the partner 
worked with preliminary information.  Then, incongruence between parts of the product 
elaborated by different partners was probably the result.  
 Finally, the level of schedule pressure was reported in the case data and in the 
literature (Ford and Sterman, 1998a; Reichelt and Lyneis, 1999; Lyneis et al. 2001) to 
affect the level of quality.  The higher the schedule pressure, the faster the project team 
members will work in order to reduce the schedule slippage, dedicating less effort to 
check the work completed and to care for details.  Hence, the level of quality is simulated 
by the following equation: 
 
quality1=iniqual_1*effcommqual1*effpriqual1*(1effschpressqual1)*frac_to_be_coord+ 
iniqual_1*effpriqual1*(1-effschpressqual1)*(1-frac_to_be_coord)  (15) 
Where: 
effcommqual1= effect of communication on the level of quality 1 
effpriqual1= effect of quality priority 1 on the level of quality 1 
effschpressqual1= effect of schedule pressure 1 on quality 1 
frac_to_be_coord= fraction of the work to be done that need to be coordinated with the Partner. 
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The quality sector is depicted in Fig. 5-8. 
 
Case 1 Model Effort Sector 
 In the model, the effort deployed by the participant organizations in the multi-
organizational project to perform the project tasks includes man-hours, computer time, 
space and all kind of required materials.  That effort is categorized in the following types: 
partner1’s effort (org1effort), coordinated effort (cooreffort 1), additional effort 
(addeffort1), rework effort (effort1 rew), revision effort (effort 1 rev), basework effort 
(effort 1), and total effort (tot effort1). 
 The partner effort is the effort that each partner should deploy in the project 
according to the project plan, which does not require to be coordinated with other 
partners.  On the other hand, the coordinated effort is the effort that requires coordination 
with other partners to be deployed, which is then affected by the level of communication 
among partners.  Additional effort is the effort deployed in response to a perceived 
schedule slippage in order to complete the work required by the project plan.  Rework 
effort is the effort deployed to execute the rework required on flawed products.  Revision 
effort is the effort deployed to review the other partners’ work.  Basework effort is the 
effort deployed to perform the basework and quality assurance tasks, and total effort is 
the sum of organizational, coordinated and additional efforts.  Because coordinated effort 
is affected by the level of communication, the level of total effort is simulated by the 
following equation: 
 
tot effort 1=planeffort1+addeffort1+comm*cooreffort1 (16) 
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According to the case data, the level of revision effort is given by the level of trust 
in the partner that submits the work -the higher the level of trust, the lower the effort 
deployed- and the amount of work to review.  Therefore, the level of revision effort is 
simulated by the following equation: 
 
effort1 rev=per_rev_eff1*tot_effort1*(1-trustin2)  (17) 
 
The level of effort allocated for rework tasks is a function of the level of perceived 
rework to be performed, which is assumed to be proportional to the amount of rework to 
be done accumulated. 
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Figure 5-9:  Case 1 Model Effort Sector 
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Assuming that the total effort is allocated to basework, rework, partners’ work 
and revision tasks, the level of effort available to perform basework (effort 1) is 
simulated by the following equation: 
 
effort1= tot_effort1-effort1_rev-effort1_rew (18) 
 
The effort sector is depicted in Fig. 5-9. 
 
Case 1 Model Scope Sector 
 
The level of priority given by partners to the scope goal ( scope pri1, scope pri 2), 
determines the resistance that project team members belonging to each partner pose to the 
reduction of project scope to reduce schedule slippage, as shown in the data collected for 
the case study.  Reducing scope would reduce the number of tasks to be completed, 
allowing the completion of the work on time without adding more effort or reducing 
quality.  The resistance to reduce scope affects the rate of scope reduction in the progress 
rework sector. The scope sector is depicted in Fig. 5-10. 
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5.3 Case 2 Model  
5.3.1 Case 2 Model Boundaries, Assumptions and Level of Aggregation 
 The second case studied presented a different situation compared to the first case.  
In the first case, the project team executed the project, while in the second case the 
project team only managed the project.  Hence, according to the case data collected, the 
way in which the level of goal alignment affected projects dynamics and performance 
was different, requiring the construction of two different models.  In the case in which the 
project team manages and executes the project, the two models could be integrated. 
 As in the first case model, the focus of the second case model is on the inner 
works of the studied multi-organizational project.  Hence, the assumptions made in the 
first case regarding model boundaries and levels of aggregation are also valid for the 
second case model.  In Fig.5-11, the case 2 model’s endogenous variables, exogenous 
variables and ignored variables are depicted. 
 The internal structure of the model that attempts to simulate the behavior of the 
multi-organizational project system as described in the case 2 is presented in the 
following section. 
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Figure 5-11: Endogenous, Exogenous and Ignored Variables for Case 2 Model. Adapted 
from Ford (1995) 
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as well as the rework of tasks with discovered errors.  The schedule sector simulates how 
the work actually completed is compared with the work that had to be completed at a 
certain point according to the project plan, with a negative difference resulting in a 
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to basework and rework tasks, as well as the deployment of additional effort to cope with 
schedule pressure.  The decision making sector simulates how the time required by the 
team that manages the project  is affected by the level of goal alignment between partners 
and the level of understanding that the senior management of the organizations 
participating in the project have about it.  The problem solving sector simulates how 
problems to be solved by the project team accumulates as a function of the time they 
require to make decisions, and of the rate at which new problems appear -such as quality, 
schedule or other kind of problems. The contractors’ supervision sector simulates how 
the level of problems to be solved by the project team affects the time available to 
supervise project contractors, then affecting the deployment of effort to review 
contractors’ work, and the prevention of schedule problems. Finally, the trust-
communication sector is similar to the one described in case 1, simulating how the level 
of trust and communication among partners is affected by the initial level of 
communication and trust and by the perceived level of alignment.  Before describing in 
detail each sector, it is suitable to explain how the exogenous variables affect the model 
sectors, and how the sectors interact between them to produce the dynamics present in the 
studied multi-organizational project, just as it was done for the previous case. 
 The relationships between the exogenous variables and the model sectors are 
presented in Fig 5-12. The exogenous variables are depicted in gray boxes.  These 
variables influence the variables included in the model, but are not affected by model 
outputs.  In this case, the level of alignment among the participants in the studied multi-
organizational project led to a certain level of trust between partners, to the degree of 
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flexibility in the interpretation of contract terms, and to the level of management involved 
in the decision making process. 
 
Figure5-12:  Effect of Exogenous Variables on Case 2 Model        
 
External factors that partners cannot control -for example, subcontractors 
failures in delivering products as specified or on time- affect the amount of problems to 
solve.  Planned effort affects the level of effort deployed and the perceived schedule 
slippage.  The fraction of work performed by the contractor to be reviewed by the project 
team affects the effort required to be deployed for that task, and also the impact of the 
level of communication between the project team and the contractor on the progress-
rework sector.  The time required for the transmission of information from the contractor 
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to the project team affects how quick the contractors’ work to be reviewed by the project 
team accumulates in the work to be reviewed stock.  Finally, the initial level of trust 
affects the level of trust between partners, and the level of quality that the contractor is 
able to deliver affects the level of rework, progress and quality problems.   
 The relationships between the model sectors are depicted in the Fig. 5-13.  The 
time required for decision making by the project team affects the rate at which problems 
are solved, and then the accumulation of problems to be solved.  The time required for 
decision making also has an impact on the progress-rework sector.  The contractor 
sometimes needs to wait for decisions that have to be made by the project team, delaying 
the execution of the associated tasks.  The amount of problems to be solved affects the 
amount of time available to the project team for the supervision of contractors.  The 
amount of time available for the supervision of contractors affects the level of effort 
deployed by the project team to the review the contractors’ work, and the prevention and 
fixing of schedule problems.  The level of schedule pressure generated in the schedule 
sector affects the deployment of additional effort to fix schedule slippage in the effort 
sector.  The amount of rework to do affects the amount of effort deployed to perform it. 
 The problem solving sector is affected by schedule slippage.  Schedule slippage 
adds more problems to solve, and also impacts the decision to deploy additional effort to 
meet deadlines.  Finally, the level of communication among the project team members 
belonging to the different organizations participating in the project affects the time 
required for decision making.  All these causal links affect the progress-rework sector 
through the timely delivery of instructions to the contractor, and the level of effort 
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deployed.  In the following section, the case 2 model sectors and the described 
relationships between them is described with further detail. 
 
Figure 5-13: Interactions between Case 2 Model Sectors  
 
Case 2 Model Progress-Rework Sector 
 As in the model corresponding to the first case, the progress- rework sector is at 
the core of the case 2 model.  This sector simulates the rate at which tasks are performed, 
the proportion of tasks that are flawed and requires rework and the rate at which that 
rework is performed.  
Effort 
Progress-Rework 
Work to be done
Work done
Progress
Work with pot. errors
Quality 
Rework 
Schedule 
Schedule Slippage
Schedule Pressure 
Contractor Supervision 
Time available for 
contractor supervision 
Effort for reviews
Trust
Communication
Knowledge about 
Partner 
Trust -Communication 
Time 
required for 
decision 
making 
Schedule    
Slippage 
Decision making effect on progress  
Communication 
Time required for decision
making 
Level of mgmt. 
involved 
Degree of flexibility in 
Contract interpretation
Effect on progress
Problem Solving 
Problems to be solved
Rate of problems 
addition 
Rate of problem solving 
Decision Making 
Rate of 
problem  
solving EffortEffort for rework 
Additional effort 
Effort 
Rework  
required 
 Schedule Slippage 
Effect on 
Add. Effort 
144
However, because in case 2 the work is performed by a single contractor, there is 
just one progress-rework cycle instead of the two that were included in the case 1 model.  
As in case 1, the progress-rework cycle is constituted by a stock of work to be performed 
(work to be done), a flow of basework performed (progress), a stock of work with 
potential errors (work with pot errors), a flow of flawed work (badwork), a flow of work 
without flaws (goodwork), a flow of rework performed (rework rate), and a stock of work 
completed (work done).  There is not a work to be done reduction flow and reduced work 
to be done stock in the second case model, because no scope reduction was reported in 
the case data. The progress-rework sector is depicted in Fig. 5-14. 
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Figure 5-14: Case 2 Model Progress-Rework Sector 
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The stock of work to be done is reduced by the execution of work.  The flow of 
work executed is determined by the following equation: 
 
progress=(work_to_be_done/dur_progress)*frac_of_work_req_feedback*dec_mak_eff_on_
progress+(work_to_be_done/dur_progress)*(1-frac_of_work_req_feedback) (19) 
 
Where: 
dur progress= average duration of basework tasks 
frac_of_work_req_feedback= fraction of the work performed by the contractor that requires 
feedback from the project team  
dec_mak_eff_on_progress= effect of delays in project team decision making on tasks execution 
 
In this case, where the project team does not execute the project but manages a 
contractor, the progress of tasks execution is affected by delays in project team decision 
making.  However, only the tasks that require feedback or specific instructions from the 
project team are the ones impacted by such delays. 
 The duration of tasks’ execution is determined by the level of effort deployed to 
perform them (effort).  However, as in the first case, the duration of basework tasks is not 
assumed to be proportional to the allocation of more effort to those activities -the 
allocation of effort is discussed while describing the effort sector.  The same assumptions 
as in the first case are made for the second case concerning the relationship between 
efforts deployed and task duration.  Hence, the relationship between effort and task 
duration is assumed to be an exponential decay, with a rate of decreasing duration that is 
reduced as more effort is added. 
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The basework completed flows to the stock of work with potential errors (work 
pot errors).  From there, products without flaws go to the stock of work completed, and 
the products in which errors are discovered go to the rework stock.  The fraction of 
products that does not require rework (goodwork) is defined by the quality level (quality).  
According to the data collected, quality is determined in this case only by the level of the 
contractors’ skills and capabilities.  
The flow of contractors’ work that does not require rework is simulated by the 
following equation: 
 
goodwork= (work_pot_errors/dur_prog)*quality (20) 
And the flow of products that require rework is simulated as follows: 
 
badwork= (work_pot_errors/dur_prog)*(1-quality)  (21) 
 
Rework is performed at a rate simulated by the following equation: 
 
rework rate=rework/dur_rework (22) 
Where: 
rework= level of rework required 
dur_rework = average duration of rework tasks 
 
The duration of rework tasks is also determined by the level of effort deployed to 
perform them (effort rew).  The duration of rework tasks is not assumed to be 
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proportional to the allocation of more effort to those activities.  The shape of the 
relationship is assumed to be exponential decay, like in the case of basework tasks.  The 
flow of reworked tasks will return to the stock of work with potential errors, because 
errors might also be present in reworked tasks. 
 A fraction of the work with potential errors (frac work to be rev) is reviewed by 
the project team.  That fraction flows to the stock of work to be reviewed by the project 
team (review) at a rate determined by the average work transmission duration from the 
contractor to the project team (inf tran dur).  Work without flaws is sent to the work done 
stock, and flawed work goes the work reviewed by the project with discovered errors.  
The proportion of work without flaws is determined by the level of the contractors’ 
quality.  The flows of work with flaws (rev badwork) and without flaws (rev goodwork) 
are simulated by the following equations: 
 
rev badwork=(review*(1-quality))/dur_rev (23) 
rev goodwork=(review*quality)/dur_rev    (24) 
Where: 
dur rev= average duration of project team reviewing tasks  
 
The average duration of the project team reviewing tasks is determined by the 
level of reviewing effort deployed by the project team.  As in the case of progress and 
rework effort, the relationship between reviewing effort and reviewing tasks’ average 
duration is also assumed to have an exponential decay shape.  
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The flow of badwork goes to the work reviewed by the project team that needs 
rework stock.  From there, work that needs rework flows back to the contractor rework 
stock.  That flow is determined by the average duration of information transmission from 
the project team to the contractor, which is assumed to be the same as in the case of the 
information flow from the contractor to the project team ( inf trans dur). 
 
Case 2   Model Decision Making Sector 
 According to the data collected in the case study, the average amount of time 
required by the project team for decision making is increased or decreased by the level of 
alignment among partners concerning project goals, and the level of understanding that 
partners’ management has about the project.  A low level of goal alignment would lead to 
a low degree of agreement on design and problem solving criteria between the project 
team members belonging to the different organizations involved.  That low level of 
agreement might create conflicts that lead to the involvement of higher levels of 
management of the respective participating organizations.  The lower the level of 
knowledge that management has about the project, the larger the amount of time required 
for decision making -more time has to be invested in presentations, reporting and 
explanations.  Moreover, the lack of common criteria for problem solving could also 
reduce the degree of flexibility in the interpretation of the contract terms.  Project 
partners might find it difficult to compromise without harming the objectives they have 
for the project.  That could limit the project team’s ability to find common ground and the 
adoption of optimal solutions to problems faced by the project. The decision making 
sector is depicted in Fig. 5-15.  
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The increment of the average time required by the project team for decision 
making (inc time req for dec making) is then simulated by the following equation: 
 
Inc time req for dec making=(1-comm)*(1-mgmt_unders)*(1-deg_of_flex)*lev_of_mgmt (25) 
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Figure 5-15:  Case 2 Model Decision Making Sector 
 
Where: 
comm= level of communication between partners 
mgmt_unders= level of partners’ management understanding of the project 
deg_of_flex= degree of flexibility for interpretation of contract terms 
lev_of_mgmt= level of management involved 
 
On the other hand, the reduction of the average time required by the project team 
for decision making (red time for dec making) is simulated by the following equation: 
 
red time for dec making= comm*mgmt_unders*deg_of_flex*(1-lev_of_mgmt) (26) 
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As mentioned in the progress-rework sector, the average amount of time required 
for decision making affects the execution of the contractor’s tasks that require feedback 
or information from the project team.  That effect is simulated by the decision making 
effect on progress (dec make eff on prog) converters. 
 
Case 2 Model  Problem Solving Sector 
 The rate of addition of problems to be solved by the project team is determined 
by the amount of quality problems (quality prob), assumed as a proportional to the level 
of contractor work quality, schedule problems (schedule slipp) and other problems 
created by external factors -for example, in the case analyzed, there were problems with 
the quality of certain components manufactured overseas.  External factors are not caused 
by model outcomes, and they are random in nature.  Hence, they are simulated by a 
random function. The problem solving sector is depicted in Fig. 5-16. 
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Figure 5-16:  Case 2 Model Problem Solving Sector 
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The rate of addition of new problems is given by the following equation: 
 
rate of prob add= ext_factors+sch_slipp+quality_prob (27) 
 
On the other hand, the rate of problem solving (rate of prob sol) is given by the 
time required for decision making.  If the rate at which new problems are added is higher 
than the rate at which problems are solved, problems will start to accumulate in the stock 
problems to be solved (prob to be solved). 
 
Model Contractor Supervision Sector 
 The case data shows that the accumulation of problems to solve reduces the 
amount of time available to the project team for contract supervision (time ava for 
contrac).  The availability of time for contractor supervision affects the level of effort 
deployed by the project team to review the contractor’s work (see Fig. 5-17).   
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Figure 5-17: Case 2 Model Contractor Supervision Sector 
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Case 2 Model Schedule Sector 
 In the schedule sector, the work actually completed at a certain point of the project 
execution by the contractor (work done) is compared to the work expected to be 
completed at that point according to the project plan (exp work done), in order to meet 
the required deadlines.  If the work actually completed is less than the work expected to 
be completed, then there is a schedule slippage (see Fig. 5-18). 
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Figure 5-18: Case 2 Schedule Sector 
 
Case 2 Model Effort Sector 
 Effort is deployed by the contractor according to the project plan (plan effort).  
However, additional effort (add eff) is also deployed to cope with schedule slippage (eff 
sch slipp add eff).  Hence, the total effort (tot effort) deployed is the addition of planned 
effort and additional effort.  According to the case data, the supervision exerted by the 
project team (eff time super add eff) contributes to the opportune detection of project 
delays, and then to the deployment of additional effort on a timely basis. 
 A certain part of the effort deployed by the contractor goes to basework (effort), 
and the other part goes to execute rework tasks (effort rew).  The amount of effort 
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allocated to rework tasks is a function of the perception that the contractor has of the 
amount of rework tasks that need to be executed. The effort sector is depicted in Fig.5-19.  
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Figure 5-19: Case 2 Model Effort Sector 
 
Case 2 Trust-Communication Sector 
 This sector is similar to the trust-communication sector described in the case 1 
model.  In the case 2 model, the equation proposed by Luna et al. (2004) is used again to 
simulate the level of trust in a certain moment between partners in the studied multi-
organizational project. 
 
trust in 1= 2’s knowledge about 1*2’s perception of 1’s trustworthiness+ (1-2’s knowledge 
about 1)* calculative trust (11) 
 
The trust equation adapted for the studied multi-organizational project is a follows:  
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trust in 1= initialtrustin1* (1- knowabout1) +knowabout1*align (12) 
Where: 
Initialtrustin1= level of trust in Partner 1 at the beginning of the project 
Knowabout1= accumulated knowledge about Partner 1 during the project 
align= level of goal alignment 
 
This equation simulates the level of trust in one partner by other partner at any 
moment in the project. 
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Figure5-20: Case 2 Model Trust-Communication Sector 
 
According to the case data, the level of trust among participants in the multi-
organizational project affected the level of communication.  Hence, the level of 
communication is simulated by the following equation: 
 
comm= inicomm*trustin1*trustin2 (13) 
Where: 
comm= level of communication between partners 1 and 2 
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potcomm= potential level of communication between 1 and 2 
trustin1= level of trust in 1 by 2 
trustin2= level of trust in 2 by 1 
 
The potential level of communication is assumed to be given by factors not related 
to the level of goal alignment, such as infrastructure, organizations’ cultures, 
management styles and policies.  The potential level of communication is then affected 
by the levels of trust between partners.  The resulting level of communication affects the 
rate at which knowledge about partners is accumulated (know1form).  The higher the 
level of communication, the faster partners would know about other partners’ 
requirements and objectives for the project. The trust-communication sector is depicted in 
Fig. 5-20. 
 
5.4 Summary 
 In this chapter, the scope, assumptions, variables and mathematical formulation of 
the models developed were discussed, as well as the support of that formulation on the 
case data and previous project system dynamics models.  This discussion constitutes the 
model documentation, and is intended to assist future researchers who would try to build 
on these models to develop other models adapted to different projects’ contexts, and to 
inform these researchers or other users about the assumptions made and their limitations.  
In the next section, the potential validity of the described models is discussed. 
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CHAPTER 6: MODELS VALIDATION AND BEHAVIOR 
ANALYSIS 
 
6.1 Chapter Overview. 
 
In this research effort, the approach suggested by Barlas (1996) to system 
dynamics models validation is used.  According to Barlas, a model is valid in the extent 
to which it serves its purpose.  Because the purpose of the elaboration of the models 
presented above is to represent the project system dynamics as described in the case data 
collected, it is required to determine to what extent the models are capable of reproducing 
these dynamics.  To do so, two basic verifications are required.  First, it is required to 
assess the validity of the model structure.  To accomplish that validation, an empirical 
structure oriented test as suggested by Forrester and Senge (1980) was used, consisting of 
the review of the model structure by participants in the studied projects. 
 Second, it is required to assess to what extent the project system’s behaviors as 
simulated by the models developed resemble plausible project behaviors according the 
case data.  To accomplish that assessment, a sensitivity analysis was performed on the 
models.  Because the focus of this research is to investigate how the level of goal 
alignment affects project performance, the sensitivity analysis was based on the 
observation of model behavior when the level of goal alignment among the organizations 
participating in the project is varied, including extreme conditions tests (Barlas, 1996).  In 
addition, possible moderating effects of the models’ exogenous variables were explored. 
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Moreover, in order to perform an initial assessment of the  extent to which the 
model could represent how the level of goal alignment affects project dynamics and 
performance in other multi-organizational projects, a panel of individuals with experience 
in several multi-organizational projects compared the model structures to their 
experiences.  Also, theoretical validation test were conducted, which consisted in 
comparing the models’ structures to previous research findings concerning project and 
collaborative work systems. 
 
6.2 Models Validation 
6.2.1 Models Structures Validation by Participants in the Studied Projects 
 A questionnaire -depicting the basic model structures both in graphics and verbal 
statements- was submitted to the project participants who collaborated with the study (see 
questionnaires in the Appendix B).  Participants were asked to assess to what extent the 
models’ structures reflected their experiences in the multi-organizational project studied.  
Participants were requested to write their assessment of each verbal statement describing 
a part of the model structure, pointing out what had to be added, eliminated or modified.  
Participants were also allowed to add comments not related specifically to any verbal 
statement.  
 Unfortunately, despite several requests for assistance, only two out of the five 
interviewed case 1’s participants responded the questionnaire.  The two respondents 
agreed with all the questionnaire statements.  
 On the other hand, all four case 2’s participants completed the questionnaire.  
Three of them supported all questionnaire statements.  One participant disagreed with 
158
statements 7, 8 and 9, mainly because he perceived that the amount of problems 
accumulated to be solved by the project team had no significant impact on the level of 
supervision on contractor, because supervisory tasks always have preeminence over other 
problem solving activities.  That perception might be related to the participant’s role in 
the project, which was the manager of the EPC contractor team, not directly involved in 
the partners’ project management team dynamics.  Because all other three interviewed 
participants supported these statements, they are considered supported.  However, further 
refinements of the model in different contexts should question to what extent the 
accumulation of problems divert attention form monitoring project progress on each case. 
 In conclusion, the assessment of the basic models structures by participants in the 
project provides confidence to a significant degree on these structures.  In addition, one 
comment was provided about the structures that should be considered for further model 
refinements or adaptations to different contexts.  In the next two sections, the assessment 
of the models structures by a panel of individuals with experience in different multi-
organizational projects is discussed.  Also, the model structures are contrasted with past 
research findings in related areas.  These analyses allow the evaluation of the potential 
validity of the model structures in contexts different from the studied projects. 
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6.2.2 Models Structures Validation by a Panel of Individuals with 
Experience in Multi-Organizational Projects  
 
A panel of five individuals with experience in diverse multi-organizational 
projects was asked to answer a questionnaire which included a graphic depiction of both 
models and their correspondent verbal statements.  That was done with the purpose of 
assessing to what degree the models developed were useful to describe how the level of 
goal alignment might affect multi-organizational projects performance in contexts 
different from the projects studied.  The panel was selected from a larger pool of 
individuals with project management experience in diverse industries.  Individuals with 
project management experience in more than one multi-organizational project in different 
industries -energy, pharmaceutical and chemical- were selected to complete the 
questionnaire.  Because the two models reflect different project situations -project 
executed by the project team in case 1, and project managed by project team in case 2- 
the subjects were asked to assess only the statements of the models that correspond to the 
situations in which they have experience.  All subjects assessed both models.  
 Table 6-1 presents a table reflecting the percentage of support given to each 
model statement.  
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Model 1 Statements  %
Support 
Model 2 Statements %
Support 
The level of goal alignment leads to the 
degree of agreement on the design and 
problem solving criteria (or the criteria to 
perform the trade-offs between the project 
cost, schedule, quality and scope priorities) 
 
100% The level of goal alignment leads to the 
degree of agreement on the design and 
problem solving criteria (or the criteria to 
perform the trade-offs between the 
project cost, schedule, quality and scope 
priorities) 
 
80% 
The degree of agreement on design and 
project solving criteria leads to the degree 
of Partners’ satisfaction with the trade-
offs performed in the project concerning 
the cost, schedule, quality and scope 
priorities.  
 
80% A low degree of agreement on design and 
problem solving criteria among partners 
leads to the involvement of a higher level 
of management in the decision making 
process 
80% 
Lack of satisfaction with the trade- offs 
performed in the project lead to animosity 
and to personal conflicts among the 
project team members, affecting the level 
of communication.
60% A low degree of agreement on design and 
problem solving criteria among partners 
provides a low degree of flexibility for 
decision making (requiring a stricter 
adherence to written agreements). 
 
80% 
Personal conflicts and low level of 
communication among the project team 
members produce delays in information 
exchange and products reviews. That 
hinders the project progress, or leads to 
work based on preliminary information, 
that in turns leads to low quality, rework, 
schedule pressure and reduced progress.
60% The level of trust among partners is 
influenced by the experiences lived 
during the negotiations and project 
planning phases (initial level of trust) and 
by the degree of agreement on design and 
problem solving criteria. The level of 
trust affects the level of communication 
(communications are driven in part by the 
expectations about the outcomes of the 
exchange). On the other hand, open 
communication (leading to understanding 
of Partners’ expectations and behaviors), 
generates higher levels of trust. 
 
80% 
 
The level of trust among the project team 
members is a function of past experiences 
with the same Partners (initial level of 
trust) and of the degree of agreement on 
design and project solving criteria. The 
level of trust affects the level of 
communication (communications are 
driven in part by the expectations about 
the outcomes of the exchange). On the 
other hand, open communication -leading 
to understanding of Partners’ behaviors, 
motivations and project developments- 
generates higher levels of trust. 
 
80% The level of communication among 
partners, the level of management 
involved, the management’s level of 
understanding of the project problems, 
and the degree of decision flexibility 
available influence the amount of time 
required for decision making.  
 
60% 
Table 6-1:   Percentage of Panel Members Supporting Models Statements  
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Model 1 Statements  %
Support 
Model 2 Statements %
Support 
The level of communication among partners 
affects the level of understanding of the 
inputs required by the other Partners to 
perform their work, the adequacy of 
activities planning and the deployment of 
resources on a timely basis. The 
deployment of resources on a timely basis 
affects the level of effort and project 
progress 
 
80% 
The amount of time required for decision 
making determines the progress in 
problem solving, and then the 
accumulation of problems to solve 
 
80% 
The level of communication among 
partners affects the level of coordination 
when partners are working in a parallel or 
concurrent way. This might affect the sub-
products’ integration later in the project. 
Problems with sub-products integration 
could generate rework, schedule pressure 
and possible scope reduction, affecting 
project progress 
 
80% The accumulation of problems to solve 
defines the amount of time available to 
partners for the supervision of contractors 
and for project schedule monitoring. 
60% 
The level of trust among partners affects 
the level of effort allocated to review 
partners’ work. A higher level of effort 
allocated to review partners’ products 
might take resources from doing work, 
generating delays and affecting project 
progress. 
 
60% Longer decision making times and less 
time available for contract supervision 
leads to delays in product reviews and in 
communications with the contractors, 
affecting creating project delays. 
60% 
Less time available for schedule 
monitoring prevents partners to 
proactively identify causes of potential 
project delays, increasing their 
probability of occurrence 
60% 
Quality problems, project delays and 
external factors create new problems to 
solve. 
 
80% 
Table 6-1:   Percentage of Panel Members Supporting Models Statements (Continued) 
 
As can be observed in Table 6-1, the minimum support for a statement is 60%, 
which provides some sustain to the idea that the project dynamics observed in the cases 
studied as responses to the level of goal alignment resemble the dynamics experienced in 
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other multi-organizational projects.  Moreover, the support observed for the models 
developed encourage to some extent their use as a departing point for the analysis of the 
dynamics induced by the level of goal alignment in other multi-organizational projects. 
 Nonetheless, the subjects were instructed not only to provide support or challenge 
the model statements, but also to comment on their reasons for that support or challenge. 
These comments and their implication for the model structure and future research are 
discussed below. 
 A comment regarding trust formation was that trust is an inter-personal and not an 
inter-organizational phenomenon, and that trust formation required direct personal 
observation of partners’ behavior.  In other words, trust can be developed between 
persons and not between organizations.  According to this observation, the level of trust 
in project team members belonging to partners’ organizations can vary among the 
different project team members belonging to the same organization.  Zaheer et al. (1998) 
defined two different constructs of trust in an inter-organizational context: 
“interpersonal” trust and “interorganizational” trust.  Interpersonal trust is defined as the 
degree to which a boundary spanning agent trusts his or her counterpart in the partner 
organization.  Interorganizational trust concerns to the extent of trust placed in the partner 
organization as a whole by the members of a focal organization.  
 Zaheer et al. conducted an empirical study in 107 different buyer-supplier 
relationships to determine the roles of interpersonal and interorganizational trusts on the 
relationship performance.  The study concluded that interpersonal and interorganizational 
trust are different but related constructs, and play different roles in exchange 
performance.  Interpersonal and inter-organizational trust seemed to reinforce one 
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another, and interorganizational trust seemed to have a larger influence on exchange 
performance.  The study also concluded that the aggregation of the levels of interpersonal 
trust should not be used as a proxy for inter-organizational trust.  In the context of the 
cases studied in this dissertation, the level of perceived goal alignment influenced the 
extent to which a partner’s project team member trusted the other partners’ organizations, 
then influencing the level of interpersonal trust.  In other words, the level of goal 
alignment affected the level of interorganizational trust, which in turn affected the level 
of interpersonal trust.  Hence, although the distinction between interpersonal and inter-
organizational trust should be always considered while analyzing multi-organizational 
relationships, in the cases studied in this research it does not represent a problem for the 
proposed model structures. 
 A panel member challenged the model statements according to which the low 
level of goal alignment led to conflict, which then might lead to animosity between 
project team members then hindering communication and trust for case 1, and to the 
delay of the project team decision making process in case 2.  The panel member stated 
that in some cases conflicts can be positive, leading to the generation of innovative 
solutions to certain problems.  Intra-team conflict literature supports the idea that, to 
some degree, task and process conflicts can be beneficial for team performance, because 
teams seems to benefit from differences of opinions about the work being done 
(Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven,1990; Shah and Jehn,1993; Jehn,1995; Jehn and Mannix, 
2001).  However, the particular context of the multi-organizational projects studied made 
the relationships between project team members to be both inter-team and intra-team in 
nature.  They are intra-team because project team members belonged to a particular team, 
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with the objective of accomplishing certain goals in an interdependent way.  However, 
project team members’ relationships can be also characterized as inter-team because 
project team members belonged to different organizations -they even stay in their original 
locations.  Inter-team conflict has been seen in the literature as negative for 
organizational performance (Putnam, 1997; Richter et al. 2005)  Besides, experimental 
social psychology research findings suggests that goal conflict intensifies hostile inter-
team behavior (Schopler et al. 2001).  
 Research findings also suggest that relationship or affective conflict in the form of 
interpersonal animosity lead to anxiety that might inhibit cognitive processing and then 
problem solving processes (Staw et al., 1981; Roseman et al., 1994).  In case 1, lack of 
goal alignment led to a high level of animosity between the project team members 
belonging to different organizations.  Finally, problem solving activities are more 
constructive when they seek a settlement that integrates the goals of all the parties 
involved (Lawrence and Lorsh, 1967; Thomas, 1992; Nauta and Sanders, 2000).  As a 
conclusion, it seems that, in the particular case of multi-organizational projects, conflicts 
rooted in lack of goal alignment might not be favorable for project team process 
performance. 
 Another model 2 statement challenged was that the low time available for 
contractor supervision might be detrimental to the project team ability of monitoring 
project progress, and then of the ability of influencing contractor’s resources allocation 
strategy to prevent schedule slippage problems.  The panel member suggested that too 
much supervision might interfere with the contractor’s work.  That claim also has support 
in the literature.  Minimizing interference and giving autonomy to the organizations most 
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responsive to problems increases efficiency in task execution (Lawrence and Lorsh, 
1967).  Moreover, Rodrigues and Williams (1998) suggest that a client too involved in 
day to day project activities might end up demanding too many progress reports, which 
might divert contractor effort from real progress work.  Hence, the observation advanced 
by the panel member is pertinent and should be considered when analyzing other multi-
organizational projects.  However, in case 2 what was influencing project performance 
was not the lack of time available for monitoring day to day contractor activities, but the 
lack of time available for analyzing potential problems and providing contractor with 
input about how to deal with them, as well as with constructive feedback about project 
progress, in order to ensure the achievement of project objectives.  
 Other comments were formulated by the panel, but not challenging the proposed 
model structures.  Conversely, the comments point out particular situations that might 
enhance the support for the causal effects described in these structures.  One comment 
referred to the fact that in some cases the senior management of the participant 
organizations could block the decision making process while trying to impose a solution 
to a problem which was not acceptable for other partners.  Another related comment was 
that in some cases delays in project team decision making process are aggravated by 
having too many possible alternatives.  That observation is shared by Thomsen et al. 
(2005), who suggests that the lack of distinct alternatives might reduce the likelihood of 
conflict of desired alternatives rooted in goal incongruence.  A comment was issued 
suggesting that a high level of role definition, through which partners would know 
exactly what to do and when to do it, might reduce the level of interdependence and then 
the necessity of a high level of communication.  That comment is also supported by the 
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literature.  High levels of task interdependence have been related to an intensification of 
the goal incongruence effects (Schmidt and Kochan, 1972; Gladstein, 1984).  A final 
comment stated that cultural issues in international multi-organizational projects -in 
particular when Asian and Western organizations are involved- add to the communication 
difficulties generated by the low level of goal alignment.   
 To summarize, the assessment of the basic model structures by the panel of 
individuals with experience in multi-organizational projects provided supported the idea 
that these structures could be useful to develop models for other multi-organizational 
projects.  On the other hand, comments were provided by the panel members about the 
structures that should be considered for further model refinements or adaptations to 
different contexts. 
 
6.2.3 Comparison of the Models’ Structures to Past Research Findings in 
Related Areas 
 Forrester and Senge (1980) suggest that system dynamics models verification may 
comprise comparing model assumptions to descriptions of organizational relationships or 
decision making processes included in relevant literature.  Then, to advance further in the 
assessment of the degree to which the developed model structures could be valid for other 
contexts, they were compared with previous descriptions of the relationships between 
variables affecting performance in multi-organizational collaborative efforts.  Because, to 
the best of my knowledge, there is no previous research addressing exactly the same 
question concerning how the level of goal alignment affects project performance in multi-
organizational projects, model structures derived from the data collected were compared 
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to findings in past research in related areas such as multi-organizational collaborative 
relationships, trust formation and its effect on team performance, effects of goal 
incongruence on project teams and project systems dynamics.  Given that the research 
works reviewed do not directly address the question of how the level of goal alignment 
affects project performance in multi-organizational projects, caution was upheld while 
using those previous research findings in other contexts to sustain or question the models’ 
assumptions. 
 
O’Sullivan Work          
 O’Sullivan (2003) studied the effect of the imposition of administrative standards 
for work content and timing on the performance of a virtual multi-organizational product 
development project.  Based on a literature review, Sullivan suggested that a major 
challenge faced by a virtual team (not co-located) is the absence of a shared work 
context.  Shared work context includes norms and routines (Ancona and Chong, 1996) 
time horizons (Doughberty, 1992), and work pace (Gersick, 1989).  The placement of 
project team members in different geographic locations might lead, according to O’ 
Sullivan, to a “ contextual depletion” of people’s work, which might affect negatively 
that work whenever it is interdependent.  Lack of verbal and non-verbal cues might lead 
to problems in the control of the conversational exchanges and feedback.  These 
problems can be reflected in a lack of synchronicity in team communications, which 
could lead to disorganized discussion or coordination problems (Montoya-Weiss et al. 
2001). 
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Beside the problems described a in the previous paragraph, a multi organizational 
virtual team, the focus of O’Sullivan research, might be affected by two additional issues.  
First, because team members stay in the same location within their organizations, they are 
subject to their influence and also to the influence of the project team.  These influences 
might be contradictory and a source of conflict.  Second, project team members need to 
establish collaborative activities with other team members working in remote locations.  
Because product development activities are usually knowledge-intensive and highly 
interdependent (Perlow, 1999), a significant number of interactions between project team 
members might be important for critical design decisions.  That could make 
synchronicity in the flow of information fundamental for design quality and project 
performance.  Hence, managing the effect of contextual influences on communication 
and coordination among the project team members is critical to facilitate the development 
of integrative work configurations and project performance. 
 O’ Sullivan conducted his research through a case study analyzing work patterns 
in an aerospace product development project, in which a leading organization worked 
with 20 suppliers, located in different geographical sites.  To accomplish the project 
objectives, the leading organization deployed two strategies.  The first was a 
modularization of the design, which reduced the amount of interfaces and 
interdependence between the suppliers, and defined standards for the performance of 
each subsystem.  The second was a profound standardization of the work patterns, 
including how, where and when the work should be performed.  To achieve that 
standardization, the leading organization made use of four tools.  First, a digital model 
based in a specific design software application, which had to be employed by all 
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suppliers.  Second, direct communications were standardized through a ‘coordinating 
memo’ template.  Third, a master schedule was devised and implemented, matching and 
integrating all suppliers’ and individuals’ schedules, to ensure the proper work 
synchronization.  Forth, the suppliers’ project managers were required to be co-located 
for a period of time at the beginning of the project to ensure they learn and internalize the 
work standards.  
 The O’Sullivan study findings and their relevance for this dissertation are 
discussed below.  The studied project was reported as a success, and the researcher 
attributes that success to the following factors.  First, the project team members achieved 
a mutual adaptation of the work configurations.  That adaptation was ensured by the 
leading organization by making the standardized contextual information available to all 
participants, and reinforced by the partial co-location of the project managers.  Second, 
the early definition of the standardized interactions between the subsystems, as well as of 
the performance standards, facilitated the success of the modularization strategy.  Third, 
the master schedule had a significant positive effect on work synchronization, but created 
a tension between a work rhythm based on the reality of events and a work rhythm based 
on a calendar.  According to the study findings, that tension was addressed by adding 
more resources to the project by the suppliers.  Finally, O’Sullivan concluded that a 
significant part of the success of the studied multi-organizational project could be 
explained by the early identification of what information needed to be shared among the 
participants, reducing the need of communication and coordination.  The development 
effort meant different things for the diverse participants, but they were able to define a 
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joint outcome in terms of shared deliverables and deadlines, providing the required 
common social context. 
 O’Sullivan’s work is relevant to this dissertation because it studied the case of a 
multi-organizational project, and analyzed some of the factors related to work design that 
affected performance.  In particular, O’Sullivan findings emphasize the importance of 
communication, coordination and synchronization of work in multi-organizational 
projects.  The success of the project was attributed in a significant part to the work 
standardization that the leading organization put in place to ensure that coordination.  In 
this dissertation research, specifically in case 1, communication, coordination and 
synchronization of work were found fundamental to explain the level of project 
performance as affected by the level of goal alignment.  However, because there was not 
apparent goal misalignment among the participating organizations in the case studied by 
O’Sullivan, lack of goal alignment was not a factor that hindered the achievement of the 
required level of communication between partners.  Hence, every project team member 
received the information required on time, and that information was clear on what the 
design requirements were and when the deliverables were needed by other project team 
members.  That contrasts with what was observed in case 1, where the low level of goal 
alignment led to a low level of trust and communication, preventing in some cases the 
opportune deployment of effort ,and making team members work with preliminary 
information, impacting negatively the level of quality. 
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The Thomsen, Jin, Levitt, Nass, Chistiansen, and Kunz Work           
 Thomsen, Jin, Levitt, Nass, Chistiansen, and Kunz developed a computational 
organizational analysis tool denominated Virtual Design Team (VDT) (Jin and Levitt, 
1996; Levitt et al., 1999).  Based on Galbraith’s (1973) information processing view of 
the organization, VDT simulates team participants as information–processing units with 
skill sets, experience, and explicitly modeled by lateral interdependences between 
activities.  VDT is based on the assumption that coordination work takes time and effort, 
with the potential of delaying work completion, increasing costs, and affecting quality.  
VDT contains three basic representational entities.  First, there are actors, modeled as 
informational processing units, who perform tasks within a team.  Second, there is an 
organizational hierarchy, defining supervisor-supervisee relationships and how 
exceptions to routine work are handled.  Third, there is a representation of work 
processes.  Activities are assigned to actors, and actors communicate in response to 
exceptions, or to accomplish interdependent tasks.  In the VDT simulation engine, 
organizations are conceptualized as a network of communication channels.  Information 
is processed at nodes (actors) and different types of communications-like decisions or 
exceptions- are transmitted. 
 The VDT concept was extended to analyze project situations in which team 
members are involved in non-routine tasks, with a certain degree of flexibility on how 
they can be executed.  Moreover, project team members could bring potentially 
incongruent goals to the project.  This extension resulted in the Virtual Team Alliance 
(VTA) (Thomsen et al, 2005).  Based on organizational theory and experimental social 
psychology, VTA accounts for factors that could moderate the effect of goal 
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incongruence on the development of task conflicts and participants’ behavioral responses.  
These factors are: activity flexibility -the size of the space of possible solutions that could 
satisfy activity requirements-activities interdependence, disparity in participants’ 
competence, team experience in working together and supervisors’ preference for micro-
management.  
 VTA considers that higher activity flexibility would amplify the effect of goal 
incongruence, because the lack of alternatives would reduce the likelihood of conflict.  
Goal incongruence would have an effect on the actors involved in a relationship only if 
they are mutually interdependent (Thomson, 1967).  One actor’s awareness of his higher 
competence and skills in a particular area would make him avoid wasting time in a 
conflict with the other part perceived as less competent.  The actor with higher expertise 
would simply appeal to a higher authority to resolve the conflict (Pfeffer, 1981).  Team 
members with a high amount of experience working together would be more willing to 
cooperate with other team members.  Because team members lack of knowledge about 
partners’ future behaviors, they would rely on past experiences to assess them, thereby 
being more willing to compromise in case of conflict (March, 1995).  Finally, managers 
with a tendency to micromanage would probably engage more in monitoring activities, 
reducing project team problem solving capabilities by reducing project team’ s autonomy 
in case of high goal incongruence. 
 VTA also relies on actors’ “canonical information processing micro-behaviors” to 
simulate project participants’ behaviors while reacting to goal incongruence and conflict.  
These micro-behaviors are listed and described below. 
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• Exception Generation.  Exceptions occur when the information available to an 
actor responsible for a certain activity is less than the information required.  
Exceptions can be technical errors or non-conformances.  Non-conformances are 
originated in goal incongruence between supervisor and subordinate.  Exceptions 
are forwarded to an appropriate supervisor who would decide how to handle it. 
• Selective Delegation of Authority.  Higher goal incongruence would lead 
managers to request a larger fraction of exceptions to be reported to them for 
decisions making. 
• Information Exchange.  VTA includes five “canonical interaction micro-
behavioral processes” that actors develop in response to goal incongruence.  
These five processes are: monitoring, which incorporates all the specific activities 
managers develop to exert control; peer communication, including “steamrolling” 
-an actor appeals to a higher authority to force a partner to perform an action- and 
politicking -an actor persuades a partner to perform an action based on a promise 
of future concessions searching for alternatives to conflict, and goal clarification. 
 A VTA macro-behavior emerges as a product of the interaction between a certain 
level of goal incongruence, the “canonical micro-behaviors”, and the factors that 
moderate the effect of goal incongruence on actors’ behaviors.  For low to intermediate 
levels of goal incongruence the diversity of behavioral selections available to the project 
team can be increased, improving project performance.  However, higher levels of goal 
incongruence might lead to time consuming discussions and arguments, negatively 
impacting project performance.  Hence, VTA predicts a U shape relationship between the 
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level of goal incongruence and project performance.  VDT and VTA have been validated 
in several test cases (Thomsen et al. 1998a, 1998b, 1998c). 
 VDT and VTA were developed under the premise that project team members 
belong to a single organization.  However, the fact that the simulation models deal with 
how goal incongruence within a project team might affect project performance makes 
those models amenable for comparison to the models developed in this dissertation.  
 There are several similarities between the VDT/VTA models and the models 
developed as a product of the present research effort.  Regarding the participants’ 
behaviors as reactions to goal incongruence, the selective delegation of authority included 
in the VDT/VTA models was also found in our case 2.  According to case 2 data, the 
lower the level of alignment -or higher the level of goal incongruence- the higher the 
level of management that needs to be involved to solve the goal conflict.  The same is 
valid for monitoring behaviors.  No evidence of the steamrolling and politicking 
mechanisms described in the VDT/VTA models was found in the cases studied here.  
Probably, the fact that in our cases the project team members belonged to different 
organizations made it more difficult to use those mechanisms, because there was a low 
level of trust induced by the low level of goal alignment.  However, the searching of 
alternatives and goal clarification was in place in the cases studied here, but it was 
disrupted to some extent by the low level of trust and communication between the project 
team members.  
 Another fundamental difference between the VDT/VTA models and the findings 
of this research is that, in the VDT/VTA models’ case, the level of communication 
increases to a certain point as the level of goal incongruence increases, because actors 
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engage in the search for alternatives to solve the conflict.  In the cases studied here, lower 
levels of alignment -or higher goal incongruence- would lead to lower levels of trust and 
communication.  Again, this discrepancy could be attributed to the fact that in our cases 
project team members belong to different organizations and no relationship conflict was 
considered.  However, this discrepancy should be subject of further research. 
 Concerning the contingency factors that might moderate the effect of goal 
incongruence on project team members’ behaviors, the level of activity interdependence 
is significant for both VDT/VTA models and this dissertation models.  A higher level of 
interdependence leads to a higher need of coordination and communication, amplifying 
the effect of goal incongruence (Gladstein, 1984).  The disparity in actors’ competence 
affected actors in case 1 in a different way from that assumed in the VDT/VTA models.  
The disparity in competence in case1 contributed to a low level of trust, and then to a 
higher level of effort in reviewing partners’ work.  On the other hand, the amount of 
experience that team members have accumulated working together seems to have a 
similar effect in the VDT/VDA models and the cases studied in this research.  Higher 
levels of experience working together would allow partners to substitute direct 
knowledge of other partners’ intentions for the project with inferences from past partners’ 
behavior, determining the initial level of trust, communication and willingness to 
cooperate. 
 Finally, there is another difference between the VDT/VTA models and the models 
proposed in this dissertation.  In case 1, the level of goal alignment affected project 
dynamics through the determination of a level of trust, communication and quality, as 
well as the ability to coordinate the deployment of effort when required.  In case 2, the 
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level of alignment affected trust and communication, and then the project team’s ability 
to make opportune decisions that affected the deployment of effort.  Conversely, 
VDT/VTA models emphasize the project team members’ ability to find solutions to 
conflicts originated in goal incongruence in an efficient way. 
 
The Bstieler Work      
 Bstieler (2006) examined the antecedents of trust formation and the effect of trust 
on new product development partnerships.  Based on previous research, Bstieler 
suggested a model in which the level of communication, shared problem solving, 
perceived fairness, level of conflicts and the presence of egoistic behaviors are the 
antecedents of partnership efficacy and project performance.  Trust plays the role of 
mediator between the aforementioned antecedents and the outcomes.  To test the model, 
Bstieler conducted an empirical study of medium-size to large machinery manufacturers.  
Data for 44 new products developed through partnerships was collected from 34 different 
manufacturers.  
 The study findings support the significant impact of communications on trust 
formation.  Timely and reliable information exchange permits partners to capture and 
understand other partners’ thoughts, context and needs concerning the project, allowing 
the achievement of high levels of trust.  Perceived fairness through a balanced 
distribution of project benefits also affects trust formation.  On the other hand, the 
absence of conflicts was found to be the most important factor in trust development. 
 Trust was found to affect positively the performance measures employed in the 
study -product performance in the market, time efficiency and partnership satisfaction.  
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Trust was also found to act as a “balancing mechanism” mitigating the negative impact of 
conflicts on project performance.  Finally, trust seems to positively impact the quality of 
communication between partners. 
 Although the Bstieler study is not focused on the effect of goal alignment on 
project performance, it is still relevant for this dissertation research because it shows that 
conflicts -lack of goal alignment is a source of conflicts in the cases studied- are a 
determinant factor in trust formation, and that trust has a positive impact on the quality of 
communication between partners and on project performance.  Moreover, the level of 
communications between partners has a positive effect on the level of trust, completing 
the reinforcing loop described in this dissertation.  These relationships are fundamental in 
the structure of the models developed in this dissertation, explaining how the level of 
goal alignment affects project performance in a multi-organizational project. 
 
The Rodrigues and Williams Work   
A study particularly relevant to the case 2 model is the one conducted by 
Rodrigues and Williams (1998).  In that study, a system dynamic model was developed to 
analyze the impact of clients’ behaviors on project performance.  The authors developed 
their model based on previous system dynamic models aimed to illustrate and quantify 
the impact of disturbances introduced by one of the parties involved in a project (Cooper, 
1980; Weil and Etherton, 1990; Willliams et al., 1995), in order to assist the other party 
in a dispute resolution.  These models characterized the relationship between client and 
contractor by two communication processes: the continuous reporting of progress and 
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achievement of major milestones, and the continuous revision of the product definition 
and functionality. 
 According to the data collected from the previous models, the report of progress 
toward milestones might generate dynamics in response to external disturbances that 
could affect project performance.  In the case that the contractor fails to meet certain 
milestones, the level of client trust on the contractor would decrease.  The contractor’s 
way to recover from the schedule slippage could lead to worse overruns later.  On the 
other hand, the client may not be willing to accept delays early in the project to favor 
success at later stages, leading the contractor to tamper solutions or to hide the delays.  
As a consequence, communications between contractor and client deteriorate, and 
conflicts become more counter-productive. 
 The continuous review of product specifications might also lead to 
communication problems between client and contractor.  As the product is developed, 
intermediate sub-products are assessed by the client and the contractor.  That assessment 
process is intended to identify misunderstandings concerning system requirements.  
However, the outcome of the process might be a growing disagreement between the 
parties.  Clients tend to demand more functionality in the product that the contractors 
think they have agreed to, especially because of ambiguities in the contract.  Differences 
in the criteria to approach the cost-functionality trade offs would lead to a reduction in 
the level of trust. 
 Rodrigues and Williams used these previously validated dynamics as assumptions 
for their model.  However, the authors also collected data from another case to complete 
the model describing the influence of client behavior on project performance.  The case 
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was the development of a “Command and Fire” control system for the Korean Navy.  The 
data collected from the case add the following dynamics to the model.  First, the 
introduction of changes and the delay in approving design documents by the client leads 
the contractor to perform work out of sequence, deteriorating the level of quality.  As 
more errors start to be detected, the contractor’s staff loses trust in the current definition 
of product specifications, which leads to a reduced productivity, affecting progress and 
inducing schedule slippages and schedule pressure.  The schedule slippage tended to 
cause the deterioration of the client trust in the contractor’s project team, making the 
client to demand more and more reports, distracting the project team’s attention from 
project tasks to reporting tasks, reducing progress and creating more schedule slippage, in 
a reinforcing feedback loop of trust deterioration and productivity loss. 
 The model developed by Rodrigues and Williams was calibrated to real project 
data in a “post-mortem” analysis, and it was able to reproduce to a large extent the 
observed project behaviors, which provides confidence in its validity.  The Rodrigues and 
Williams’ model has various implications for the models developed for this dissertation.  
First, in the particular case of the case 2 model, the impact of delays in approving 
documents by the client on project dynamics and performance observed by Rodrigues 
and Williams validates to some degree the case 2 model’s structure.  A significant part of 
the impact of the level of goal alignment on project performance in the case 2 model is 
through delays in the client project team decision making process, which might lead to 
delays in the contractor work. 
 Second, the impact of a continuous revision of product specifications by the client 
as described by Rodrigues and Williams is to some degree similar to the impact of one of 
180
the partners’ behavior in case 1, who is contractor and  product user at the same time.  
That partner always wanted to stretch the product capabilities to the largest extent 
possible in order to satisfy all its requirements, even beyond cost and contractual 
considerations.  As in the case studied by Rodrigues and Williams, the disagreement in 
the way to approach the product functionality -cost trade off - due to a low level of 
quality goal alignment- led to a deterioration of the level of trust and communication 
among the case 1’s project partners, leading to lower levels of quality, more rework, 
schedule pressure and then to more quality problems, as well as difficulties in 
coordinating the deployment of the effort required on a timely basis. 
 
The Black and Luna Work            
 In the literature review discussed in this dissertation, a mention was made of a 
system dynamics model attempting to represent the interaction between collaboration, 
trust and knowledge sharing in a multi-organizational project setting (Black et al., 2003).                     
That model was the product of a case studying the development of an information system 
by an agency of the New York State government in collaboration with state funded 
housing services providers.  The main assumption of the model is that collaborative work 
is entrenched in a series of reinforcing processes associated with participants learning 
partners’ roles, needs, restrictions and objectives concerning the project work.  The 
model encompasses three main parts: a project model simulating the dynamics of 
performing work -similar to the progress-rework cycles of the models developed in this 
dissertation- the stocks of knowledge of participants own and other partners’ work with 
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the resultant levels of trust and engagement to continue the collaborative effort, and the 
influence of a facilitator on the communicational exchanges between the participants. 
 The basic dynamics represented in the model are described as follows.  A 
participant’s engagement in the collaborative effort depends on her sense of progress and 
level of trust in other participants.  The level of trust depends on how much a participant 
knows about other participants’ roles, needs, constraints and objectives for the project. 
That knowledge accumulates as participants work together, and the higher the level of 
knowledge, the lower the probability of making mistakes, diminishing the amount of 
rework required, increasing productivity, progress and the level of engagement.  The 
higher the level of engagement, the more partners work together, increasing their level of 
knowledge about their roles, constraints and objectives.  Moreover, higher levels of trust 
lead to a higher probability of information sharing, increasing the level of knowledge 
about participants’ roles, constraints and objectives in the project. 
 Even though the Black et al. model does not consider the effect of a possible lack 
of goal alignment in the collaborative effort, it is still relevant for this research effort 
because it provides evidence of the mutual relationship between trust and communication 
in a multi-organizational project setting, as well as of the influence of the level of 
communication between the participants in the project on quality and productivity.  
 A significant difference between the Black et al. model and the models proposed 
in this dissertation is the relationship between the levels of trust among participants in the 
project, the sense of progress and the participants’ engagement in the collaborative effort.  
Black et al. found evidence in their case that the level of engagement of the entities 
participating in the project depended on the perception that the project objectives are 
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being achieved, and on the level of trust between participants.  On the other hand, in the 
cases studied in this dissertation research, that evidence was not found.  In the cases 
studied here the level of trust affects the level of communication between partners, but 
not the level of engagement or effort deployed on the project.  A possible explanation of 
that discrepancy is that the project studied by Black et al. was a completely collaborative 
one, where participants were involved in a “voluntary” way.  Conversely, in the cases 
studied in this dissertation, the participants were “obliged” to participate and deliver 
products according to a contract.  Hence, participants were not able to restrain effort if 
their objectives for the project were not accomplished because they were legally forced to 
do so. 
 
The Andres and Zmud Work        
 Andres and Zmud (2002) advanced a research model suggesting that goal conflict, 
task interdependence and coordination strategies significantly affect productivity and 
satisfaction in software design projects.  In their literature review the authors found that 
goal conflict can disrupt information exchange, undermine commitment, reduce team 
cohesion, and the team’s ability to adapt to changes and to solve problems (Boehem and 
Ross, 1989; Amason and Schweiger, 1997).  Hence, a hypothesis was proposed 
suggesting that software design activities characterized by low goal conflict would be 
more successful than software design activities characterized by high goal conflict 
conditions. 
 Task interdependence was another factor considered in the model.  In the 
literature review, Andres and Zmud found that high levels of task interdependence 
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required higher level of information exchange in order to clarify roles, assignments, 
project requirements, and progress.  Productivity was reduced because of the efforts 
required to establish shared mental models concerning task requirements, which are 
needed for successful effort integration (Straus and McGrath, 1994).  Moreover, the 
progress of a team member was often held up while waiting for an output produced by 
other team member (Saavedra et al., 1993).  Then, a hypothesis was advanced suggesting 
that software activities characterized by low task interdependence are more successful 
than software design activities characterized by high task interdependence.  
 Concerning coordination strategies, Andres and Zmud used the characterization 
suggested by Burns and Stalker (1961) which classifies coordination strategies in organic 
-reflecting an informal, cooperative and decentralized strategy- and mechanistic -
reflecting a formal, controlling and centralized strategy.  Informal horizontal 
communications favor the performance of jointed problem solving activities, as well as 
task clarification, task sequencing and synchronization of activities.  Moreover, a 
decentralized decision making strategy allows the decisions to be made at the most 
sensitive levels, minimizing decision making delays and increasing task performance 
efficiency.  Hence, Andres and Zmud stated the following hypothesis: software design 
activities managed with a centralized coordination strategy are less successful than 
software design activities managed with an organic coordination strategy. 
 Andres and Zmud also advanced hypothesis concerning possible interactions 
between coordination strategy and task interdependence, and between coordination 
strategy and goal conflict.  The model was tested through a 2x2x2 factorial experimental 
design, using MBA and MIS students as subjects.  The experiment results showed that 
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projects characterized by low task interdependence displayed higher productivity than 
projects with higher tasks interdependence.  Projects managed with an organic 
coordination strategy were more productive than projects managed with a mechanistic 
coordination strategy.  Organic coordination was more successful in projects 
characterized for high tasks interdependence than in projects with low tasks 
interdependence.  
 As predicted, goal conflict was found negatively associated with productivity, 
although not in statistically significant way.  However, the findings regarding the 
interaction between goal conflict and task interdependence contrasted with the 
hypotheses formulated.  The effect of goal conflict on productivity was not found to be 
exacerbated by higher levels of task interdependence, as the proposed hypothesis 
suggested.  Andres and Zmud offered an explanation for the absence of the expected 
interaction.  They suggest that larger task durations were required to develop the negative 
effects of goal conflict, including reduced effort commitment and task integration 
difficulties. 
 The Andres and Zmud’s work explores relationships included in the structures of 
the models proposed in this dissertation, although not in a multi-organizational project 
setting.  The study findings underline the effect of the level of communication between 
project team members on productivity, in particular when the tasks performed are highly 
interdependent.  Moreover, the relationship between a more autonomous decision making 
and task performing productivity is also supported -relevant in particular for model 2.  
 However, the study findings concerning the interaction between task 
interdependence and goal conflict are not in line with the structure of the models 
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developed in this dissertation, in which higher levels of interdependence amplify the 
effects of goal conflict.  The fact that the model developed by Andres and Zmud was 
tested in an experimental setting and not in a real life multi-organizational project could 
also contribute to explain the non- significant effect of goal conflict on productivity.  
That also could explain the fact that the effect of higher levels of goal conflict did not 
seem to be intensified by higher levels of tasks interdependence.  In a real multi-
organizational project, the intensity of a real goal conflict can be much higher, because 
project participants need to support and defend their organizations’ goals for the project. 
 
The Green and Keogh Work 
 To complete the comparison of the models’ structures with relationships described 
in related past research, the results of an analysis conducted on 63 conference papers 
describing practitioners’ experiences in alliances ( Green and Keogh,2000) is discussed.  
These alliances were constituted to accomplish large oil production projects in the North 
Sea.  In these 63 papers presented between 1993 and 1998, the factors related to 
alliances’ success that were more frequently mentioned were: shared vision and 
objectives ( 37 times), open communications at all levels, without hidden agendas (27 
times), integrated teams (27 times), high level of trust (23 times), senior management 
involvement (21), and risk –reward structures to enable goal alignment (19). 
 These factors mentioned by the practitioners as critical for multi-organizational 
projects’ success, are to a large degree similar to the concepts contained in the structure 
of the models developed in this dissertation to explain how the level of alignment might 
affect multi-organizational project performance.  In particular, trust and communication 
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between partners, as well as management involvement in project problems, are 
fundamental factors in the structure of the models developed.  In spite of the fact that the 
experiences captured in the studied papers are particular to the North Sea oil production 
projects -and that the data analysis does not provide an explanation about “how” those 
factors affect project performance- these experiences provide support for some of the 
relationships that constitute the basic structures of the models’ advance in this 
dissertation. 
 As a conclusion, there is evidence in the literature that provides support for most 
of the relationships between the factors involved in the dynamics observed within the 
studied multi-organizational projects.  These relationships constitute the structures of the 
models that attempt to represent the projects’ system behaviors responding to variations 
in the level of goal alignment among the participating organizations.  A table 
summarizing the reviewed literature and how its findings support or contradict the model 
structures is presented below. 
 
18
7
Authors Research
Question
Methodology Independent
Variables
Dependent
Variables
Findings Models Structures
Supported or
Challenged
O Sullivan (2003) How does the
imposition of
administrative
standards for
work content
and timing
affect the
performance of
a virtual multi-
organizational
product
development
project?
Action Case Study Implementation of:
Modularization
Work
Standardization
Master Schedule
Co-location
Levels of:
Participants mutual
adaptation
Work
synchronization
Need for
communication
Project
performance
The implementation of
modularization, work
standardization , master
schedule and co-location
of project managers
permitted the reduction of
the need for
communication, a higher
work synchronization, an
early definition of
requirements and higher
project performance
Effect of communications
on coordination, work
synchronization,
requirements definition
and then on project
performance
Jin and Levitt (1996)
Thomsen ,Levitt and
Nass (2005)
How does the
level of goal
incongruence
affect actors’
behaviors and
project
performance?
Development of a
simulation model
based on
theoretical
assumptions, and
tested later in cases
studies
Level of goal
incongruence.
Moderators:
Activities
flexibility
Activities
interdependence
Disparity in
participants’
competence Team
experience in
working together
Supervisors’
preference for
micro-
management.
Project
performance:
Schedule
Quality
Cost
For low to intermediate
levels of goal
incongruence the diversity
of behavioral selections
available to the project
team can be increased,
improving project
performance. However,
higher levels of goal
incongruence might lead
to time consuming
discussions and
arguments, impacting
negatively project
performance
High goal incongruence
leads to higher levels of
management involved in
decision making
Moderating effects of
tasks interdependence,
Previous experience
working together and
disparity in
levels of actors
competence
Challenge: Positive effect
of intermediate levels of
goal incongruence on
performance
Table 6-2: Summary of the Reviewed Literature for the Assessment of the Models Structures
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Authors Research
Question
Methodology Independent
Variables
Dependent
Variables
Findings Models Structures
Supported or
Challenged
Bstieler (2006) What are the
antecedents of trust
formation and their
effect of trust on new
product development
Partnerships?
Survey, cross-
sectional research
Level of
communication,
shared problem
solving, perceived
fairness, the level of
conflicts and the
presence of egoistic
behaviors
Partnership
efficacy and
project
performance
Mediator:
Level of trust
There is a Positive
impact of
communications on
trust formation.
Perceived fairness
through a balanced
distribution of project
benefits also affects
trust formation.
The absence of conflicts
was found to be the
most important factor in
trust development.
Trust was found to
affect positively the
performance measures
employed in the study.
Finally, trust seems to
positively impact the
quality of
communication
between partners.
Conflicts are a
determinant factor in
trust formation, and that
trust has a positive
impact on the quality of
communication
between partners and on
project performance.
The level of
communications
between partners has a
positive effect on the
level of trust,
completing the
reinforcing loop
described in this
dissertation.
Table6-2: Summary of the Reviewed Literature for the Assessment of the Models Structures (Continued)
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Authors Research
Question
Methodology Independent
Variables
Dependent
Variables
Findings Models Structures
Supported or
Challenged
Rodrigues and
Williams (1998)
How client’s
behaviors affect
project performance?
Case study, system
dynamics
modeling.
Introduction of
changes.
Delays in client
decision making
process
Project Performance The introduction of
changes and the delay
in approving design
documents by the client
lead the contractor to do
work out of sequence,
deteriorating the level
of quality. Contractor’s
staff loses trust in the
current definition of
product specifications,
leading to a reduced
productivity, and
progress. The schedule
slippage reduces the
client trust in the
contractor’s project
team, making the client
to demand more and
more reports,
distracting project
team’s attention from
project tasks to
reporting tasks,
reducing progress and
leading to more trust
and productivity loses.
A part of the impact of
the level of goal
alignment on project
performance in case 2 is
through delays in the
client project team
decision making
process, reducing
progress rate.
The impact of a
continuous revision of
product specifications
by the client is similar
to the impact of one of
partners’ behavior in
case 1. That partner
always wanted to
increase the product
capabilities, even
beyond cost
considerations. That
led to a deterioration of
the level of trust and
communication, and to
more quality problems,
as well as to difficulties
in coordinating the
deployment of effort.
Table6-2: Summary of the Reviewed Literature for the Assessment of the Models Structures (Continued)
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Authors Research
Question
Methodology Independent
Variables
Dependent
Variables
Findings Models Structures
Supported or
Challenged
Black et al.
(2002).
How does collaborative
work in multi-
organizational projects
is affected by
reinforcing processes
associated with mutual
trust, and participants
learning Partners’ roles,
needs, restrictions and
objectives concerning
the project work?
Case study,
system
dynamics
modeling.
Level of mutual
trust.
Sense of progress
Knowledge about
Partners roles,
intentions,
constraints and
objectives
Level of
engagement in
collaborative work
Project
Performance
A participant engagement
in the collaborative effort
depends on her sense of
progress and level of trust
in other participants. The
level of trust depends on
how much a participant
knows about other
participants’ roles, needs,
constraints and objectives
for the project. That
knowledge accumulates as
participants work together,
and the higher the level of
knowledge, the higher the
quality level, diminishing
the amount of rework
required, increasing
productivity, progress and
the level of engagement
Higher levels of trust lead
to a higher probability of
information sharing,
increasing the level of
knowledge about
participants’ roles,
constraints and objectives
in the project.
This study provides
evidence of the mutual
relationship between
trust and
communication in a
multi-organizational
project setting, as well
as of the influence of
the level of
communication
between the participants
in the project on quality
and productivity.
Challenge:
Black et al. found
evidence in their case
that the level of
engagement of the
entities participating in
the project depended on
the perception that the
project objectives are
being achieved, and on
the level of trust
between participants.
On the other hand, in
the cases studied in this
dissertation research,
that evidence was not
found
Table6-2: Summary of the Reviewed Literature for the Assessment of the Models Structures (Continued)
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Authors Research
Question
Methodology Independent
Variables
Dependent
Variables
Findings Models Structures
Supported or Challenged
Andres and Zmud
( 2002)
Does goal conflict,
task interdependence
and coordination
strategy significantly
affect productivity
and satisfaction in
software design
projects?
2x2x2 factorial
experiment
Goal conflict
Tasks
interdependence
Coordination
strategies
Interaction
between goal
conflict and
coordination
strategy
Interaction
between task
interdependence
and coordination
strategy.
Productivity
Project team
member
satisfaction
Goal conflict was found
negatively associated with
productivity, although not in
statistically significant way.
The effect of goal conflict on
productivity was not found
to be intensified by higher
levels of task
interdependence
Projects characterized by
low task interdependence
displayed higher productivity
than projects with higher
tasks interdependence
Projects managed with an
organic coordination strategy
were more productive than
projects managed with a
mechanistic coordination
strategy., in particular l in
projects characterized for
high tasks interdependence
The study findings underline
the effect of the level of
communication between
project team members on
productivity, in particular when
the tasks performed are highly
interdependent. Moreover, the
relationship between a more
autonomous decision making
and task performing
productivity is also supported
(relevant in particular for
model 2).
Challenge:
The study findings concerning
the interaction between task
interdependence and goal
conflict are not in line with the
structure of the models
developed in this dissertation.
Green and Keogh
(2000)
What are the factors
associated to
alliances success,
according to
practitioners’
experiences in north
sea projects
alliances?
Analysis of
papers
submitted by
practitioners in
conferences
between 1993
and 1998.
The most mentioned factors
are:
Shared vision and objectives,
open communications at all
levels without hidden
agendas, integrated teams,
high level of, senior
management involvement,
and risk –reward strategies
for goal alignment.
Trust and communication
between partners, as well as
management involvement in
project problems, are
fundamental concepts in the
structure of the models
developed in this dissertation.
Table 6-2: Summary of the Reviewed Literature for the Assessment of the Models Structures (Continued)
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6.3 Model Simulations and Model Behavior Analysis     
 The qualitative data collected through the case interviews provided the base for 
the models’ structure.  However, to perform the model simulations quantitative data is 
required to define the shape of the relationships between model variables.  The shape of 
the relationships between variables might have a significant impact on system dynamics 
model behaviors (Luna, 2004).  As mentioned in the research methodology section, it was 
not possible to collect quantitative data during the cases studies that would allow the 
definition of those relationships.  Hence, a strategy developed by Ford (1995) was 
adapted to define the shape of the relationships between model variables to be used 
during the simulations. 
 The strategy consists of devising three possible scenarios for setting the 
relationship shapes: positive, linear or neutral, and negative.  In the positive scenario, 
relationship shapes would improve, according to the model structure, measures of project 
performance.  In the neutral or linear scenario, all relationships between variables are 
assumed linear.  Finally, in the negative scenario relationship shapes are set in a way that 
might worsen measures of project performance.  The shapes of the relationships are 
assumed to be exponential, linear or hyperbolic (see Fig. 6-1) 
 Once the relationships had been set for each scenario, a sensitivity analysis was 
performed, setting the level of goal alignment between partners at a low, intermediate and 
high level.  Then, the variations observed in measures of project performance-quality, 
effort deployed, scope reduced, and work completed-while varying the level of goal 
alignment in the case of each scenario were compared and analyzed. 
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Figure 6-1:   Proposed Models Relationships Shapes. 
 
The scenario in which the measures of project performance were less affected in a 
negative way by variations in the level of goal alignment was selected to perform that 
sensitivity analysis.  Because the purpose of the model is to illustrate how the level of 
goal alignment might affect project performance, that scenario was more conservative in 
the sense that it presents those effects in the most positive way.  Once the scenario had 
been selected and the relationships between model variables had been set, further 
sensitivity analysis can be performed to investigate possible moderating effects of 
exogenous variables on the dynamics mediating between the level of goal alignment and 
project performance.  In the next section, the relationships between variables are defined 
for each model. 
 
Definition of Relationships Shapes for Case 1 Model  
 
The relationships which shapes needed to be defined to perform the sensitivity 
analysis and to study project behavior are shown in Table 6-3 , as well as the shape of 
Linear Exponential Hyperbolic 
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each relationship associated to the positive, neutral or negative scenarios.  Relationship 
shapes were assigned to the scenarios according to their potential effect on measures of 
project performance.  
 For example, in the case of the positive scenario for model 1, the relationship 
between level of communication and quality was assigned with a hyperbolic shape.  
Because higher levels of communication lead to higher quality according to the case data, 
a hyperbolic shape of the relationship would intensify that positive effect because at each 
level of communication the hyperbolic shape returns a higher level of quality than the 
linear or exponential shapes.  On the other hand, the effect of schedule pressure on 
quality was assigned with an exponential shape for the positive scenario.  In this case, 
higher levels of schedule pressure lead to lower levels of quality.  Hence, an exponential 
shape would diminish the effect of schedule pressure on quality, which is required in the 
positive scenario.  
 To define the scenario that provides better project performance measures, the 
following sensitivity analysis was performed.  Model parameters were set at an average 
level, except the level of priority assigned to the quality goal by Partner 1, which was set 
at low, intermediate and high levels.  Because the level of priority assigned to the quality 
goal by the Partner 2 was fixed at an intermediate level, high, intermediate and low levels 
of alignment were generated. 
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Relationship Negative Neutral Positive 
Effect of communication on quality exp lin hyper 
Effect of schedule pressure on quality hyper lin exp 
Effect of  quality priority on quality exp lin hyper 
Effect of communication on coordinated effort exp lin hyper 
Effect of schedule pressure on additional effort exp lin hyper 
Effect of trust on communication exp lin hyper 
Effect of scope priority on resistance to reduce scope exp lin hyper 
Effect of scope reduction on schedule pressure exp lin hyper 
Relationship between schedule slippage. and schedule pressure hyper lin exp 
Relationship between communication and inf. trans. Duration hyper lin exp 
Relationship between schedule pressure, resistance to reduce scope and 
scope reduction rate hyper lin exp 
Table 6-3: Relationships Shapes for each Case 1 Scenario 
 
The following parameters were used for the sensitivity analysis: 
 
Scope Priority 2 =0.5  
Scope priority1= 0.5  
Quality Priority2=0.5  
Initial Quality1=1 
Initial Quality2=1  
Initial Trust in 1=0.5 
Initial Trust in 2=0.5  
Potential communication=0.5  
Fraction of work to be coordinated=0.5  
Fraction of work done by 1 and used by 2=0.5  
Fraction of work done by 2 and used by 2=0.5 
 
Quality Priority1 is set at 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9  
 
The output of the sensitivity analysis is presented in Table 6-4.  The project 
performance measures -work done, quality, total effort deployed and scope reduced- are 
better for the positive scenario when compared to the linear and negative scenarios.  In 
order to be conservative in depicting the effects of goal alignment on the studied multi-
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organizational projects performance, the relationships associated to the positive scenario 
were selected for further use in the exploration of model behavior. 
 
Scenario Positive Linear Negative 
Level of 
Alignment 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.9 
Work done 1 22.72 68.22 70.48 1.98 17.98 34.58 0.18 1.49 6.30 
Work done 2 81.11 87.99 86.63 38.41 39.98 39.44 3.67 3.68 3.68 
Quality1 0.18 0.62 0.72 0.02 0.15 0.30 0.00 0.01 0.06 
Quality2 0.51 0.53 0.51 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Total effort 1 156.22 137.77 133.72 175.48 164.44 152.37 183.15 182.23 178.29 
Total effort 2 127.81 128.22 126.36 130.19 130.00 129.38 161.00 161.00 160.98 
Scope reduction1 0.26 0.04 0.03 16.86 14.15 11.13 17.83 17.62 16.81 
Scope reduction2 0.03 0.01 0.01 9.89 10.82 12.28 11.64 11.60 11.75 
Table 6-4:  Sensitivity Analysis Output for each Case 1 Scenario 
 
The selection of the positive scenario is conservative in the sense that it 
minimizes the potential negative impact of variations in the level of goal alignment on 
project performance. 
 
Definition of Relationships Shapes for Case 2 Model 
 The shapes of the relationships between model 2 variables were defined in a 
similar way as the model 1 case.  The relationships which shapes needed to be defined 
are shown in Table 6-5, as well as the shape of each relationship associated to the 
positive, neutral or negative scenarios.  As in the model 1 case, to define the scenario that 
provides better project performance measures, a sensitivity analysis was performed. 
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Relationship positive neutral negative 
Increment in time required for decision making exp lin hyper 
Reduction in time required for decision making hyper lin exp 
Decision making effect on progress hyper lin exp 
Rate of problem solving hyper lin exp 
Reduction in time available for contractor supervision exp lin hyper 
Effect of time available for contractor supervision on project team effort for 
reviewing contractors' work hyper lin exp 
Effect of time available for contractor supervision on additional effort 
deployment hyper lin exp 
Effect of schedule slippage on additional effort deployment hyper lin exp 
Effect of trust on communication hyper lin exp 
Table 6-5: Relationships Shapes for each Case 2 Scenario 
 
Model parameters were set at an average level, except the level of goal 
alignment, which was set at a low, intermediate and high level.  The following 
parameters were used for the sensitivity analysis: 
 
Potential Quality=1 
Potential Communication among Partners= 0.5 
Management understanding of the project=0.5 
Fraction of contractor work to be reviewed by the project team=0.5 
Initial level of trust between Partners=0.5 
Project team-contractor information transmission duration=3 
Fraction of contractor work that requires feedback=0.5 
 
Alignment levels=0.1, 0.5, 0.9 
 
Scenario Positive Linear Negative 
Level of Alignment 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.9 
Work done 95.07 96.20 97.70 78.32 84.06 87.76 62.89 66.18 69.47 
Quality  0.86 0.90 0.95 0.61 0.68 0.75 0.53 0.56 0.59 
Total effort 149.05 142.51 133.54 182.46 178.03 172.03 161.09 159.98 158.91 
Table 6-6:   Sensitivity Analysis Output for each Case 1 Scenario 
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Again, the simulation output shows that the project performance measures are 
better -showing the lesser negative impact on project performance- for the positive 
scenario when compared to the linear and negative scenarios (see Table 6-6).  Hence, the 
relationship shapes associated to the positive scenario were selected for further model’s 
behavior exploration. 
 
6.3.1 Case 1 Model Behavior Analysis 
 
Case 1 Basic Model Behavior 
 
The purpose of the model is to represent the behavior of the multi-organizational 
project studied in case 1 under different levels of participant organizations’ goal 
alignment.  In the specific case of model 1, the project work is executed by the project 
team, which is constituted by personnel coming from the two participant organizations.  
Assessing the validity of the model is assessing to what extent the model accomplishes its 
purpose (Barlas, 1996).  Hence, it is required to evaluate to what extent the model 
displays plausible behaviors in agreement with the case data while performing a 
sensitivity analysis.  To perform the analysis, the level of goal alignment was varied, and 
then the effect of that variation on project performance indicators -work performed, 
quality, effort required, and scope reduction- was evaluated.  The model would be useful 
to its purpose of representing the behavior of the studied multi-organizational project 
system if it is able to reproduce to a significant degree the behavior described in the data 
collected during the case study.  
 Because the model behavior is also affected by the rest of the variables -level of 
interdependence between partners for task execution, potential quality, initial trust and 
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potential communication- the sensitivity analysis was performed in two stages.  First, the 
model behavior was simulated under the exogenous variables’ average conditions.  In 
that case, most exogenous variables were assumed to be at an intermediate level of their 
range -all exogenous variables were assumed to vary in a 0-1 range.  In the second stage, 
the exogenous variables were assigned extreme values, just like in the extreme conditions 
test described in Chapter 3.  These conditions are assumed to be positive and negative.  
Positive condition would reinforce the effects of goal alignment on improving project 
performance.  On then other hand, negative conditions would reinforce the effects of goal 
alignment that hinder project performance.  In the following section, those conditions and 
their effect on how the level of goal affects project performance are described.  
 
Analysis of Case 1 Model’s Behavior under Average Conditions and Scope Priority 
Fixed 
 As mentioned above, for the average conditions the exogenous variables assume an 
intermediate value.  In the model 1’s case, the level of goal alignment among the partners 
is determined by the level of agreement on the priority assigned by each partner to the 
quality and scope goals.  Hence, for each condition -average, positive and negative- two 
scenarios were analyzed.  In one scenario, the scope priority was fixed at the same level 
for both participants, while the quality priority was fixed for one participant, and set at 
three different levels for the other, generating three different levels of quality goal 
alignment.  In the second scenario, the quality priority was fixed at the same level for the 
two participants, while the scope priority was fixed for one participant, and set at three 
different levels for the other, generating three different levels of scope goal alignment. 
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Average Conditions (Scope Priority fixed): 
 
Scope Priority 2 =0.5  
Scope Priority1= 0.5  
Quality Priority2=0.5  
Initial Quality1=1 
Initial Quality2=1  
Initial Trust in 1=0.5 
Initial Trust in 2=0.5  
Potential communication=0.5  
Fraction of work to be coordinated=0.5  
Fraction of work done by 1 and used by 2=0.5  
Fraction of work done by 2 and used by 2=0.5 
Quality Priority1 is set at 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9  
 
In the average conditions, the model’s parameters related to the exogenous 
variables -level of interdependence, potential communication between partners, and 
initial level of trust among them- were set at an intermediate value.  Only the value of 
potential quality was set at the maximum value, assuming that the resources available to 
perform project tasks -personnel and technology- fit tasks’ requirements.  Because the 
Quality Priority 2 was set at a 0.5 level, when Quality Priority 1 was also set a 0.5 level, 
the level of goal alignment reached the highest value.  On the other hand, when the 
Quality Priority value was set at 0.1, and 0.9, the level of alignment was lower.  
 According to the case data, the level of alignment influences the level of 
communication between partners.  In the Fig. 6-2, it can be seen that the maximum 
potential level of communication is kept for the case of maximum alignment (curve 2).  
Lower levels of alignment lead to a reduced level of trust among partners, and then to a 
lower level of communication (curves 1 and 3). 
 
201
7:14 PM   Fri, Jan 19, 2007
Communications ( average conditions)
Page 1
1.00 4.00 7.00 10.00 13.00
Months
1:
1:
1:
0
0
0
comm: 1 - 2 - 3 - 
1
1
1 1
2 2 2 2
3
3 3 3
Figure 6-2: Case 1 Level of   Communications (Avg. Conditions and Scope Priority 
Fixed) 
 
As the knowledge about partner’s intentions and objectives for the project 
accumulates during project execution, the weight of the initial trust in the trust formation 
equation is reduced, while the weight of the perceived level of goal alignment increases.  
Hence, when the level of alignment is low, the levels of trust and communication 
between partners decrease as project progresses.     
 In the Figs. 6-3 and 6-4, the behavior of the quality variable for both partners is 
shown.  The quality priority for Partner 2 (Quality Priority2) was set at an intermediate 
level (0.5).  Therefore, the level of quality goal alignment has a relatively higher weight 
in quality formation for Partner 2 than the level of priority of the quality goal.  In 
consequence, the maximum level of quality is reached at the highest level of alignment 
(curve 2).  For the lower levels of alignment (curves 2 and 3), the lower level of 
communication between partners leads to a continuous reduction in the quality level. 
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. Figure 6-3:  Case 1 Level of Quality 1 (Avg. Conditions and Scope Priority Fixed) 
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Figure 6-4: Case 1 Level of Quality 2 (Avg. Conditions and Scope Priority Fixed) 
 
On the other hand, the level of quality priority for Partner 1 (Quality Priority1) is 
set at three different levels.  In this case, each level of quality priority is associated with a 
203
level of quality.  The highest level of quality is achieved when Quality Priority 1 was set 
at the highest level (curve 3 in Fig. 6-3).  The second level of quality is achieved with the 
second level of quality priority and with the additional support of the highest level of 
alignment -both Quality Priority1 and Quality Priority 2 were set at the same level of 0.5. 
The higher level of alignment explains the fact that curve 2 is much closer to curve 3 than 
to curve 1, which corresponds to the lowest level of quality priority. 
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Figure 6-5: Case 1 Level of Schedule Pressure 1 (Avg. Conditions and Scope Priority 
Fixed) 
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Figure 6-6: Case 1 Level of Schedule Pressure 2 (Avg. Conditions and Scope Priority 
Fixed) 
 
If at a certain point of the execution of the project the amount of work performed 
is less than the expected at that point, schedule slippage and schedule pressure are 
generated (see Figs. 6-5 and 6-6).  The schedule pressure on Partner 1 (sch press1) is 
much higher when the level of Quality Priority 1 was set at the minimum level (curve 1 
in Fig .6-5).  Because the level of quality is low due to low quality priority and a low 
level of alignment, more work performed requires rework, reducing progress and then 
leading to schedule slippage.  The intermediate level of Quality Priority 1 leads to higher 
alignment, higher level of partners’ communication and higher quality, therefore reducing 
the level of schedule pressure.  The high level of Quality Priority 1 leads to higher quality 
and less rework, schedule slippage and schedule pressure. 
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Figure 6-7: Case 1 Level of Total Effort 1 (Avg. Conditions and Scope Priority Fixed) 
 
The amount of effort required to complete project tasks is associated with project 
cost performance.  In the case of Partner 1, the effect of the level of quality priority is 
added to the effect of the level of goal alignment to generate the level of quality.  The 
higher level of quality generated by the high level of quality priority reduces the necessity 
of rework and of additional effort to cope with schedule slippage, and then the total effort 
deployed (curve 3, Fig. 6-7).  The high level of alignment -both partners have the same 
level of quality priority- and the intermediate level of quality priority also lead to a high 
level of quality, less rework and less effort deployed (curve 2 in Fig. 6-7).  Conversely, 
the low level of alignment and the low level of quality lead to a low level of quality, more 
rework and more additional effort required to complete the project tasks (curve 1 in 
Fig.6-7). 
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Figure 6-8: Case 1 Level of Total Effort 2 (Avg. Conditions and Scope Priority Fixed) 
 
In the case of Partner 2, there is no significant difference between the amounts of 
effort deployed when the Partner 1’s quality priority is varied.  The low level of 
alignment generated by the low level assigned to the quality goal by the Partner 1 lead to 
a low level of trust and then to a higher effort deployed by Partner 2 to review Partner 1’s 
work (see curve 1, Fig. 6-8).  On the other hand, the higher level of communication 
generated by the higher level of alignment (curve 2, Fig.6-8) affects positively the level 
of effort that requires coordination between partners.  Hence, the level of total effort 
deployed by Partner 2 did not vary significantly when the level of quality goal alignment 
changes. 
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Figure 6-9: Case 1 Level of Scope Reduction 1(Avg. Conditions and Scope Priority 
Fixed) 
 
Concerning scope reduction, it is not significant for any of the two partners.  
However, for Partner 1 the amount of scope reduced is higher for the lowest quality 
priority (curve 1 in Fig.6-9).  The scope reduction in this case is a response to the higher 
level of schedule pressure generated by the schedule slippage associated to a higher 
amount of rework required. 
 For Partner 2, the amount of scope reduction is also associated to the level of 
schedule pressure.  However, in Partner 2’s case the difference between the amounts of 
scope reduced is less significant when the level of quality goal alignment is varied (see 
Fig. 6-10).  These variations are the product of changes in the level of alignment and trust 
between partners, which affect quality, rework, schedule slippage and schedule pressure.  
Hence, the minimal amount of scope reduction is produced when both partners assign the 
same level of priority to quality goals and the level of alignment is maximized (see curve 
2 in Fig. 6-10). 
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Figure 6-10: Case 1 Level of Scope Reduction 2 (Avg. Conditions and Scope Priority 
Fixed) 
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Figure 6-11: Case 1 Level of Work Done 1 (Avg. Conditions and Scope Priority Fixed) 
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As a consequence of the behaviors described above, the amount of work 
completed in the case of Partner 1 is higher when the quality priority is maximized (curve 
3 in Fig. 6-11) and when the level of alignment is maximized (curve 2 in Fig. 6-11).  
Because the level of quality priority is fixed at an average value in the case of Partner 2, 
the differences in work completed generated by the variation of the level of Partner 1’s 
quality priority can be attributed only to the variation of the level of goal alignment.  
Hence, those differences are less significant than the differences observed for Partner 1.   
 
Analysis of Case 1 Model’s Behavior under Average Conditions and Quality 
Priority Fixed 
 In this average conditions scenario, the level of quality priority was fixed for both 
project participants, and the level of priority assigned to the scope goal by Partner 1 was 
set at low (0.1), intermediate (0.5), and high (0.9) levels.  The level of scope priority was 
fixed at an intermediate (0.5) level for Partner 2. 
 
Average Conditions (Quality Priority fixed): 
 
Scope Priority 2 =0.5  
Quality Priority1= 0.5  
Quality Priority2=0.5  
Initial Quality1=1 
Initial Quality2=1  
Initial Trust in 1=0.5 
Initial Trust in 2=0.5  
Potential communication=0.5  
Fraction of work to be coordinated=0.5  
Fraction of work done by 1 and used by 2=0.5  
Fraction of work done by 2 and used by 2=0.5 
 Scope Priority 1 is set at 0.1, 0.5, 0.9 
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Figure 6-12: Case 1 Level of Communication (Avg. Conditions and Quality Priority 
Fixed) 
 
In this case, the level of communication between partners and the level of quality 
are products of the level of goal alignment.  Maximum levels of communication and 
quality are achieved when the level of priority assigned to the scope goals are the same 
for both partners (curve 2 in Fig. 6-12, 6-13, 6-14).  Other variations in the levels of 
quality could be attributed to schedule pressure. 
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Figure 6-13: Case 1 Level of Quality 1 (Avg. Conditions and Quality Priority Fixed) 
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Figure 6-14: Case 1 Level of Quality 2 (Avg. Conditions and Quality Priority Fixed) 
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Figure 6-15: Case 1 Level of Schedule Pressure 1 (Avg. Conditions and Quality Priority 
Fixed) 
 
Conversely, the level of schedule pressure is a product of the level of quality and 
rework required which hinders progress and creates schedule slippage.  Again, the level 
of schedule pressure is minimized when the level of scope goal alignment is maximized 
(curve 2 in Fig. 6-15, 6-16). 
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Figure 6-16: Case 1 Level of Schedule Pressure 2(Avg. Cond. and Quality Priority Fixed) 
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Figure 6-17: Case 1 Level of Total Effort 1 (Avg. Conditions and Quality Priority Fixed) 
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Figure 6-18: Case 1 Level of  Total Effort 2(Avg. Cond. and Quality Priority Fixed) 
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The differences in total effort between the different levels of scope goal 
alignment are not significant.  That is because the higher levels of rework and review 
effort that need to be deployed due to the lower level of alignment are compensated by 
the higher level of coordinated effort deployed when goal alignment is maximized. 
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Figure 6-19:  Case 1 Level of Scope Reduction 1 (Avg. Cond. and Quality Priority Fixed) 
 
For Partner 1, the level of scope reduction is given by the variation in the level 
of priority assigned to the scope goal and the level of scope goal alignment among 
partners -which leads to a certain level of communication, quality, rework, schedule 
slippage and schedule pressure.  Hence the level of scope reduction is higher when the 
levels of scope priority and scope goal alignment are minimum (curve 1 in Fig. 6-19, 6-
20).  
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Figure 6-20: Case 1 Level of Scope Reduction 2(Avg. Conditions and Quality Priority 
Fixed) 
 
On the other hand, the level of scope reduction for Partner 2 is only a function of 
the level of scope goal alignment among partners, because the level of scope priority is 
fixed.  A higher level of goal alignment leads to better communication, higher quality, 
less schedule slippage, less schedule pressure and to a lesser need to reduce scope (curve 
2 in Fig. 6-20).  Again, the level of work completed is a consequence of the behaviors 
described above.  
 For both partners, the higher level of work completed is accomplished when the 
level of scope goal alignment is maximized (curve 2 in Fig.6-21, 6-22).  Because the 
level of schedule pressure during project execution for both partners was low, the effect 
of scope reduction is very limited. 
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Figure 6-21: Case 1 Level of Work Done1 (Avg. Conditions and Quality Priority Fixed) 
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Figure 6-22: Case 1 Level of Work Done 2 (Avg. Conditions and Quality Priority Fixed) 
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Analysis of Case 1 Model’s Behavior under Extreme Positive Conditions and Scope 
Priority Fixed 
 
As mentioned above, extreme conditions can be positive -conditions that favor the 
effect of goal alignment on improving project performance- or negative -reinforcing the 
effects of goal alignment that hinder project performance.  Positive conditions include 
maximizing scope priority -when quality priority is varied- and quality priority-  when 
scope priority is varied.  Initial quality, trust and potential communications are also 
maximized.  Moreover, a minimum level of interdependence between partners would 
minimize the communications and coordination requirements, reducing the impact of 
those variables on project performance.  Communication and coordination between 
partners are, according to the case data, highly impacted by the level of alignment.  
Hence, the fraction of work to be coordinated between partners, and the fraction of 
partners’ work used by the other partner are minimized for positive extreme conditions. 
 The negative conditions include minimizing scope priority -when quality priority is 
varied- and quality priority -when scope priority is varied. Initial trust and potential 
communications are also minimized.  Moreover, negative conditions imply maximum 
level of interdependence between partners, which maximizes the communications and 
coordination requirements between partners.  Hence, the fraction of work to be 
coordinated between partners, and the fraction of partners’ work used by the other partner 
are maximized. 
 As in the average conditions case, the behavior of the model was explored for two 
scenarios: the scope priority fixed scenario and the quality priority fixed scenario. 
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Positive conditions (Scope Priority fixed): 
 
Scope priority 2 =1  
Scope priority1=1  
Quality Priority2=1  
Initial Quality1=1 
Initial Quality2=1  
Initial Trust in 1=1 
Initial Trust in 2=1  
Potential communication=1  
Fraction of work to be coordinated=0.1,  
Fraction of work done by 1 and used by 2=0.1  
Fraction of work done by 2 and used by 1=0.1 
Quality Priority1 is set at 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9  
 
As expected, the maximum level of trust and communication between partners is 
reached when the level of goal alignment is maximized -when quality priority 1 is set at 
0.9 and quality priority 2 is set at 1.  Moreover, the level of communication between 
partners under the positive conditions is higher than the level of communication obtained 
under average conditions. 
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Figure 6-23: Case 1 Level of Communication (Positive Cond. and Scope Priority Fixed) 
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Figure 6-24: Case 1 Level of Quality 1(Positive Conditions and Scope Priority Fixed) 
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Figure 6-25:  Case 1 Level of Quality 2 (Positive Conditions and Scope Priority Fixed) 
 
For Partner 1, the level of quality is determined mostly by the level of quality 
priority and to a lesser extent by the level of goal alignment.  On the other hand, for 
Partner 2 the level of goal alignment is the factor that determines the level of quality, 
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because the level of quality priority was fixed.  However, the impact of goal alignment on 
quality for Partner 2 is less significant than in the case of average conditions, because in 
this case partners are less interdependent and require less communication to perform their 
work. 
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Figure 6-26: Case 1 Level of Schedule Pressure 1(Positive Cond. and Scope Priority 
Fixed) 
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Figure 6-27: Case 1 Level of Schedule Press. 2 (Positive Cond. and Scope Priority Fixed) 
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Schedule pressure for Partner 1 is determined by the level of quality.  For high and 
intermediate levels of quality priority, the higher level of quality leads to lower rework, 
and minimal schedule slippage and schedule pressure (curves 2 and 3 in Fig. 6-26).  For 
Partner 2, because the level of quality priority was fixed and the effect of goal alignment 
is attenuated by positive conditions, quality remains at high level for all levels of 
Partner1’s quality priority, and then the level of schedule pressure also remains minimal. 
 Total effort deployed by Partner 1 is higher when the level of quality priority is 
minimal (curve 1 in Fig 6-28), due to the amount of rework required.  For intermediate 
and high levels of quality priority, as well as for Partner 2, the difference between the 
total effort deployed when the quality priority 1 was varied is not significant, because the 
effect of goal alignment is reduced by the effect of positive conditions on 
communications and quality. 
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Figure 6-28: Case 1 Level of Total Effort 1(Positive Cond. and Scope Priority Fixed) 
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Figure 6-29: Case 1 Level of Total Effort 2 (Positive Cond. and Scope Priority Fixed) 
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Figure 6-30:  Case 1 Level of Scope Reduction1 (Positive Cond. and Scope Priority 
Fixed) 
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Figure 6-31: Case 1 Level of Scope Reduction 2 (Positive Cond. and Scope Priority 
Fixed) 
 
Due to the low level of schedule pressure, none of the partners required to reduce 
scope. 
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Figure 6-32: Case 1 Level of Work Done 1(Positive Cond. and Scope Priority Fixed) 
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Figure 6-33:  Case 1 Level of Work Done 2 (Positive Cond. and Scope Priority Fixed) 
 
For Partner 1 the amount of work completed is affected basically by the level of 
priority given to the quality goal.  For Partner 2, the amount of work completed does not 
vary significantly with the level of priority given to the quality goal by Partner 1, because 
the effect of alignment is attenuated by positive conditions, including a lower level of 
interdependence between partners. 
 
Analysis of Case 1 Model’s Behavior under Extreme Positive Conditions and 
Quality Priority Fixed 
 
Positive conditions (Quality Priority fixed): 
 
Scope Priority 2 =1  
Quality Priority1=1  
Quality Priority2=1  
Initial Quality1=1 
Initial Quality2=1  
Initial Trust in 1=1 
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Initial Trust in 2=1  
Potential communication=1  
Fraction of work to be coordinated=0.1,  
Fraction of work done by 1 and used by 2=0.1  
Fraction of work done by 2 and used by 2=0.1 
 Scope Priority 1 is set at 0.1, 0.5, 0.9. 
 
As in every case, the level of communication is determined by the level of goal 
alignment between partners -in this particular case, the level of scope goal alignment. 
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Figure 6-34: Case 1 Level of Communication (Positive Cond. and Quality Priority 
Fixed) 
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3:58 PM   Tue, Feb 06, 2007
Quality  1 (positive conditions)
Page 1
1.00 4.00 7.00 10.00 13.00
Months
1:
1:
1:
1
1
1
quality1: 1 - 2 - 3 - 
1
1 1 1
2 2 2 2
3 3 3 3
Figure 6-35: Case 1 Level of Quality1 (Positive Cond. and Quality Priority Fixed) 
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Figure 6-36: Case 1 Level of Quality 2 (Positive Cond. and Quality Priority Fixed) 
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Figure 6-37: Case 1 Level of Schedule Pressure 1(Positive Cond . and Quality 
Priority Fixed) 
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Figure 6-38: Case 1 Level of Schedule Pressure 2 (Positive Cond. and Quality 
Priority Fixed) 
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Figure 6-39: Case 1 Level of Total Effort1 (Positive Cond. and Quality Priority Fixed) 
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Figure 6-40: Case 1 Level of Total Effort 2 (Positive Cond. and Quality Priority 
Fixed) 
 
The level of quality, schedule pressure, and scope reduction for both partners are 
very similar, because the variation in the level of priority assigned to the scope goal by 
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Partner 1 has a minor impact compared to the impact of variations in the quality priority.  
Moreover, any impact of variations in the level of scope goal alignment is attenuated by 
the low level of interdependence between partners. 
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Figure 6-41: Case 1 Level of Scope Reduction 1(Positive Cond. and Quality Priority 
Fixed) 
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Figure 6-42: Case 1 Level of Scope Reduction 2 (Positive Cond. and Quality Priority 
Fixed) 
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The level of priority given to the scope goal by Partner 1 influences the level of 
scope reduction (see Fig.6-41).  On the other hand, the high level of quality, and the low 
level of rework, schedule slippage and schedule pressure lead to minimal scope reduction 
in the Partner 2’s case. 
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Figure 6-43: Case 1 Level of  Work Done 1 (Positive Cond. and Quality Priority Fixed) 
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Figure 6-44: Case 1 Level of Work Done 2 (Positive Cond. and Quality Priority Fixed) 
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The level of work completed by both partners is not affected by the level of scope 
goal alignment.  In addition, the level of scope priority only affects the amount of work 
performed when there is a significant level of schedule pressure -scope reduction is a 
mechanism used to alleviate schedule pressure.  Because the effect of the level of goal 
alignment on quality and progress is reduced by the low level of interdependence 
between partners, schedule pressure is not an issue and then the impact of scope 
reduction is not significant. 
 
Analysis of Case 1 Model’s Behavior under Extreme Negative Conditions and Scope 
Priority Fixed 
 
Negative conditions (Scope Priority fixed): 
 
Scope priority 2 =0.1  
Scope priority1=0.1  
Quality Priority2=0.1  
Initial Quality1=1 
Initial Quality2=1  
Initial Trust in 1=0.1 
Initial Trust in 2=0.1  
Potential communication=0.1  
Fraction of work to be coordinated=1  
Fraction of work done by 1 and used by 2=1  
Fraction of work done by 2 and used by 2=1 
Quality Priority 1 set at 0.1,0.5, 0.9 
 
Again, the level of communication is determined by the level of goal alignment 
between partners.  In this case, the level of communication is minimal due to the low 
level of potential communication and initial trust. 
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Figure6-45: Case 1 Level of Communication (Negative Cond. and Scope Priority Fixed) 
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Figure 6-46: Case 1 Level of Quality 1(Negative Cond. and Scope Priority Fixed) 
 
233
10:28 AM   Wed, Feb 07, 2007
Quality  2 (negative conditions)
Page 1
1.00 4.00 7.00 10.00 13.00
Months
1:
1:
1:
0
0
0
quality2: 1 - 2 - 3 - 
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
Figure 6-47: Case 1 Level of Quality 2(Negative Cond. and Scope Priority Fixed) 
 
For Partner 1, the level of quality is determined by the level of priority assigned to 
the quality goal, because that priority is varied.  Moreover, quality stays at a very low 
level along project execution due to the very low level of communication and the high 
level of interdependence between partners.  For Partner 2, the low level of potential 
communication and the high level of partners’ interdependence made the level of quality 
low for all levels of quality goal alignment.  
 Because the levels of quality are very low for Partners 1 and 2 at all levels of goal 
alignment -leading to high levels of rework and schedule slippage- the level of schedule 
pressure is very high for both partners. 
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Figure 6-48: Case 1 Level of Schedule Pressure 1(Negative Cond. and Scope Priority 
Fixed) 
 
10:40 AM   Wed, Feb 07, 2007
Schedule Pressure 2 ( positive scenario)
Page 1
1.00 4.00 7.00 10.00 13.00
Months
1:
1:
1:
0
0
1
sch press 2: 1 - 2 - 3 - 
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
Figure 6-49: Case 1 Level of Schedule Pressure 2 (Negative Cond. and Scope Priority 
Fixed) 
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Figure 6-50: Case 1 Level of Total Effort 1(Negative Cond. and Scope Priority Fixed) 
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Figure 6-51: Case 1 Level of Total Effort 2 (Negative Cond. and Scope Priority Fixed) 
 
The low level of communication at all levels of goal alignment -influencing the 
ability to display coordinated effort- the low level of quality -determining the high 
amount of rework effort required- and the high level of schedule pressure -determining 
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the high amount of additional effort required- lead to a similar high level of total effort 
deployed by both partners. 
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Figure 6-52: Case 1 Level of Scope Reduction 1(Negative Cond. and Scope Priority 
Fixed) 
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Figure 6-53: Case 1 Level of Scope Reduction 2 (Negative Cond. and Scope Priority 
Fixed) 
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Under negative conditions, both partners experience a high level of scope 
reduction, due to the low level of priority assigned to the scope goal and to the high level 
of schedule pressure. 
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Figure 6-54: Case 1 Level of Work Done 1(Negative Cond. and Scope Priority Fixed) 
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Figure 6-55: Case 1 Level of Work Done 2 (Negative Cond. and Scope Priority Fixed) 
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Due to the extremely low level of quality, and the inability to deploy a coordinated 
effort by lack of communication, the amount of work completed is not significant for any 
of the two partners under extreme negative conditions and varying levels of priority 
assigned by Partner 1 to the quality goal. 
 
Negative conditions (Quality Priority fixed): 
 
Scope Priority 2 =0.1  
Quality Priority1=0.1  
Quality Priority2=0.1  
Initial Quality1=1 
Initial Quality2=1  
Initial Trust in 1=0.1 
Initial Trust in 2=0.1  
Potential communication=0.1  
Fraction of work to be coordinated=1,  
Fraction of work done by 1 and used by 2=1  
Fraction of work done by 2 and used by 2=1 
 Scope Priority 1 is set at 0.1, 0.5, 0.9 
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Figure 6-56: Case 1 Level of Communication (Negative Cond. and Quality Priority 
Fixed) 
239
Despite minor differences in the level of communication due to variation in the 
level of goal alignment, the low level of potential communication and initial trust lead to 
a very low level of communication at any level of scope goal alignment for extreme 
negative conditions. 
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Figure 6-57: Case 1 Level of Quality 2 (Negative Cond. and Quality Priority Fixed) 
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Figure 6-58: Case 1 Level of Schedule Pressure 1(Negative Cond. and Quality Priority 
Fixed) 
 
12:22 PM   Wed, Feb 07, 2007
Schedule Pressure 2 ( positive scenario)
Page 1
1.00 4.00 7.00 10.00 13.00
Months
1:
1:
1:
0
0
1
sch press 2: 1 - 2 - 3 - 
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
Figure 6-59:  Case 1 Level of  Schedule Pressure 2 (Negative Cond. and Quality Priority 
Fixed) 
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Figure 6-60: Case 1 Level of Total Effort 1(Negative Cond. and Quality Priority Fixed) 
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Figure 6-61: Case 1 Level of Total Effort 2 (Negative Cond. and Quality Priority Fixed) 
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Figure 6-62: Case 1 Level of Work Done 1 (Negative Cond. and Quality Priority Fixed) 
 
12:26 PM   Wed, Feb 07, 2007
Work done 2 ( negative conditions)
Page 1
1.00 4.00 7.00 10.00 13.00
Months
1:
1:
1:
0
0
1
work done 2: 1 - 2 - 3 - 
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
Figure 6-63: Case 1 Level of Work Done 2 (Negative Cond. and Quality Priority Fixed) 
 
As in the case of fixed quality priority for Partner 1, the effect of variations in the 
level of scope goal alignment is attenuated by the extreme negative conditions, especially 
the low level of priority given to the quality goal, the low level of initial trust, the low 
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level of potential communications and the high level of interdependence between 
partners.  Hence, the level of quality and work completed provided by the simulation 
under extreme negative conditions are very low, while the level of schedule pressure and 
scope reduction are very high.  The level of total effort deployed is balanced by the need 
of additional effort to cope with the schedule slippage, the need of rework, and the 
inability to deploy coordinated effort due to poor communication between partners. 
 In general, the case 1 model behaves as expected under average and extreme 
conditions.  As suggested by the case data, the level of goal alignment influences the 
level of communication between partners, affecting the level of quality displayed, the 
need for rework and additional effort, the ability to deploy coordinated effort and the 
level of effort assigned to reviewing other partners’ work.  These factors affect other 
project performance indicators, such as total effort deployed -associated to cost 
objectives- scope reduction, and the amount of work completed.   
 Exogenous variables moderate the effect of goal alignment, especially the ones 
associated to the level of interdependence between partners.  Finally, under extreme 
negative conditions, the low level of initial trust and communication between partners 
attenuates the impact of variations in the level of goal alignment. 
 
6.3.2 Case 2 Model Behavior Analysis 
 
Case 2 Basic Model Behavior 
 As in the model 1 case, the purpose of the model is to represent the behavior of a 
multi-organizational project system under different levels of participant organizations’ 
goal alignment.  However, in the particular case of model 2, the project work is executed 
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by a contractor and managed by the project team, which is constituted by personnel 
coming from the two participant organizations.  Again, assessing the validity of the 
model is assessing to what extent the model accomplishes its purpose.  Then, it is 
required to evaluate to what extent the model displays plausible behaviors while 
performing a sensitivity analysis.  Like in the model 1 case, the sensitivity analysis is 
performed varying the level of goal alignment, and then the effect of that variation on 
project performance indicators -in this case: work performed and effort deployed- is 
evaluated.  
 The model behavior is also affected by exogenous variables that provide inputs to 
the model-potential quality, potential communication between partners, level at which 
management understanding of the project, fraction of contractor work to be reviewed by 
project team, fraction of contractor work that requires project team feedback, and average 
project team-contractor information transmission duration.  As in model 1’s case, the 
sensitivity analysis was performed in two stages.  First, the model behavior was 
simulated under the exogenous variables’ average conditions.  In this case, most 
exogenous variables were assumed to be at an intermediate level of their range -in this 
case, all exogenous variables had a 0-1 range, except the information transmission 
duration between the contractor and the project team, which was assumed to have a 0-5 
range.  In the second stage, the exogenous variables were assigned with extreme values, 
positive and negative.  Positive conditions favor the effect of goal alignment on 
improving project performance.  Conversely, negative conditions reinforce the effects of 
goal alignment that hinder project performance.  Those conditions and their effect on how 
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the level of goal alignment affects project performance in the case 2 model are described 
below.  
Analysis of Case 2 Model’s Behavior under Average Conditions  
 As mentioned above, for the average conditions the exogenous variables assume 
an intermediate value, reflecting normal or regular conditions of the system’s exogenous 
variables. 
 
Quality=0.5 (note that in this case quality is an exogenous variable) 
Potential Communication among Partners= 0.5 
Management understanding of the project=0.5 
Fraction of contractor work to be reviewed by the project team=0.5 
Initial level of trust between Partners=0.5 
Project team-contractor information transmission duration=3 
Fraction of contractor work that requires feedback=0.5 
Alignment level is set at 0.1, 0.5, 0.9 
 
Under average levels of the management understanding of the project, initial trust 
and potential communication between partners, a higher level of goal alignment leads to a 
higher level of communication between partners, a lower level of management involved 
and a higher degree of flexibility for decision making granted to the project team 
members.  As a consequence, higher levels of alignment lead to a reduction of the time 
required for decision making (see Fig. 6-64). 
 A reduction in the time required for decision making leads to a reduction in the 
accumulation of problems to be solved, then leaving more time available for contractor’s 
supervision.  More time dedicated to contractor supervision favors the project team 
ability to monitor project progress, and to influence contractor reactions to schedule 
slippage, increasing the chances for the deployment of additional effort to cope with 
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schedule slippage, which lead to a higher total effort deployed when the level of 
alignment among partners is higher (see Fig. 6-67). 
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Figure 6-64: Case 2 Time Required for Decision Making (Average Conditions) 
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Figure 6-65: Case 2 Level of Problems to be Solved (Average Conditions) 
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Figure 6-66: Case 2 Time Available for Contractor Supervision (Average Conditions) 
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Figure 6-67: Case 2 Total Effort (Average Conditions) 
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A slightly higher amount of work completed is observed for higher levels of 
alignment.  That difference is reduced by the higher level of effort deployed to cope with 
schedule slippage. 
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Figure 6-68: Case 2 Work Done (Average Conditions) 
 
Analysis of Case 2 Model’s Behavior under Extreme Negative Conditions  
 For the extreme conditions the exogenous variables assume very high or very low 
values, reflecting extreme positive or negative conditions of the systems exogenous 
variables. 
 
Negative conditions:  
 
Quality=0.1 
Potential Communication among Partners= 0.1 
Management understanding of the project=0.1 
Fraction of contractor work to be reviewed by the project team=0.9 
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Initial level of trust between Partners=0.1 
Project team-contractor information transmission duration=5 
Fraction of contractor work that requires feedback=0.9 
Alignment level is set at 0.1, 0.5, 0.9 
 
Reduced levels of initial trust and potential communication between partners 
reinforce the impact of low level of alignment between partners on communication.  
Also, the lower level of management understanding of the project reinforces the impact 
of the level of goal alignment on raising the level of management involved, and on 
reducing the degree of flexibility for decision making given to the project team members.  
Hence, in the case of negative conditions, the time required for decision making increases 
during project execution at low levels of alignment (see Fig. 6-69). 
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Figure 6-69:  Case 2   Time Required for Decision Making (Negative Conditions) 
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Figure 6-70: Case 2  Level of Problems to be Solved (Negative Conditions) 
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Figure 6-71: Case2 Time Available for Contractor Supervision (Negative Conditions) 
 
Regarding the accumulation of problems to be solved and the time available for 
contractor supervision, the behavior of the model 2 under negative conditions is similar to 
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the model behavior under average conditions, but in a more extreme way.  Lower levels 
of alignment lead to more time required for problem solving, a lower rate of problem 
solving, accumulation of problems and less time available for contractor supervision. 
 The reduced amount of time available for contractor supervision impacts the 
amount of effort devoted to reviewing contractors’ work by the project team, and the 
amount of additional effort deployed by the contractor to cope with schedule slippage, 
reducing total effort, progress rate and the amount of work completed. 
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Figure 6-72: Case 2 Total Effort (Negative Conditions) 
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Figure 6-73: Case 2 Work Done (Negative Conditions) 
 
Analysis of Case 2 Model’s Behavior under Extreme Positive Conditions  
 
Positive conditions:  
 
Quality= 0.9 
Potential Communication among Partners= 0.9 
Management understanding of the project=0.9 
Fraction of contractor work to be reviewed by the project team=0.1 
Initial level of trust between Partners=0.9 
Project team-contractor information transmission duration=1 
Fraction of contractor work that requires feedback=0.1 
Alignment level set at 0.1, 0.5, 0.9 
 
The behavior of model 2 under positive conditions is similar to its behavior under 
average conditions.  However, the effect of variations on the level of goal alignment is 
moderated by the high level of initial trust and communication between partners, and the 
high level of management understanding of project issues, which lead to a significant 
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reduction of the time required for decision making by the project team during project 
execution.  Nonetheless, the reduction of the time required for decision making is, as 
expected, much more considerable when the level of goal alignment is high. 
 As in the average conditions case, a reduction in the amount of time required for 
decision making leads to a reduction in the amount of problems to solve and to lower 
rates of reduction in the amount of time available to the project team for contractor 
supervision. 
 Finally, higher levels of management understanding of project issues, initial trust 
and potential communication lead to a reduced time required for decision making.  That, 
added to a lower level of interdependence between the project team and the contractor -
given by minimal fractions of contractor’s work needing feedback or reviewing by the 
project team- leads to a higher rate of progress and to more effort deployed by the 
contractor to cope with schedule slippage.  These two factors generate a reduction of the 
variation of the amount of work completed when the level of goal alignment is varied. 
 
254
8:05 PM   Fri, Mar 02, 2007
Time required f or decison making (positive conditions)
Page 1
1.00 4.00 7.00 10.00 13.00
Months
1:
1:
1:
0
30
60
time req f or dec making: 1 - 2 - 3 - 
1 1 1 1
2
2
2
2
3
3
3 3
Figure 6-74: Case 2   Time Required for Decision Making (Positive Conditions) 
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Figure 6-75:  Case 2   Level of Problems to be Solved (Positive Conditions) 
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Figure 6-76: Case 2 Time Available for Contractor Supervision (Positive Conditions) 
 
8:16 PM   Fri, Mar 02, 2007
Total Ef f ort (positive conditions)
Page 1
1.00 4.00 7.00 10.00 13.00
Months
1:
1:
1:
5
15
25
tot ef f ort: 1 - 2 - 3 - 
1
1
1
1
2 2
2
2
3
3
3
3
Figure 6-77: Case 2 Total Effort (Positive Conditions) 
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Figure 6-78: Case 2 Work Done (Positive Conditions) 
 
In conclusion, model 2 behaves as expected under average and extreme 
conditions.  As suggested by the case data, the level of goal alignment influences the 
level of communication between partners, the level of flexibility given to the project team 
for decision making and the level of management involved in the decision making 
process. 
 These factors determine the time required by the project team to make its 
decisions regarding project issues, and then the amount of problems to be solved 
accumulated, as well as the time available for the supervision of project contractors.  The 
amount of time available for contractors’ supervision affects the amount of time the 
project team dedicates to reviewing the contractor’s work, and the project team’s ability 
to influence the allocation of additional resources when required to cope with schedule 
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problems, then affecting the project progress rate.  These factors affect project 
performance indicators such as total effort deployed and the amount of work completed.   
 Exogenous variables moderate the effect of goal alignment, especially the ones 
associated to the level of interdependence between the project team and the contractor.  
Lastly, under extreme conditions, the very low or high levels of management 
understanding of project issues, initial trust and potential communication between 
partners attenuate the impact of variations in the level of goal alignment. 
 
6.3.3 Models’ Sensitivity Analysis Considering Exogenous Variables 
 As mentioned in previous sections, both model dynamics are affected by 
exogenous variables -exogenous in a sense that their values are determined by dynamics 
external to the model, but affecting model outputs.  These exogenous variables were 
incorporated in the models in a way consistent with the case data collected.  According to 
the data, exogenous variables interact with variables included in models’ dynamics to 
generate models’ dynamics and outputs.  Hence, in order to determine if model outputs 
reflect the actual project system behaviors, it is important to verify if the interaction 
between exogenous and endogenous variables produce the outputs expected according to 
the actual project system behavior as described in the case data.  To do so, a sensitivity 
analysis was performed, setting the exogenous parameters at low, intermediate and high 
levels, and observing as project performance measures variations when the level of goal 
alignment is varied.  If project performance measures vary in a way consistent with what 
is expected according to the case data, then there could be more confidence on the 
models’ ability to represent the studied multi-organizational project systems’ behaviors. 
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Case 1 Model Sensitivity Analysis 
 To perform the sensitivity analysis, all model’s exogenous variables were set at an 
intermediate level.  Then each exogenous variable, one by one, were considered for 
variation, while all other were kept at the intermediate level.  Hence, each “experiment” 
or sensitivity analysis run consisted in setting one exogenous variable and the level of 
alignment at low, intermediate and high levels, while the other exogenous variables were 
kept at the intermediate level.  That was done with the purpose of assessing the effect of 
the interaction between the level of goal alignment and each exogenous variable on 
project performance. 
 In the model 1 case, all the exogenous variables were considered for the 
sensitivity analysis.  These variables and their values at which they were set are listed 
below. 
 
Scope Priority 2 =0.5  
Scope Priority1= 0.5  
Quality Priority2=0.5  
Initial Quality1=1 
Initial Quality2=1  
Initial Trust in 1=0.5 
Initial Trust in 2=0.5  
Potential communication=0.5  
Fraction of work to be coordinated=0.5  
Fraction of work done by 1 and used by 2=0.5  
Fraction of work done by 2 and used by 2=0.5 
 
Also, in the model 1 case, the level of goal alignment is determined by the degree 
to which project partners assign the same level of priority to the quality and scope goals.  
Because each of these goals might have a different impact on project dynamics, each goal 
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is considered separately while defining the level of goal alignment.  Therefore, each 
simulation run will consists of setting one exogenous variable at low, intermediate, and 
high level, with either the level of quality or scope priority was set at low ( 0.1), 
intermediate (0.5) and high (0.9) levels    
 For the sensitivity analysis, initial quality -the level of quality that can be 
achieved according to the skills and technologies available for tasks execution- was 
assumed to be at maximum level.  Moreover, the fraction of work to be coordinated by 
partners and the fraction of the work performed by the other partner to be used as an 
input by each partner were grouped in one variable denominated level of 
interdependence.  The outputs of the simulation runs performed are shown as follows: 
 
Scenario High Interdep. Medium Interdep. Low Interdep. 
Level of Quality Priority1 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.9 
Work done 1 5.22 26.95 28.01 11.78 54.42 61.53 21.67 80.10 89.20 
Work done 2 21.37 30.51 23.81 44.50 57.63 51.82 70.21 80.18 76.98 
Quality1 (average) 0.08 0.38 0.48 0.11 0.53 0.70 0.14 0.63 0.85 
Quality2 (average) 0.33 0.37 0.33 0.49 0.51 0.49 0.61 0.62 0.61 
Total effort 1 168.93 162.56 158.80 166.56 150.93 145.42 162.66 142.83 139.95 
Total effort 2 154.59 153.64 153.79 145.86 143.93 144.12 134.32 132.09 131.87 
Scope reduction1 0.37 0.17 0.16 0.29 0.06 0.04 0.22 0.01 0.01 
Scope reduction2 0.46 0.36 0.43 0.26 0.19 0.23 0.10 0.05 0.07 
Table 6-7: Model 1 Level of Interdependence Simulation Output (Scope Priority Fixed) 
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Scenario High Interdep. Medium Interdep. Low Interdep. 
Level of Scope Priority1 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.9 
Work done 1 20.75 26.95 20.74 47.23 54.42 47.25 75.15 80.1 75.16 
Work done 2 23.04 30.51 23.03 49.57 57.63 49.56 75.5 80.18 75.5 
Quality1 (average) 0.34 0.38 0.34 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.62 0.63 0.62 
Quality2 (average) 0.33 0.37 0.33 0.49 0.51 0.49 0.61 0.62 0.61 
Total effort 1 161.99 162.56 162.43 150.54 150.93 150.58 140.75 142.83 140.75 
Total effort 2 154.02 153.64 154.02 144.70 143.93 144.70 132.57 132.09 132.57 
Scope reduction1 1.90 0.17 0.02 0.31 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.01 0 
Scope reduction2 0.44 0.36 0.44 0.24 0.19 0.24 0.08 0.05 0.08 
Table 6-8: Model 1 Level of Interdependence Simulation Output (Quality Priority Fixed) 
 
When varying the level of interdependence between partners, the effect of the 
level of goal alignment for both the quality and scope priorities add to the level of 
interdependence effect.  Higher interdependence between partners means that they use 
more partners’ work as input for their tasks, and need to share more information and 
coordinate efforts.  Because the level of goal alignment affects the level of trust and 
communication between partners, higher levels of interdependence reinforce the effects 
of low levels of goal alignment on project performance.  In the simulation outputs a 
decline can be observed in project performance indicators when the level of 
interdependence increases, as expected.  
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Scenario High Pot. Comm Med. Pot. Comm. Low Pot. Comm. 
Level of Quality Priority1 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.9 
Work done 1 12.03 57.97 63.06 11.78 54.42 61.53 10.57 44.49 54.52 
Work done 2 45.15 62.64 55.63 44.5 57.63 51.82 41.95 47.88 45.69 
Quality1 (average) 0.13 0.61 0.80 0.11 0.53 0.70 0.08 0.38 0.53 
Quality2 (average) 0.55 0.59 0.55 0.49 0.51 0.49 0.38 0.39 0.39 
Total effort 1 174.40 156.91 152.85 166.56 150.93 145.42 152.75 138.47 133.76 
Total effort 2 153.34 150.52 150.68 145.86 143.93 144.12 134.59 133.61 133.88 
Scope reduction1 0.29 0.05 0.04 0.29 0.06 0.04 0.30 0.10 0.06 
Scope reduction2 0.25 0.16 0.21 0.26 0.19 0.23 0.28 0.26 0.27 
Table 6-9: Model 1 Level of Potential Communication Simulation Output (Scope Priority 
Fixed) 
 
Scenario High Pot. Comm Med. Pot. Comm. Low Pot. Comm. 
Level of Scope Priority1 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.9 
Work done 1 48.50 57.97 48.52 47.23 54.42 47.25 41.63 44.49 41.65 
Work done 2 52.52 62.64 52.51 49.57 57.63 49.56 44.53 47.88 44.52 
Quality1 (average) 0.58 0.61 0.58 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.38 0.38 0.38 
Quality2 (average) 0.55 0.59 0.55 0.49 0.51 0.49 0.39 0.39 0.39 
Total effort 1 157.94 156.91 158.00 150.54 150.93 150.58 138.57 138.47 138.65 
Total effort 2 151.52 150.52 151.52 144.70 143.93 144.70 134.14 133.61 134.14 
Scope reduction1 0.28 0.05 0.01 0.31 0.06 0.01 0.46 0.10 0.01 
Scope reduction2 0.22 0.16 0.22 0.24 0.19 0.24 0.27 0.26 0.27 
Table 6-10: Model 1 Level of Potential Communication Simulation Output (Quality 
Priority Fixed) 
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Scenario High Initial Trust Med. Initial Trust Low Initial Trust 
Level of Quality Priority 1 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.9 
Work done 1 22.50 75.74 84.63 11.78 54.42 61.5 5.7 23.28 29.78 
Work done 2 63.67 78.47 74.42 44.50 57.63 51.82 24.43 26.78 25.42 
Quality1 (average) 0.13 0.60 0.79 0.11 0.53 0.70 0.09 0.38 0.52 
Quality2 (average) 0.55 0.58 0.56 0.49 0.51 0.49 0.39 0.40 0.39 
Total effort 1 168.97 148.87 147.06 166.56 150.93 145.42 157.65 153.37 147.61 
Total effort 2 143.01 138.52 139.32 145.86 143.93 144.12 143.10 144.04 142.83 
Scope reduction1 0.20 0.01 0.01 0.29 0.06 0.04 0.36 0.21 0.16 
Scope reduction2 0.12 0.05 0.07 0.26 0.19 0.23 0.43 0.40 0.42 
Table 6-11: Model 1 Level of Initial Trust Simulation Output (Scope Priority Fixed) 
 
Scenario High Initial Trust Med. Initial Trust Low  Initial Trust 
Level of Scope Priority 1 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.9 
Work done 1 70.65 75.74 70.67 47.23 54.42 47.25 22.25 23.28 22.21 
Work done 2 72.01 78.47 72.01 49.57 57.63 49.56 25.10 26.78 25.10 
Quality1 (average) 0.58 0.60 0.58 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.37 0.38 0.37 
Quality2 (average) 0.56 0.58 0.56 0.49 0.51 0.49 0.39 0.40 0.39 
Total effort 1 148.97 149.37 149.77 150.54 150.93 150.58 150.83 153.37 151.30 
Total effort 2 140.41 139.02 141.21 144.70 143.93 144.70 142.93 144.04 142.93 
Scope reduction1 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.31 0.06 0.01 1.88 0.21 0.02 
Scope reduction2 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.24 0.19 0.24 0.42 0.40 0.42 
Table 6-12: Model 1 Level of Initial Trust Simulation Output (Quality Priority Fixed) 
 
The same is true for the initial trust and level of communication variables.  
According to the case data, trust and communication between partners reinforce one to 
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the other.  Higher levels of trust lead partners to be more open and willing to 
communicate their intentions and objectives to the other partners, and the knowledge of 
these intentions and objectives reinforces trust.  Hence, it can be expected that higher 
levels of initial trust contribute to developing a higher level of communication.  
Therefore, the combination of higher initial levels of trust with higher level of alignment 
would result in better indicators of project performance, because it would lead to higher 
quality, higher coordination in effort deployment, more work completed, less schedule 
pressure and then higher quality.  On the other hand, high potential communication -in 
the form of co-location, technological infrastructure, and communication policies- also 
favors the development of a high level of communication between partners.  A decline in 
project performance measures can be observed in the simulation outputs when the levels 
of potential communication and initial trust decline, reinforcing the effect of a reduction 
in the level of goal alignment -for both scope and quality priorities.  That decline is in 
concordance with the expected model behavior. A table summarizing the relative 
significance of the effects of the different exogenous variables studied on case 1 model’s 
performance parameters is presented below.  
 
Table 6-13: Relative Effect of Exogenous Variables on Case 1 Model Behavior. 
IntermediateIntermediateHighScope reduction2
IntermediateIntermediateHighScope reduction1
LowLowIntermediateTotal effort 2
LowLowIntermediateTotal effort 1
HighIntermediateHighQuality2 (average)
HighIntermediateHighQuality1 (average)
HighIntermediateHighWork done 2
HighIntermediateHighWork done 1
Initial TrustPotential CommunicationLevel of InterdependenceExogenous Factor
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Case Model 2 Sensitivity Analysis 
 The sensitivity analysis for model 2 was performed in a similar way as in the 
model 1 case.  The exogenous variables considered for the sensitivity analysis and the 
value they were set at are listed below: 
 
Quality= 0.5 
Potential Communication among Partners= 0.5 
Management understanding of the project=0.5 
Fraction of contractor work to be reviewed by the project team=0.5 
Initial level of trust between Partners=0.5 
Project team-contractor information transmission duration=3 
Fraction of contractor work that requires feedback=0.5 
 
In the model 2 case, the level of alignment is not determined by a specific level of 
agreement on specific goals, but in a general way, which can be applied to any project 
goal.  The levels at which the alignment variable was set for the sensitivity analysis are 
presented below: 
 
Alignment levels=0.1, 0.5, 0.9 
 
As in the model 1 case, the fraction of contractor’s work to be reviewed by the 
project team, and the fraction of contractor’s work that requires feedback from the project 
team are grouped in one variable denominated level of contractor dependence on project 
team.  The model 2’s sensitivity simulation runs are presented below: 
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Scenario 
High Contractor 
Dependence on 
Project    Team 
 
Medium Contractor 
Dependence on 
Project Team 
Low   Contractor 
Dependence on Project 
Team 
Level of  Goal 
Alignment 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.9 
Work done 30.22 41.43 66.01 65.15 67.18 73.65 77.35 78 78.18 
Total effort  241.98 281.18 318.13 296.51 310.82 328.62 322.33 325.21 330.14 
Table 6-14: Model 2 Level of Contractor Dependence on Project Team Simulation 
Output  
 
In the model 2 case, a high level of contractor dependence on project team is 
generated by a work design that requires the contractor to request a lot of feedback from 
the project team -and then having to wait for the project team’s decision making process.  
The high level of dependence is also generated by specifying that a high fraction of 
contractor work has to be reviewed and approved by the project team.  A high level of 
contractor dependence on project team requires a project team being capable of providing 
swift feedback and expedited reviews in order to avoid affecting project performance.  
Moreover, according to the case data, the level of goal alignment among partners affects 
the time required by the project team to make decisions and provide indications to the 
contractor.  Hence, a high contractor dependence on the project team would reinforce the 
effect of variations in the level of project team goal alignment on project performance 
measures.  That reinforcement effect can be observed in the Table 6-14, where the higher 
level of contractors’ dependence on the project team led to a stronger effect of the level 
of project team goal alignment on project performance indicators.  
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Scenario 
High Level of Mgmt. 
Understanding of 
Project Issues 
Medium Level of 
Mgmt. Understanding 
of Project Issues 
Low Level of Mgmt. 
Understanding of 
Project Issues 
Level of  Goal 
Alignment 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.9 
Work done  66.02 70.72 74.56 65.58 69.34 73.7 61.37 68.29 70.66 
Total effort  315.97 327.90 330.85 307.32 326.24 330.58 288.01 320.69 316.65 
Table 6-15: Model 2 Level of Mgmt. Understanding of Project Issues Simulation Output  
 
According to the case data, a high level of understanding of project issues by the 
management of the organizations participating in the project would contribute to reduce 
the time required for project team decision making, because the decision making time for 
senior managers would be also reduced when consulted by the project team about project 
issues. That behavior is observed in the simulation output depicted in the Table 6-15. 
 
Scenario 
High  Level of Initial 
Trust 
Med.  Level of Initial 
Trust 
Low Level of Initial 
Trust 
Level of  Goal 
Alignment 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.9 
Work done  66.81 70.21 73.77 68.48 68.65 73.7 66.64 67.65 73.56 
Total effort  310.63 322.06 330.59 299.20 318.00 330.58 305.67 320.37 330.51 
Table 6-16:  Model 2 Level Initial Trust Simulation Output  
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Scenario 
High  Level of 
Potential 
Communication 
Medium  Level of 
Potential 
Communication 
Low Level of Potential 
Communication 
Level of  Goal 
Alignment 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.9 
Work done  68.25 71.19 74.58 67.84 69.38 73.7 66.1 68.2 70.27 
Total effort  313.54 327.93 330.85 308.78 319.79 330.58 292.06 306.74 326.03 
Table 6-17: Model 2 Level Potential Communication Simulation Output  
 
Finally, the initial level of trust among partners, and the level of potential 
communication would affect the development of communications between partners 
during the project execution.  The level of communication among partners affects the 
time required for project team decision making, because many decisions might require 
the participation of all organizations participating in the project.  Therefore, lower levels 
of initial trust and potential communication could reinforce the effect of a low level of 
alignment on trust and communication on project team decision making and project 
performance.  However, because these two exogenous variables affect project 
performance through the level of communication between partners and the time required 
for project team decision making, the effect of each variable operating alone is less 
significant than the effect of the other exogenous variables considered for the sensitivity 
analysis ( see Table 6-17 ).  A table summarizing the relative effect of the studied 
exogenous variables on case 2 model’s performance parameters is presented below.   
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Table 6-18: Relative Effect of Exogenous Variables on Case 2 Model Behavior 
 
6.4 Summary 
 The models’ structures validation by the participants in the projects provides 
confidence that the model structures resemble the project dynamics induced by the level 
of goal alignment in the cases studied.  The validation of the model structures by 
individuals with experience in multiple multi-organizational projects suggest that the 
basic model structures could be applicable to simulate, with the required adaptations to 
particular contexts, the dynamics induced by the level of goal alignment in other multi-
organizational projects.  Finally, the comparative analysis of the model structures with 
findings in previous related research provides evidence that scholars have observed 
dynamics and relationships in projects and collaborative efforts to some degree similar to 
the ones associated with the model structures.  On the other hand, discrepancies observed 
were analyzed and their impact on the model validity assessed.  
 In general, the models’ simulations outputs show that the models behave in a way 
consistent with the behaviors described in the case data.  However, it should be recalled 
that the consistency between model behaviors and the behaviors reported in the case data 
LowLowIntermediateLowTotal effort 
LowLowIntermediateHighWork done
Potential
Communication
Initial 
Trust
Level of Mgmt. 
Understanding of 
Project Issues
Level of Project 
Team-Contractor 
Dependence
Exogenous  
Factor
269
should be interpreted only as a sign of the models ability to fulfill their purpose, which is 
to represent the behaviors of the multi-organizational project systems studied.  Because 
the modeling process lacked of quantitative data, there is a lot of uncertainty about the 
magnitudes of the variables involved, as well as about the shape of the relationships 
between them.  Qualitative data only allows defining the structure of the models and the 
directions of the relationships.  Hence, the modeling process and the resulting system 
dynamics models should be considered only as a way to present the case study results in a 
structured way, describing how the level of goal alignment affected performance in the 
multi-organizational projects studied.  Because the models have not been validated for all 
possible contexts, they should not be used to explore possible multi-organizational 
project systems’ behaviors under circumstances different from the ones described in the 
case data without studying each project’s specific environment.  For the same reasons, 
the models should be used with caution to analyze possible effects of the implementation 
of management policies on projects’ dynamics and performance. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS FOR 
PRACTITIONERS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
7.1 Recapitulation  
 
As the number of multi-organizational collaborative ventures has been growing 
during the last several decades in the form of alliances, partnerships, consortia and 
business networks, they have been the focus of extensive research.  However, the 
particular case of multi-organizational projects presents specific challenges to 
management because, to be successful, they require collaboration of disparate 
organizations with their own objectives regarding the project, and probably different 
strategic goals and priorities.  Hence, this dissertation has focused on examining the 
project dynamics induced by the level of alignment toward project goals among the 
organizations participating in multi-organizational projects, and how these dynamics 
might affect project performance. 
 To accomplish this purpose, this dissertation benefited from previous research on 
the areas of goal alignment, multi-organizational collaboration, and project management 
to elaborate a set of propositions that attempted to explain how the level of goal 
alignment affects multi-organizational project dynamics and performance.  These 
propositions were assessed through a case study inquiry, including two cases and a cross-
case data analysis.  The findings of that inquiry were expressed in system dynamics 
models simulating the dynamics generated in a multi-organizational project by the level 
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of goal alignment among the participating organizations.  These models are intended to 
help to understand how these dynamics develop and affect project performance.  
Participants in the studied multi-organizational projects, individuals with experience in 
multi-organizational projects and previous research in related areas were used to assess 
the validity and potential generizability of the models.  Finally, average conditions tests, 
extreme conditions tests and sensitivity analysis were applied to the models to assess to 
what extent their behavior resembles the expected behavior according to the case data.  
 The findings of this research effort, the implication of these findings for 
researchers and practitioners, avenues for further research, and potential limitations of the 
study are discussed below. 
 
7.2 Major Findings, Discussion and Contributions to the Inter-
Organizational Collaboration and Project Management Theory 
 The major findings of this study are discussed below, with emphasis on an analysis 
of the findings in the context of the existing literature and the contribution to the inter-
organizational collaboration and project management theory. 
1. Changes in the business environment of the participating organizations in 
a multi-organizational project might induce changes in the level of goal 
alignment.  
2. In the cases studied, the low level of goal alignment during the project life 
cycle did not lead the participating organizations to reduce the level of 
effort allocated to project execution.  This finding contrasts with the initial 
study proposition derived from the alliances dynamics literature, which 
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suggest that when organizations involved in alliances perceived that their 
objectives for the alliance have not been achieved, the organizations 
constrain the resources allocated to the alliance (Ring and Van den Ven, 
1994; Doz, 1996; Arino and de la Torre, 1998).  A possible explanation of 
this divergence of findings is that, in both cases studied, legal contracts 
had to be honored and the partners operated in the same markets.  Failing 
to fulfill the contract terms might cause the organization responsible to 
have problems while attempting to do business in the future within the 
markets in which that organization operates. 
3. In both cases studied, a pattern was identified concerning the mechanism 
through which the level of goal alignment affected project performance.  
In both cases, that mechanism was the variation of the level of 
communication and trust among partners.  Also, in both cases the level of 
communication and trust reinforced one another.  In the multi-
organizational collaboration literature, the models developed by Black et 
al. (2002) and Luna (2004) discussed in the literature review section 
described the relationship between trust and knowledge about partners 
intentions.  In these models, trust was characterized as an average of a 
calculative component -based on a prior perception of partner’s 
trustworthiness and the risks associated with trusting the partner- and a 
knowledge component -based on a perception of trustworthiness 
developed through the collaborative interaction.  That model is supported 
by the findings of this study.  The case data shows that there is a 
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calculative component, named in this study as “initial trust” determined by 
prior experiences with the partners, including experiences -or lack of 
them- lived during the project negotiation phase.  However, the second 
knowledge component in the cases studied is related to the perception by 
the trustier partner -or partner who trusts other partners- that its goals are 
considered by the trustee partners -or partners who are trusted by the 
trustier.  Luna and Black models did not consider the goal alignment 
factor in their models.  On the same token, they did not consider the effect 
of trust on communication and then on knowledge about partners observed 
in the cases studied in this research. 
4. The trust–communication mechanism operated in different ways in the 
cases studied because in one case the project team executed the project 
tasks, and in the other the project team only managed the project, which 
was executed by a contractor.  
5. In the first case, the low level of trust led to a low level of communication 
between partners.  The perception that the partners did not share the same 
quality and scope goals led to a low level of trust concerning partners’ 
intentions for the project and to a high level of animosity between 
partners.  That animosity can be characterized as a relationship conflict, 
because it involves perception of other people, including their motives and 
actions, leading to interpersonal tension (Simons and Peterson, 2000).  
Relationship conflict has been found in previous research positively 
related to low levels of communication in teams’ contexts (Pelled, 1996).  
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Hence, the trust-communication relationship observed in the cases studied 
corresponds in a significant degree to what has been described in the 
literature. 
6. The low level of communication affected the quality of the tasks that had 
to be coordinated between partners -in particular system integration 
problems- as well as the deployment of resources as required to complete 
the products needed by the other partners as inputs for  their tasks.  
Quality and effort coordination problems led to delays in tasks execution, 
project slippage and schedule pressure.  Some options proposed or used by 
partners to cope with the schedule pressure created the perception in other 
partners that their goals for the project were not considered  In the first 
case studied, one partner perceived that its quality and scope goals were 
not considered and somewhat traded off in favor of schedule and cost 
goals.  That led to further reduction in the level of trust and 
communication in a reinforcing cycle that deteriorated even further project 
performance.  Black et al. (2002) described a similar feedback loop in 
which the level of trust led to the level of willingness to engage in the 
collaborative effort.  The experiences of working together -including the 
achievement of outcomes perceived as positive or negative- led to a new 
level of trust and willingness to collaborate.  However, as mentioned 
above, the Black et al. model does not consider the effect of trust on 
communication, and then on the knowledge accumulated about partners’ 
intentions and constraints for the project. 
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7. In the second case, the trust-communication mechanism operated in a way 
that interfered with the project team’s ability to manage the project.  Low 
levels of trust and communication limited the project team’s problem 
solving capabilities leading to delays in the decision making processes.  
Because the problem solving activities had to involve all partners -in 
particular when the issues could affect project schedule or cost, or the 
facilities’ performance and operability- low levels of communication 
enlarged the time required for decision making.  Thomsen et al. (2005) 
proposed, for the case of a single organization, that moderate levels of 
goal incongruence among the participants in a project would improve 
project performance, because it could bring more alternative courses of 
action while facing project problems (Weck, 1979).  On the other hand, 
high levels of goal incongruence could lead to time consuming arguments 
in detriment of project performance (March and Simon, 1993).  Then, 
Thomsen et al. suggested a U shaped relationship between goal 
incongruence and project cost and duration.  The behavior predicted by 
Thomsen et al. for high goal incongruence situations was observed in the 
case 2 data collected.  The low level of goal alignment -or high level of 
goal incongruence- led to “finger pointing and haggling over contract 
terms” between partners, which delayed the making of decisions about 
project issues and then project schedule.  In addition, the low level of goal 
alignment induced a low level of trust and then a low level of 
communication.  The positive relationship between trust and 
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communication in teams has been documented in the literature (Butler, 
1999; Dyer and Chu, 2003).  In case 2, the low level of trust led to very 
“guarded and cautious communications”.  Partners established 
communications mostly to argue about the conflicts generated by the low 
level of goal alignment, and not to find workable solutions to the issues, 
delaying the decision making process.  
8. The difficulties observed in project team problem solving and decision 
making in case 2 led to the elevation of the conflict to higher levels of 
management.  Because the project goals the project team members 
received from their organizations contradicted in some cases the goals 
received by the project team members belonging to other partners’ 
organizations, they needed to consult their senior management to see to 
what extent they might compromise on those goals to reach agreements on 
solutions to project issues.  A related problem described in case 2 data was 
that the low level of goal alignment led to an strict and literal 
interpretation of the project contract, because partners wanted to preserve 
their interests from changing project goals through the strict adherence to 
the contract terms, making possible compromises much harder to achieve, 
then leading to more delays in the decision making process.  
9. The delays in the decision making process limited the rate at which the 
project team was able to solve problems, leading to schedule delays and to 
the accumulation of problems to solve.  Simon (1997) proposed that 
human actors have cognitive limitations to process information, and assign 
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priorities to information processing tasks according to their own goals.   In 
the case studied the accumulation of problems to be solved created a 
“bottleneck” which led each partner to try to solve the most important 
problems according to their priorities, hindering the team effort to be 
proactive in anticipating incoming problems and in contributing with the 
contractor with strategies to approach them before they affect project 
performance.  The inability to anticipate and solve problems at their early 
stages of development contributed with the accumulation of more 
problems to solve, in a reinforcing cycle that accelerates the deterioration 
of project performance measures.   
10. Yin (2003) suggests that while performing a case study the researcher 
should guide her inquiry by the assessment of the case study propositions, 
and collect only the information required to that assessment, which should 
lead to the answer of the research question.  However, during the 
interview and in the questionnaires’ responses some issues were discussed 
that, although they do not directly contribute to the assessment of the 
study propositions, they might interact with the factors directly involved in 
the effect of the level of goal alignment on project performance, to 
somehow moderate that effect.  These factors are: the geographic location 
of the project members -lack of face to face contact might hinder the 
communication efforts and the development of trust- the level of task 
interdependence -lower levels of interdependence and coordination might 
make the level of communication less relevant- the level of project team 
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members experience in multi-organizational projects, the level of 
definition of project requirements -the higher the ambiguity in 
requirements definition, the higher the likelihood of misinterpretation or 
introduction of changes by an interested partner- and the level of detail in 
project planning -including the degree to which that plan is known by all 
participants, which would reduce the ambiguity about when sub-products 
are required.  
11. As a conclusion, the study findings discussed above lead to the following 
explanatory statements and assumptions, which constitute a theory 
concerning how the level of goal alignment affect multi-organizational 
projects performance:  
• The level of goal alignment among partners in a multi-
organizational project affects the level of agreement on design, 
problem solving and decision making criteria and partners’ 
perception that their goals are being considered while performing 
required goals trade-offs. 
• The degree to which partners perceive that their goals are being 
considered lead to a degree of relationship conflicts between 
project team members belonging to different partners. 
• The level of agreement on design, problem solving and decision 
making criteria lead to a level of flexibility and autonomy for 
decision making available to the project team, and to a certain level 
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of trust among partners. The level of relationship conflict also lead 
to a certain level of trust among partners. 
• The level of trust leads to a level of communication. The level of 
communication also affects the level of trust. Past experiences and 
perceptions of the level of risk involved in the relationship lead to 
the initial level of trust among partners.  
• Concerning project execution, the level of trust and 
communication affects the exchange of information required to 
perform interdependent tasks, to deploy effort that requires 
coordination between partners, and the amount of effort allocated 
to review other partners’ work thereby affecting quality, progress 
rate and work completed. Slippage in the achievement of project 
goals concerning these performance measures might exacerbate 
goals conflict, leading to less trust and communication, in a 
reinforcing feedback cycle. 
• Concerning project management, the level of trust and 
communication between partners, as well as the level of flexibility 
and autonomy for decision making available to the project team, 
affect the time required for decision making. The rate of decision 
making affects the accumulation of problems to be solved and 
thereby the amount of time available to manage the project in a 
proactive way, which influences the rate of progress and the 
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amount of work completed, affecting again the level of problems 
to be solved, in a reinforcing feedback cycle. 
• The effects described in these statements are moderated by the 
following factors: the level of tasks interdependence and 
coordinated effort t-in the case of project execution- and the level 
of autonomy of the execution party -in the case of project 
management- the initial level of trust, the partners’ potential 
quality and communication level 
The potential validity of these statements is constrained by the degree to 
which the following assumptions hold true: 
• Each organization involved in a multi-organizational project brings 
its own goals to the project, which might differ from the other 
partners’ goals.  
• The multi-organizational project is executed in an environment of 
stable organizations. No major technological or organizational 
changes occurs during the project life cycle in the participating 
organizations 
• The organizational contexts do not impose resources constraints on 
the project out of the normal resources limitations faced by the 
participating organizations. Each participating organization is 
assumed able to supply the required resources to the project. 
• The project manager’s leadership skills, the project team members’ 
teamwork skills level, and the power asymmetry between partners 
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have no effect on the project dynamics described in the statements. 
The influence of these factors should be matter of future research. 
 This research contributes to start filling a gap in the project management and inter-
organizational collaboration fields.  To the best of my knowledge, there is not another 
study attempting to describe how the level of goal alignment among the participants 
affects multi-organizational projects performance.  Most of the studies available focus on 
investigating the factors that might affect multi-organizational collaboration formation 
and performance, but not on how those factors interact to produce the observed effects.  
Only the Black et al. (2002) and Luna (2004) models describe the dynamics of trust and 
collaboration, but these models do not consider the effect of the level of goal alignment 
among the participants in the collaborative effort.  The virtual team alliance (VTA) model 
introduced by Thomsen et al. (2005) attempts to predict to what degree the level of goal 
incongruence among the participants in a project influences certain project performance 
measures like cost and time to completion.  This model is a stochastic one; built on 
micro-canonical behaviors based on the information processing approach to the 
organization.  The model also incorporates several moderating variables.  However, the 
VTA model does not describe how the level of goal incongruence affects the dynamics 
developed between the elements of the project system, including resources, goals, 
processes, constraints and management policies.  
 Hence, the main general contribution of this study is the development of a 
preliminary theory about how the level of goal alignment affects the multi-organizational 
project system dynamics and performance.  Future researchers could build on this 
preliminary theory to analyze particular cases of multi-organizational projects, refining it 
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according to the specific project environment, and incorporating new direct or 
moderating effects according to new data available. 
 Other particular theoretical contributions of this study are discussed as follows: 
1. The study findings suggest that the level of goal alignment among participants in 
a multi-organizational project affects project dynamics at both project 
management and project execution levels.  At the project management level, the 
level of goal alignment seems to affect the project team ability to make the 
required decisions promptly to get the project back on track when facing 
problems.  Also, the level of goal alignment seems to affect the project team 
ability to monitor project progress and anticipate incoming issues which might 
affect performance. At the project execution level, the study findings indicate that 
the level of goal alignment affects the project team’s ability to exchange the 
information required to execute interdependent tasks, and also the ability to 
coordinate the use of resources to deliver the required sub-products on time, 
affecting the quality, effort and progress structures of the project dynamics 
system, and then project performance. 
2. Study findings suggest that the effects described above are generated through the 
variation of the level of trust and communication between partners.  Also, the 
study provides evidence of the dynamic relationship between trust, the perception 
of the incorporation of partners’ goals for the project and the level of 
communication among partners in the cases studied.  These contributions add to 
past research on inter-organizational collaboration by including the reinforcing 
dynamics between the level of trust and communication, and their effect on the 
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perception of other partners’ intentions and constraints for the project.  The 
importance of the initial level of trust between the project team members was also 
identified.  The initial level of trust can contribute to start a “virtuous” feedback 
loop of high trust leading to a high level of communication and then to a higher 
level of trust. 
3. This study presents two system dynamics models based on previous project 
management system dynamics applications, and on the case data collected.  The 
first model attempts to represent the dynamics developed at the project execution 
level by the level of goal alignment among partners in the studied multi-
organizational project (case 1).  The second model (case 2) attempts to represent 
the dynamics developed at the project management level by the level of goal 
alignment among partners in the case 2 multi-organizational project.  Despite the 
fact that these models are based only in qualitative data, that they represents the 
dynamics in particular cases and that they only include two organizations; the 
models can be useful as a tool to explain the possible impact of goal alignment on 
multi-organizational projects performance.  Also, future researchers could build 
on these models to develop their own system dynamics applications for other 
multi-organizational projects under similar or different circumstances and 
contexts. 
 The contributions described above are theoretical or research contributions.  As 
follows the practical implications of the findings of this study are discussed. 
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7.3 Implications of the Study Findings for Project Management Practitioners 
 The findings of the present research have the following implications for the senior 
management of the organizations, as well as for project managers and other personnel 
involved in a multi-organizational project.  These implications are based on the analysis 
of the data collected for the particular cases studied, and on its comparison with previous 
research.  Hence, they should not be interpreted as prescriptions for all multi-
organizational projects, but just as points to be considered while managing that kind of 
projects.  The implications should be rather used as suggestions which applicability is 
contingent to the specific project circumstances. 
1. Because, according to the study findings, a low level of goal alignment might 
significantly affect multi-organizational projects dynamics and performance, 
senior management of the organizations involved should be aware of possible 
changes in the business environment that could induce variations in the level 
of goal alignment among the project partners.  In the case of detected 
misalignment, project goals should be renegotiated in order improve the level 
of goal alignment.  Senior management should clearly state the renegotiated 
project goals for the project team. 
2. Senior management should analyze possible goal conflicts -or potential low 
level of goal alignment- while selecting partners for the accomplishment of a 
multi-organizational project.  Situations like the one described in case 1, in 
which a partner was also the final user of the product developed, should be 
considered candidates for further analysis.  In that analysis the risks of low 
level of goal alignment and its consequences should determined, as well as 
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possible courses of action, including the replacement of  partners, or specific 
mitigating actions to reduce the goal conflict impact (see points 5 and 6 
below). 
3. Senior management of the organizations participating in a multi-
organizational project should be aware of project issues with a certain level of 
detail, in order to provide swift support to the project management team when 
they elevate problems related to goal conflicts between  partners.  On the other 
hand, when the strategic objectives of the organization are not compromised, 
senior management should provide the project team with guidelines and 
certain latitude to negotiate with other partners’ representatives when goals 
conflicts are present, in order to quickly find workable solutions, without 
submitting the conflict to senior management consideration.  These 
suggestions might contribute to increase the efficiency of the project team 
decision making process, avoiding the accumulation of problems, preventing 
possible schedule slippages and giving more time to the project team for 
effective project monitoring. 
4. The study findings suggest the importance of the level of trust and 
communications between partners in multi-organizational project 
performance, and how the level of goal alignment might affect project 
performance through the reduction of those levels.  In addition, the study 
findings also highlight the importance of the level of initial trust between 
partners, which could start a virtuous cycle of trust formations and high level 
of communication.  The case data reflects that the initial trust can be enhanced 
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by involving the project team in the project negotiations phase, where project 
team members can learn about other partners’ intentions, resources and 
constraints for the project.  Moreover, some face-to face contact and team 
building interventions could be helpful to improve the initial level of trust, 
especially in the case that project team members have not worked together 
before, or when they will not be located in the same physical facilities (virtual 
teams). 
5. The study findings also suggest that the most important mechanism through 
which the level of goal alignment affected project performance in the cases 
studied was the low level of communication between partners.  Hence, project 
managers should consider specific measures to enhance the level of 
communication between the project team members belonging to the different 
organizations participating in the project, in order to facilitate the information 
exchange required by the interdependent tasks and the coordination of the 
resource deployment as required to perform collaborative tasks.  O’ Sullivan 
(2003) described in his case study the strategies deployed by the leading 
organization of an aerospace product development project, which worked with 
20 suppliers, located in different geographical sites.  To overcome possible 
communication difficulties and accomplish the project objectives, the leading 
organization deployed two strategies.  The first strategy was a profound 
standardization of the work patterns, including how, where and when the work 
should be performed.  To achieve that standardization, the leading 
organization made use of three tools.  First, the implementation of a digital 
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model based in a specific design software application, which had to be 
employed by all suppliers.  Second, direct communications were standardized 
through a ‘coordinating memo” template, to make sure that all the information 
required was conveyed.  Third, a master schedule was devised and 
implemented, matching and integrating all suppliers’ individual schedules, to 
ensure the proper work synchronization.  These strategies are to a large extent 
similar to the ones proposed by the case 1’s interviewees.  They suggested that 
project requirements had to be defined with minimum ambiguity before the 
project starts, as well as common work standards.  Case 1 interviewees also 
suggested the necessity of having a project plan, accepted by all team 
members, which clearly specifies when the required sub-products for 
integration should be released, to reduce the possible ambiguity of the 
“meaning of quick”.  Hence, the strategy implemented by the leading 
organization, as described in the O’Sullivan case, seems to be very plausible 
for consideration to reduce the ambiguity in multi-organizational projects’ 
communications and coordination. 
6. The second strategy implemented by the leading organization in the 
O’Sullivan case was a modularization of the design, which reduced the 
amount of interfaces and interdependence between the suppliers, and defined 
standards for the performance of each subsystem.  The objective of this 
strategy was to reduce the required level of communication for task execution, 
making the project less susceptible to communications problems.  Because the 
level of communication was identified in the studied case data as the most 
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important mechanism through which the level of goal alignment affects multi-
organizational project performance, a strategy that reduces the potential 
impact of a low level of communication on project performance would reduce 
the project exposure to the risk of variations in the level of goal alignment 
among partners.  
 
7.4 Study Limitations and Further Research 
 The present study has several limitations, rooted in the research methodology used 
and in the data available.  These limitations are discussed below. 
1. The case study research methodology, while useful to answer “how” research 
questions; imposes limitations for the generizability of the studies’ findings. In the 
research methodology chapter, that limitation was discussed. Like experiments, 
case studies are generalizable to theoretical propositions, and not to populations. 
A case study does not represent a sample, and in doing a case study, the goal is to 
expand and generalize theories and not to enumerate frequencies (Yin, 2003).  
Hence, the only way to assess to what extent the theory developed in this study 
about how the level of goal alignment affect multi-organizational project 
performance is valid for other cases is to perform a similar study on those cases. 
As more replications are performed, more data would be collected and more 
confidence could be allocated to the resultant theoretical propositions. 
2. Due to confidentially issues discussed in the research methodology section, only 
interviews data was collected. Written documentation was not available, so the 
triangulation strategy proposed could not be implemented. Hence, quantitative 
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data was not available. Lack of quantitative data prevented the numeric definition 
of the relationships between the variables in the system dynamics models, and 
then the comparison of the models simulation outputs with real project 
performance values. The use of data collected during the interviews without being 
triangulated with other data sources might have introduced biases because 
interviews data was based only on interviewees’ recollection of past events -
however, one of the projects studied is still on progress. Moreover, those 
recollections diverged somewhat according the interviewee role in the project. 
Project managers had the tendency to see the past projects in a more positive way 
then other project team members, in particular what concerns to team processes.  
That bias has been reported in other studies (Larson and LaFasto, 1989; McComb 
et al., 1999).  Finally, in case 2 only members belonging to a partner organization 
and to the EPC contractor were available for interviewing, then other partners’ 
views were not incorporated in the analysis.  These limitations might have had an 
impact on the validity of some of the findings of the study.  On other hand, the 
fact that the majority of the interviewees, the majority of the panel of individuals 
with experience in multi-organizational projects, and the comparison to past 
related research validated the models structures provides a certain level 
confidence in them.  
3. Another limitation is that both project presented a relative low level of goal 
alignment, instead of a high level of alignment. That might have introduced a 
“negative bias” in the research.  Further research should attempt to study the 
effects of a high level of alignment on project dynamics and performance. 
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4. Because the system dynamics models developed in this study are based only in 
qualitative data, caution should be displayed if these models are going to be used 
to analyze the effects of project management policies implementation.  The 
models should be adapted for each particular case, and specific parameters for 
each case should be estimated as well. The models developed in this dissertation 
are intended only to be a repository of case’ findings and a way to represent 
possible behaviors of the project systems studied. 
 Future research might be able to overcome this study’s limitations, then refining 
and enriching the theoretical propositions elaborated. As follows, some avenues for these 
future research efforts are suggested. 
1. A research design which would contribute to validate and enhance the theoretical 
propositions developed in this study is a longitudinal study of multi-
organizational project, in which the researcher could have access to all the project 
data as reported by all partners, including communications, meeting minutes, 
project reports etc.  The researcher should be able to conduct interviews with a 
certain frequency with individuals at all level of the project organization, 
belonging to all the organizations involved, probably applying instruments to 
measure variables such as the level of trust and communication.  The conduction 
of the study while the project is in progress would allow the researcher not to rely 
on interviewees’ recollection of past events -or the recollection of the 
interviewees’ perceptions of these events- but on “fresh” perceptions contrasted 
with written data.  The availability of project numeric data would permit to 
determine with more precision models’ parameters, and to perform simulations 
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which outputs could be compared with the project historic data.  That would allow 
the researcher to assess to what extent the model developed is able to reproduce 
real projects behaviors (model calibration). 
2. Another avenue for research is the analysis of possible factors the might moderate 
the effect of the level of goal alignment on project dynamics, such as the role of 
project manager personality, skills, and leadership style; the organizational 
cultures of the participating organizations, the project team members level of 
teamwork skills,  the comparative partners’ sizes and capabilities, the salience of 
power asymmetries between partners, and the effects of facilitation in the 
resolution of  conflicts generated by low levels of goal alignment.. 
3. Relaxing some of the basic models assumptions could also provide research 
topics.  One models assumption establishes that no major technological or 
organizational changes occur outside the project during the simulation period that 
might affect project team performance.  Particular attention should be directed to 
the possible effects of the implementation of management policies such as 
risk/rewards systems, used very frequently in project alliances (Green and Keogh, 
2000).  Another assumption which relaxation could be investigated is the lack of 
limits to the amount of skilled resources available to the project partners, so the 
case in which other projects in partners’ portfolios might compete for resources 
with the project studied could be analyzed. 
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INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
 
The interviewees’ rights as subjects of this study should be disclosed, including the right 
of withdraw from the study at will, as well as the right to not to answer questions. The 
signature of the informed consent form should be required. 
 
The purpose of this research is to investigate how the level of goal alignment might affect 
multi-organizational projects performance. For our case, goal alignment is defined as 
the degree to which participant organizations in a multi-organizational project 
agree in the level of priority of the cost, schedule, scope, and quality goals. Also, 
project performance is defined as the degree to which the project objectives 
concerning cost, schedule, quality and scope were achieved. 
 
It is important to keep in mind that all the questions are referred to the particular project 
subject of this study (in your case xxxx). Your answer should reflect only your 
experiences in that project. 
 
Questions: 
 
1- Describe the project, its goals, and the partnership structure 
2- Describe your role in the project, for how long you were involved? 
3- How would you characterize the level of goal alignment among partners during 
the project, were there variations of that level?  
4- Were there variations in the level of goal alignment among Partners regarding 
project cost priority? How did they affect project performance? 
5- The same question  for the time, quality and scope priorities 
6- How was the level of trust between Partners? Did that level of trust affect project 
performance? If yes, how?  
7- How was that trust generated or destroyed?  
8- To what extent the satisfaction of the expectations that each participating 
organization brought to the project affected the level and quality of resources 
deployed by these Partners on the project? 
 
9- The following picture is a project cause effect structure associated to the quality 
variable. Please assess to what extent this cause-effect structure is valid for the 
project studied.  How could the level of goal alignment concerning cost, schedule, 
quality, and scope affect that cause- effect structure?  Note: the cause effect 
structures should be sent in advance (at least a week before the interview) to 
the interviewees, so they can be familiarized with them. The researcher 
should be available to the interviewees for any clarification required 
concerning the cause effect structures.   
 
10- The question no. 9 will be repeated for the labor, scope, schedule and basework   
feedback structures. 
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The Quality Structure 
 
The quality standard (degree to which high quality is pursued in project outcomes) drives 
quality (degree to which tasks outcomes fulfill project requirements). Quality is the 
antecedent of the proportion of good work and bad work generated. Bad work generates 
rework (delaying the work completion), and good work increases the amount of work 
done. The level of work to be done, compared with the time available until deadline, 
increases or decreases the perceived schedule slippage. An increasing perceived schedule 
slippage might lead to a pressure to reduce the quality standard, in order to accelerate the 
progress and reduce the slippage, but reducing the quality of work performed, increasing 
the level of rework required and then reducing the level of work done, in a cycle 
reinforcing quality deterioration. On the other hand, a decreasing perceived schedule 
slippage would lead to a decreasing pressure to reduce quality standards, reinforcing 
quality. In addition, a higher level of good work will reduce the perceived gap between 
the quality of the products and the quality standards, reducing the pressure to reduce the 
project requirements. 
 
Quality 
standard 
 
Quality 
 
Bad Work
Work done 
Perceived Schedule 
Slippage.
Time 
Available 
+
-
-
++
Work to be 
done 
-
Good 
Work 
Quality 
Gap 
Pressure to 
reduce Project 
requirements 
+
+
-
+
-
+
+
309
Labor Structure 
 
The effort deployed to generate progress in completing project tasks is  a result of the 
head count and labor intensity, which are driven by  the schedule pressure (pressure 
to complete the project on schedule). The effort deployed to complete the project is 
translated into progress, and then into work done, which reduces the time required to 
completion. The time require to complete the project is compared with the time 
available. A negative difference (perceived project slippage) would reinforce a higher 
schedule pressure, inducing higher labor intensity and head count, in a balancing 
cycle. 
 
Time 
Available Schedule 
Pressure 
Time to 
Completion 
Work to be 
Done 
Progress 
Effort 
Head Count 
Labor 
intensity 
+
+
+
+
+
-
+
+
Perceived Schedule 
Slippage 
+
_
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Scope Structure 
 
The amount of work to be done compared with the amount of time available would 
lead to a perceived schedule slippage and then to a higher pressure to reduce scope in 
order to catch up with the schedule. This pressure might cause a schedule reduction if 
it can overcome the resistance to reduce scope associated with project team 
commitment with project objectives. A reduction of work to be done increases the 
proportion of work done, thus reducing the perceived schedule slippage and the 
pressure to reduce scope in a balancing feedback cycle. 
 
Work to be done 
Pressure to reduce scope 
Scope reduction 
Perceived schedule 
slippage  
Time Available 
Resistance to 
reduce Scope 
-
+
+
+
-
-
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Schedule Structure 
 
The time remaining at a given moment to the project deadline is compared to the 
expected required time to finish the project. If the perception is that there is not enough 
time to complete the project before the deadline, schedule pressure is generated. The 
higher the schedule pressure, the higher the drive to postpone the deadline, but a 
resistance to slip the deadline (produced by the relative importance of the time goal) 
should be overcome. If the deadline is postponed, the time to deadline will be increased, 
reducing the schedule pressure in a balancing feedback loop. 
Schedule 
Pressure 
Expected Time 
to Completion 
Deadline Time to 
Deadline 
Calendar 
Time  Resistance to Slip Deadline 
+
+
-
-
+
-
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Rework Structure 
 
The rework structure depicts how work is accomplished along the project life, 
incorporating the quality control activity. The “work to be done” stock is transformed 
through progress (or task performing) into work to be checked by quality control and, 
depending upon the quality of the work, it becomes either good work (approved) or bad 
work (rejected). The good work is work completed (work done) and reduces the amount 
of work to be done; while the bad work needs rework and, after this process, it becomes 
again work to be checked, where it is separated by quality control in good and bad work, 
repeating the cycle the number of times it is required until all the work is approved and 
the work to be done stock is completely depleted (project completion). The quality level 
drives the proportion of good and bad work. The level of work that remains to be done, 
and the time available until the deadline influence the schedule pressure. A higher level 
of schedule pressure might induce a reduction in the quality standards, thus lowering the 
quality level. Lower quality implies more work that needs rework, reducing the amount 
of work done, increasing the schedule pressure in a reinforcing feedback loop. 
Work to be 
done 
Schedule Pressure 
 
-
Quality Standards
Quality 
Work done 
Good work 
 
+
++
-
Bad work 
+
-
+
Time 
available 
-
Rework 
+
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Basework Structure 
 
Basework is work performed for the first time. An enlargement of the project scope or an 
increase in the upstream work increases the total basework available to complete, but 
project constraints might reduce that availability. The more basework is available to 
complete, the higher the basework completion rate will be and more basework will be 
completed. This basework completed reduces the stock of basework available but not 
complete, but also might increase the total basework available to complete (the basework 
completed can be required to perform subsequent tasks) 
 
11- Is there any other issue you would like to mention concerning how the level of 
goal alignment among partners affected project performance? 
 
Basework 
completion rate 
Basework 
available but 
not complete 
Basework 
complete 
Total basework 
available to 
complete 
Project 
Scope 
Project 
Constraints 
Upstream 
task release 
rate 
+
-
+
-
+
+
+
+
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Models Validation Questionnaire 
 
Purpose 
 
The purpose of this questionnaire is to assess the validity of two models developed to 
describe how the level of goal alignment might affect performance in a multi-
organizational project. 
 
Definitions 
 
A multi-organizational project is a project accomplished by two or more different and 
independent organizations, each one having their own goals for the project. Goal 
alignment is the degree to which participants organizations in a multi-organizational 
project agree in the level of priority for the quality, schedule, scope and cost goals. 
Project performance is the degree to which project goals concerning quality, scope, cost 
and schedule are accomplished. 
 
Models 
 
The two models presented here were developed from two case studies of multi-
organizational projects. 
 
Task Statement 
 
For each model, please review the associated figure and statements, and assess to what 
extent the models reflect your experiences in multi-organizational projects. Then write 
your assessment of each statement, pointing out what you think needs to be added, 
eliminated or modified. If you consider it appropriate, add comments not related 
specifically to any statement. However, please keep in mind that the models attempt to 
describe only how the level of goal alignment might affect project performance, and not 
other possible project dynamics. 
 
If your experience in multi-organizational projects applies to just one of the models, 
please comment only that model’s statements. 
 
Questions 
 
Please direct questions to xxxxxxxxx, or call  xxxxxxxx. 
 
Thank you very much for your cooperation. It will be very valuable for the success of this 
research effort. 
 
Best regards 
 
Atilio Moran 
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Model Case 1.
Model Case 1 Statements: 
 
1. The level of goal alignment leads to the degree of agreement on the design and 
problem solving criteria (or the criteria to perform the trade-offs between the 
project cost, schedule, quality and scope priorities) 
 
2. The degree of agreement on design and project solving criteria leads to the degree 
of Partners’ satisfaction with the trade-offs performed in the project concerning 
the cost, schedule, quality and scope priorities.  
 
3. Lack of satisfaction with the trade- offs performed in the project lead to animosity 
and to personal conflicts among the project team members, affecting the level of 
communication.  
 
4. Personal conflicts and low level of communication among the project team 
members produce delays in information exchange and products reviews. That 
hinders the project progress, or leads to work based on preliminary information, 
that in turns leads to low quality, rework, schedule pressure and reduced progress.  
Level of Goal 
Alignment 
Degree of 
agreement on 
design and problem 
solving criteria 
Degree of 
incorporation of 
organizational goals 
Animosity 
Level of Trust 
Level of Communication 
Level of understanding of 
Partners requirements 
Proper 
activities 
planning 
Effort 
Progress 
Level of effort 
invested in 
reviewing 
Partners’ work 
Quality 
 
Level of coordination 
while working in 
parallel 
Quality 
Initial level of trust 
Delays in 
delivering 
sub-
products or 
reviews 
Personal 
Conflicts 
Deployment of 
resources on 
timely basis 
Scope 
reduction 
Schedule 
Pressure 
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5. The level of trust among the project team members is a function of past 
experiences with the same Partners (initial level of trust) and of the degree of 
agreement on design and project solving criteria. The level of trust affects the 
level of communication (communications are driven in part by the expectations 
about the outcomes of the exchange). On the other hand, open communication -
leading to understanding of Partners’ behaviors, motivations and project 
developments- generates higher levels of trust. 
 
6. The level of communication among partners affects the level of understanding of 
the inputs required by the other partners to perform their work, the adequacy of 
activities planning and the deployment of resources on a timely basis. The 
deployment of resources on a timely basis affects the level of effort and project 
progress. 
 
7. The level of communication among partners affects the level of coordination 
when partners are working in a parallel or concurrent way. This might affect the 
sub-products’ integration later in the project. Problems with sub-products 
integration could generate rework, schedule pressure and possible scope 
reduction, affecting project progress 
 
8. The level of trust among partners affects the level of effort allocated to review 
Partners’ work. A higher level of effort allocated to review Partners’ products 
might take resources from doing work, generating delays and affecting project 
progress. 
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Model Case 2 
Model Case 2 Statements: 
 
1. The level of goal alignment leads to the degree of agreement on the design 
and problem solving criteria (or the criteria to perform the trade-offs between 
the project cost, schedule, quality and scope priorities) 
 
2. A low degree of agreement on design and problem solving criteria among 
partners leads to the involvement of a higher level of management in the 
decision making process. 
 
3. A low degree of agreement on design and problem solving criteria among 
partners provides a low degree of flexibility for decision making (requiring a 
stricter adherence to written agreements). 
 
4. The level of trust among partners is influenced by the experiences lived during 
the negotiations and project planning phases (initial level of trust) and by the 
degree of agreement on design and problem solving criteria. The level of trust 
affects the level of communication (communications are driven in part by the 
Level of 
Goal 
Alignment 
Progress 
Project Delays
Degree of 
Agreement  on 
Design and 
Problem Solving 
Criteria 
Level of 
Mgmt. 
involved 
Time Required 
for Decision 
Making 
Progress in 
Problem 
Solving 
Amount of 
Problems to 
Solve 
Level of  
Communication 
Time Available 
for Contractors’ 
Supervision 
Senior Mgmt 
Understanding of 
Project Problems 
Delays in 
Communications 
with Contractors 
New Problems to Solve 
External Factors 
Degree of 
Flexibility for 
Decision Making 
Initial Level 
of Trust 
Level of Trust 
Time Available for 
Schedule Monitoring 
Quality Problems 
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expectations about the outcomes of the exchange). On the other hand, open 
communication (leading to understanding of Partners’ expectations and 
behaviors), generates higher levels of trust. 
 
5. The level of communication among partners, the level of management 
involved, the management’s level of understanding of the project problems, 
and the degree of decision flexibility available influence the amount of time 
required for decision making.  
 
6. The amount of time required for decision making determines the progress in 
problem solving, and then the accumulation of problems to solve. 
 
7. The accumulation of problems to solve defines the amount of time available to 
partners for the supervision of contractors and for project schedule 
monitoring. 
 
8. Longer decision making times and less time available for contract supervision 
leads to delays in product reviews and in communications with the 
contractors, affecting creating project delays. 
 
9. Less time available for schedule monitoring prevents partners to proactively 
identify causes of potential project delays, increasing their probability of 
occurrence. 
 
10. Quality problems, project delays and external factors create new problems to 
solve. 
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CASE 1 MODEL 
 
Alignment 
align = 1-((ABS(prior_qual1-prior_qual_2))*weight_qual_pri+((ABS(scope_pri1-
scope_pri2))*(1-weight_qual_pri))) 
weight_qual_pri = 0.5 
 
Effort 
effort1 = tot_effort1-effort1_rev-effort1_rew 
effort1_rev = tot_effort1*(1-trustin2)+per_rev_eff1*tot_effort1 
effort2 = tot_effort2-effort2_rev-effort2_rew 
effort2_rev = per_rev_eff2*tot_effort2+(1-trustin1)*tot_effort2 
tot_effort1 = planeffort1+addeffort1+cooreffort1*effcomcoor1 
tot_effort2 = planeffort2+addeffort2+effcomcoor2*cooreffort2 
addeffort1 = GRAPH(effschpradeff1) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.1, 0.375), (0.2, 1.03), (0.3, 1.45), (0.4, 1.93), (0.5, 2.33), (0.6, 2.83), (0.7, 
3.33), (0.8, 3.88), (0.9, 4.42), (1, 4.93) 
addeffort2 = GRAPH(effschpradeff2) 
(0.00, 0.075), (0.1, 0.475), (0.2, 0.875), (0.3, 1.40), (0.4, 1.90), (0.5, 2.45), (0.6, 3.00), 
(0.7, 3.43), (0.8, 3.90), (0.9, 4.53), (1, 4.95) 
cooreffort1 = GRAPH(TIME) 
(1.00, 3.00), (2.00, 3.00), (3.00, 2.95), (4.00, 2.95), (5.00, 2.95), (6.00, 2.95), (7.00, 2.95), 
(8.00, 2.95), (9.00, 2.95), (10.0, 2.95), (11.0, 2.95), (12.0, 2.95), (13.0, 3.00) 
cooreffort2 = GRAPH(TIME) 
(1.00, 2.95), (2.00, 3.00), (3.00, 2.95), (4.00, 2.95), (5.00, 2.95), (6.00, 2.95), (7.00, 2.95), 
(8.00, 2.95), (9.00, 2.95), (10.0, 2.95), (11.0, 2.95), (12.0, 2.95), (13.0, 2.95) 
effcomcoor1 = GRAPH(comm) 
(0.00, 0.055), (0.1, 0.39), (0.2, 0.53), (0.3, 0.685), (0.4, 0.78), (0.5, 0.86), (0.6, 0.9), (0.7, 
0.95), (0.8, 0.99), (0.9, 0.995), (1, 1.00) 
effcomcoor2 = GRAPH(comm) 
(0.00, 0.05), (0.1, 0.29), (0.2, 0.45), (0.3, 0.57), (0.4, 0.675), (0.5, 0.775), (0.6, 0.855), 
(0.7, 0.915), (0.8, 0.955), (0.9, 0.975), (1, 1.00) 
effort1_rew = GRAPH(per_rew_eff1) 
(0.00, 0.1), (0.1, 0.5), (0.2, 0.9), (0.3, 1.50), (0.4, 1.98), (0.5, 2.60), (0.6, 3.18), (0.7, 
3.60), (0.8, 4.13), (0.9, 4.53), (1, 5.00) 
effort2_rew = GRAPH(per_rew_eff) 
(0.00, 0.05), (0.1, 0.4), (0.2, 0.825), (0.3, 1.25), (0.4, 1.70), (0.5, 2.20), (0.6, 2.63), (0.7, 
3.13), (0.8, 3.73), (0.9, 4.35), (1, 5.00) 
effschpradeff1 = GRAPH(sch_press1) 
(0.00, 0.045), (0.1, 0.245), (0.2, 0.385), (0.3, 0.52), (0.4, 0.66), (0.5, 0.78), (0.6, 0.865), 
(0.7, 0.92), (0.8, 0.965), (0.9, 0.985), (1, 1.00) 
effschpradeff2 = GRAPH(sch_press_2) 
(0.00, 0.03), (0.1, 0.3), (0.2, 0.47), (0.3, 0.605), (0.4, 0.725), (0.5, 0.825), (0.6, 0.895), 
(0.7, 0.95), (0.8, 0.98), (0.9, 0.995), (1, 1.00) 
per_rev_eff1 = GRAPH(work_to_be_used_by_1) 
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(0.00, 0.00), (2.00, 0.11), (4.00, 0.215), (6.00, 0.285), (8.00, 0.38), (10.0, 0.47), (12.0, 
0.555), (14.0, 0.655), (16.0, 0.78), (18.0, 0.9), (20.0, 0.99) 
per_rev_eff2 = GRAPH(work_to_be_used_by2) 
(0.00, 0.00), (2.00, 0.1), (4.00, 0.185), (6.00, 0.265), (8.00, 0.35), (10.0, 0.45), (12.0, 
0.555), (14.0, 0.64), (16.0, 0.77), (18.0, 0.87), (20.0, 1.00) 
per_rew_eff = GRAPH(rework_2) 
(0.00, 0.005), (2.00, 0.1), (4.00, 0.165), (6.00, 0.255), (8.00, 0.385), (10.0, 0.48), (12.0, 
0.6), (14.0, 0.695), (16.0, 0.8), (18.0, 0.9), (20.0, 0.995) 
per_rew_eff1 = GRAPH(rework_1) 
(0.00, 0.005), (2.00, 0.12), (4.00, 0.21), (6.00, 0.29), (8.00, 0.395), (10.0, 0.51), (12.0, 
0.605), (14.0, 0.715), (16.0, 0.825), (18.0, 0.925), (20.0, 1.00) 
planeffort1 = GRAPH(TIME) 
(1.00, 10.0), (2.00, 9.95), (3.00, 9.95), (4.00, 9.95), (5.00, 9.90), (6.00, 9.90), (7.00, 9.65), 
(8.00, 8.90), (9.00, 8.40), (10.0, 7.95), (11.0, 7.35), (12.0, 6.25), (13.0, 4.40) 
planeffort2 = GRAPH(TIME) 
(1.00, 10.0), (2.00, 10.0), (3.00, 9.60), (4.00, 9.30), (5.00, 8.95), (6.00, 8.65), (7.00, 8.25), 
(8.00, 7.80), (9.00, 7.30), (10.0, 6.85), (11.0, 6.30), (12.0, 5.50), (13.0, 4.15) 
 
Progress-Rework 
rework12(t) = rework12(t - dt) + (badwork12 - rew12_trans) * dt 
INIT rework12 = 0 
 
INFLOWS: 
badwork12 = (work_to_be_used_by2/durrev12)*(1-quality1) 
OUTFLOWS: 
rew12_trans = GRAPH(rework12/inftrandur) 
(0.00, 0.00), (10.0, 0.00), (20.0, 0.00), (30.0, 0.00), (40.0, 0.00), (50.0, 0.00), (60.0, 0.00), 
(70.0, 0.00), (80.0, 0.00), (90.0, 0.00), (100, 0.00) 
rework21(t) = rework21(t - dt) + (badwork21 - rew21trans) * dt 
INIT rework21 = 0 
 
INFLOWS: 
badwork21 = (work_to_be_used_by_1/durrev21)*(1-quality2) 
OUTFLOWS: 
rew21trans = rework21/inftrandur 
rework_1(t) = rework_1(t - dt) + (badwork_1 + rew12_trans - rework_rate_1) * dt 
INIT rework_1 = 0 
 
INFLOWS: 
badwork_1 = (work_to_be_checked_1/dur_prog1)*(1-quality1) 
rew12_trans = GRAPH(rework12/inftrandur) 
(0.00, 0.00), (10.0, 0.00), (20.0, 0.00), (30.0, 0.00), (40.0, 0.00), (50.0, 0.00), (60.0, 0.00), 
(70.0, 0.00), (80.0, 0.00), (90.0, 0.00), (100, 0.00) 
OUTFLOWS: 
rework_rate_1 = rework_1/dur_rework1 
rework_2(t) = rework_2(t - dt) + (rew21trans + badwork2 - rework_rate2) * dt 
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INIT rework_2 = 0 
 
INFLOWS: 
rew21trans = rework21/inftrandur 
badwork2 = (work_to_be_checked_2/dur_prog2)*(1-quality2) 
OUTFLOWS: 
rework_rate2 = rework_2/dur_rework2 
scope_red1(t) = scope_red1(t - dt) + (scope_red_rate_1) * dt 
INIT scope_red1 = 0 
 
INFLOWS: 
scope_red_rate_1 = GRAPH((1-resis_to_red_scope1)*sch_press1) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.1, 0.025), (0.2, 0.075), (0.3, 0.25), (0.4, 0.5), (0.5, 0.7), (0.6, 1.10), (0.7, 
1.65), (0.8, 2.30), (0.9, 3.40), (1, 5.00) 
scope_red2(t) = scope_red2(t - dt) + (scope_red_rate_2) * dt 
INIT scope_red2 = 0 
 
INFLOWS: 
scope_red_rate_2 = GRAPH(sch_press_2*(1-resis_to_red_scope2)) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.1, 0.05), (0.2, 0.125), (0.3, 0.325), (0.4, 0.725), (0.5, 1.08), (0.6, 1.48), 
(0.7, 2.02), (0.8, 2.70), (0.9, 3.33), (1, 5.00) 
work_done_1(t) = work_done_1(t - dt) + (goodwork1) * dt 
INIT work_done_1 =  0 
 
INFLOWS: 
goodwork1 = (work_to_be_checked_1/dur_prog1)*quality1 
work_done_2(t) = work_done_2(t - dt) + (goodwork2) * dt 
INIT work_done_2 = 0 
 
INFLOWS: 
goodwork2 = (work_to_be_checked_2/dur_prog2)*quality2 
work_to_be_checked_1(t) = work_to_be_checked_1(t - dt) + (progress_1 + 
rework_rate_1 - goodwork1 - badwork_1 - work_12) * dt 
INIT work_to_be_checked_1 = 0 
 
INFLOWS: 
progress_1 = (work_to_be_done_1/dur_prog1)*(1-
frac_to_be_coord)+(work_to_be_done_1/dur_prog1)*frac_to_be_coord*comm 
rework_rate_1 = rework_1/dur_rework1 
OUTFLOWS: 
goodwork1 = (work_to_be_checked_1/dur_prog1)*quality1 
badwork_1 = (work_to_be_checked_1/dur_prog1)*(1-quality1) 
work_12 = (work_to_be_checked_1/inftrandur)*work_1_used_by2 
work_to_be_checked_2(t) = work_to_be_checked_2(t - dt) + (progress_2 + rework_rate2 
- goodwork2 - work_21 - badwork2) * dt 
INIT work_to_be_checked_2 = 0 
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INFLOWS: 
progress_2 = (work_to_be_done_2/dur_prog2)*(1-
frac_to_be_coord)+(work_to_be_done_2/dur_prog2)*frac_to_be_coord*comm 
rework_rate2 = rework_2/dur_rework2 
OUTFLOWS: 
goodwork2 = (work_to_be_checked_2/dur_prog2)*quality2 
work_21 = (work_to_be_checked_2/inftrandur)*work_2_used_by1 
badwork2 = (work_to_be_checked_2/dur_prog2)*(1-quality2) 
work_to_be_done_1(t) = work_to_be_done_1(t - dt) + (goodwork21 - progress_1 - 
scope_red_rate_1) * dt 
INIT work_to_be_done_1 =  100 
 
INFLOWS: 
goodwork21 = (work_to_be_used_by_1/durrev21)*quality2 
OUTFLOWS: 
progress_1 = (work_to_be_done_1/dur_prog1)*(1-
frac_to_be_coord)+(work_to_be_done_1/dur_prog1)*frac_to_be_coord*comm 
scope_red_rate_1 = GRAPH((1-resis_to_red_scope1)*sch_press1) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.1, 0.025), (0.2, 0.075), (0.3, 0.25), (0.4, 0.5), (0.5, 0.7), (0.6, 1.10), (0.7, 
1.65), (0.8, 2.30), (0.9, 3.40), (1, 5.00) 
work_to_be_done_2(t) = work_to_be_done_2(t - dt) + (goodwork12 - progress_2 - 
scope_red_rate_2) * dt 
INIT work_to_be_done_2 = 100 
 
INFLOWS: 
goodwork12 = (work_to_be_used_by2/durrev12)*quality1 
OUTFLOWS: 
progress_2 = (work_to_be_done_2/dur_prog2)*(1-
frac_to_be_coord)+(work_to_be_done_2/dur_prog2)*frac_to_be_coord*comm 
scope_red_rate_2 = GRAPH(sch_press_2*(1-resis_to_red_scope2)) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.1, 0.05), (0.2, 0.125), (0.3, 0.325), (0.4, 0.725), (0.5, 1.08), (0.6, 1.48), 
(0.7, 2.02), (0.8, 2.70), (0.9, 3.33), (1, 5.00) 
work_to_be_used_by2(t) = work_to_be_used_by2(t - dt) + (work_12 - goodwork12 - 
badwork12) * dt 
INIT work_to_be_used_by2 = 0 
 
INFLOWS: 
work_12 = (work_to_be_checked_1/inftrandur)*work_1_used_by2 
OUTFLOWS: 
goodwork12 = (work_to_be_used_by2/durrev12)*quality1 
badwork12 = (work_to_be_used_by2/durrev12)*(1-quality1) 
work_to_be_used_by_1(t) = work_to_be_used_by_1(t - dt) + (work_21 - goodwork21 - 
badwork21) * dt 
INIT work_to_be_used_by_1 = 0 
 
325
INFLOWS: 
work_21 = (work_to_be_checked_2/inftrandur)*work_2_used_by1 
OUTFLOWS: 
goodwork21 = (work_to_be_used_by_1/durrev21)*quality2 
badwork21 = (work_to_be_used_by_1/durrev21)*(1-quality2) 
frac_to_be_coord = 0.5 
work_1_used_by2 = 0.5 
work_2_used_by1 = 0.5 
durrev12 = GRAPH(effort2_rev) 
(0.00, 2.00), (1.00, 1.58), (2.00, 1.37), (3.00, 1.21), (4.00, 1.03), (5.00, 0.92), (6.00, 0.81), 
(7.00, 0.71), (8.00, 0.66), (9.00, 0.65), (10.0, 0.61) 
durrev21 = GRAPH(effort1_rev) 
(0.00, 2.00), (1.00, 1.73), (2.00, 1.40), (3.00, 1.17), (4.00, 1.02), (5.00, 0.88), (6.00, 0.78), 
(7.00, 0.68), (8.00, 0.62), (9.00, 0.62), (10.0, 0.62) 
dur_prog1 = GRAPH(effort1) 
(0.00, 4.90), (1.00, 3.38), (2.00, 2.65), (3.00, 2.23), (4.00, 1.78), (5.00, 1.55), (6.00, 1.40), 
(7.00, 1.33), (8.00, 1.20), (9.00, 1.15), (10.0, 1.05) 
dur_prog2 = GRAPH(effort2) 
(0.00, 4.90), (1.00, 3.23), (2.00, 2.55), (3.00, 2.18), (4.00, 1.95), (5.00, 1.75), (6.00, 1.50), 
(7.00, 1.23), (8.00, 1.03), (9.00, 1.00), (10.0, 1.00) 
dur_rework1 = GRAPH(effort1_rew) 
(0.00, 2.00), (1.00, 1.63), (2.00, 1.40), (3.00, 1.20), (4.00, 1.09), (5.00, 0.95), (6.00, 0.87), 
(7.00, 0.78), (8.00, 0.7), (9.00, 0.62), (10.0, 0.6) 
dur_rework2 = GRAPH(effort2_rew) 
(0.00, 2.00), (1.00, 1.74), (2.00, 1.36), (3.00, 1.14), (4.00, 1.00), (5.00, 0.85), (6.00, 0.72), 
(7.00, 0.66), (8.00, 0.64), (9.00, 0.62), (10.0, 0.6) 
 
Quality 
iniqual_1 = 1 
iniqual_2 = 1 
prior_qual1 = 0.5 
prior_qual_2 = 0.2 
quality1 = iniqual_1*effcommqual1*effpriqual1*(1-
effschpressqual1)*frac_to_be_coord+iniqual_1*effpriqual1*(1-effschpressqual1)*(1-
frac_to_be_coord) 
quality2 = iniqual_2*effcommqual2*effpriqual2*(1-
effschpressqual2)*frac_to_be_coord+iniqual_2*(1-effschpressqual2)*effpriqual2*(1-
frac_to_be_coord) 
effcommqual1 = GRAPH(comm) 
(0.00, 0.01), (0.1, 0.225), (0.2, 0.425), (0.3, 0.55), (0.4, 0.66), (0.5, 0.74), (0.6, 0.825), 
(0.7, 0.895), (0.8, 0.955), (0.9, 0.98), (1, 0.995) 
effcommqual2 = GRAPH(comm) 
(0.00, 0.04), (0.1, 0.285), (0.2, 0.42), (0.3, 0.53), (0.4, 0.62), (0.5, 0.715), (0.6, 0.795), 
(0.7, 0.87), (0.8, 0.935), (0.9, 0.985), (1, 1.00) 
effpriqual1 = GRAPH(prior_qual1) 
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(0.00, 0.015), (0.1, 0.175), (0.2, 0.325), (0.3, 0.44), (0.4, 0.565), (0.5, 0.695), (0.6, 0.775), 
(0.7, 0.84), (0.8, 0.915), (0.9, 0.95), (1, 1.00) 
effpriqual2 = GRAPH(prior_qual_2) 
(0.00, 0.025), (0.1, 0.24), (0.2, 0.395), (0.3, 0.505), (0.4, 0.61), (0.5, 0.69), (0.6, 0.775), 
(0.7, 0.84), (0.8, 0.92), (0.9, 0.97), (1, 1.00) 
effschpressqual1 = GRAPH(sch_press1) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.1, 0.02), (0.2, 0.05), (0.3, 0.11), (0.4, 0.175), (0.5, 0.235), (0.6, 0.295), 
(0.7, 0.36), (0.8, 0.45), (0.9, 0.67), (1, 1.00) 
effschpressqual2 = GRAPH(sch_press_2) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.1, 0.035), (0.2, 0.06), (0.3, 0.09), (0.4, 0.155), (0.5, 0.205), (0.6, 0.29), 
(0.7, 0.395), (0.8, 0.525), (0.9, 0.725), (1, 1.00) 
 
Schedule 
sch_slipp1 = IF(exp_work_done1-work_done_1)<=0THEN(0)ELSE(exp_work_done1-
work_done_1) 
sch_slipp_2 = IF(exp_work_done2-work_done_2)<=0THEN(0)ELSE(exp_work_done2-
work_done_2) 
effscopered2 = GRAPH(scope_red2) 
(0.00, 0.015), (10.0, 0.245), (20.0, 0.415), (30.0, 0.56), (40.0, 0.67), (50.0, 0.76), (60.0, 
0.825), (70.0, 0.895), (80.0, 0.95), (90.0, 0.975), (100, 1.00) 
effscopered_1 = GRAPH(scope_red1) 
(0.00, 0.00), (10.0, 0.17), (20.0, 0.345), (30.0, 0.475), (40.0, 0.58), (50.0, 0.675), (60.0, 
0.755), (70.0, 0.825), (80.0, 0.885), (90.0, 0.94), (100, 1.00) 
exp_work_done1 = GRAPH(TIME) 
(1.00, 0.00), (2.00, 4.50), (3.00, 13.5), (4.00, 25.0), (5.00, 39.0), (6.00, 49.0), (7.00, 63.0), 
(8.00, 73.0), (9.00, 81.0), (10.0, 88.0), (11.0, 93.0), (12.0, 97.0), (13.0, 100) 
exp_work_done2 = GRAPH(TIME) 
(1.00, 0.00), (2.00, 5.00), (3.00, 15.5), (4.00, 29.0), (5.00, 43.0), (6.00, 57.0), (7.00, 70.0), 
(8.00, 79.0), (9.00, 87.5), (10.0, 94.0), (11.0, 97.5), (12.0, 99.0), (13.0, 99.5) 
sch_press1 = GRAPH((IF(sch_slipp1)<=0THEN(0)ELSE(sch_slipp1))*(1-
effscopered_1)) 
(0.00, 0.015), (10.0, 0.015), (20.0, 0.015), (30.0, 0.07), (40.0, 0.135), (50.0, 0.22), (60.0, 
0.32), (70.0, 0.455), (80.0, 0.58), (90.0, 0.745), (100, 1.00) 
sch_press_2 = GRAPH((IF(sch_slipp_2)<=0THEN(0)ELSE(sch_slipp_2))*(1-
effscopered2)) 
(0.00, 0.00), (10.0, 0.00), (20.0, 0.055), (30.0, 0.11), (40.0, 0.185), (50.0, 0.255), (60.0, 
0.32), (70.0, 0.41), (80.0, 0.56), (90.0, 0.71), (100, 1.00) 
 
Scope 
resis_to_red_scope1 = effscope_pri1 
resis_to_red_scope2 = effscope_pri2 
scope_pri1 = 0.5 
scope_pri2 = 0.5 
effscope_pri1 = GRAPH(scope_pri1) 
(0.00, 0.005), (0.1, 0.245), (0.2, 0.395), (0.3, 0.56), (0.4, 0.65), (0.5, 0.74), (0.6, 0.815), 
(0.7, 0.875), (0.8, 0.92), (0.9, 0.97), (1, 1.00) 
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effscope_pri2 = GRAPH(scope_pri2) 
(0.00, 0.025), (0.1, 0.235), (0.2, 0.36), (0.3, 0.51), (0.4, 0.655), (0.5, 0.735), (0.6, 0.815), 
(0.7, 0.89), (0.8, 0.95), (0.9, 0.995), (1, 1.00) 
 
Trust-Communication 
knowabout1(t) = knowabout1 (t - dt) + (know1form) * dt 
INIT knowabout1 = 0.2 
 
INFLOWS: 
know1form = GRAPH(comm) 
(0.00, 0.0005), (0.1, 0.07), (0.2, 0.175), (0.3, 0.275), (0.4, 0.365), (0.5, 0.465), (0.6, 
0.545), (0.7, 0.655), (0.8, 0.785), (0.9, 0.885), (1, 1.00) 
knowabout2(t) = knowabout2(t - dt) + (know2form) * dt 
INIT knowabout2 = 0 
 
INFLOWS: 
know2form = GRAPH(comm) 
(0.00, 0.01), (0.1, 0.11), (0.2, 0.2), (0.3, 0.3), (0.4, 0.415), (0.5, 0.53), (0.6, 0.625), (0.7, 
0.72), (0.8, 0.8), (0.9, 0.88), (1, 0.985) 
comm = inicomm*efftrucom1*efftrucom2 
inicomm = 0.5 
initialtrustin2 = 0.5 
intialtrustin1 = 0.5 
trustin1 = intialtrustin1*(1-(if(knowabout1)>1then(1) 
ELSE(knowabout1))+(if(knowabout1)>1then(1)ELSE(knowabout1))*(align)) 
trustin2 = initialtrustin2*(1-
(if(knowabout2)>1then(1)ELSE(knowabout2))+(if(knowabout2)> 
1then(1)ELSE(knowabout2))*align) 
efftrucom1 = GRAPH(trustin2) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.1, 0.245), (0.2, 0.48), (0.3, 0.64), (0.4, 0.73), (0.5, 0.805), (0.6, 0.875), 
(0.7, 0.92), (0.8, 0.96), (0.9, 0.98), (1, 1.00) 
efftrucom2 = GRAPH(trustin1) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.1, 0.22), (0.2, 0.415), (0.3, 0.55), (0.4, 0.675), (0.5, 0.765), (0.6, 0.84), 
(0.7, 0.89), (0.8, 0.95), (0.9, 0.965), (1, 1.00) 
inftrandur = GRAPH(comm) 
(0.00, 5.00), (0.1, 4.28), (0.2, 3.20), (0.3, 2.55), (0.4, 2.20), (0.5, 1.98), (0.6, 1.78), (0.7, 
1.53), (0.8, 1.48), (0.9, 1.48), (1, 1.48) 
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CASE 2 MODEL 
 
Contractor Supervison 
time_ava_for_super(t) = time_ava_for_super(t - dt) + (- red_time_ava_for_contr) * dt 
INIT time_ava_for_super =  50 
 
OUTFLOWS: 
red_time_ava_for_contr = GRAPH(prob_to_be_solved) 
(0.00, 0.00), (30.0, 1.00), (60.0, 2.00), (90.0, 3.50), (120, 5.25), (150, 8.25), (180, 11.3), 
(210, 16.0), (240, 22.0), (270, 31.8), (300, 50.0) 
eff_time_super_effrev = GRAPH(time_ava_for_super) 
(0.00, 0.00), (5.00, 0.25), (10.0, 0.435), (15.0, 0.575), (20.0, 0.665), (25.0, 0.75), (30.0, 
0.825), (35.0, 0.9), (40.0, 0.955), (45.0, 0.985), (50.0, 0.985) 
p_team_eff_rev = GRAPH(eff_time_super_effrev) 
(0.00, 0.1), (0.1, 0.8), (0.2, 1.80), (0.3, 2.65), (0.4, 3.65), (0.5, 4.75), (0.6, 5.70), (0.7, 
6.70), (0.8, 7.70), (0.9, 8.85), (1, 9.75) 
 
Decision Making 
time_req_for_dec_making(t) = time_req_for_dec_making(t - dt) + 
(inc_time_req_for_dec_making - red_time_for_dec_making) * dt 
INIT time_req_for_dec_making = 50 
 
INFLOWS: 
inc_time_req_for_dec_making = GRAPH((1-comm)*(1-mgmt_unders)*(1-
deg_of_flex)*lev_of_mgmt) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.1, 0.2), (0.2, 0.5), (0.3, 1.05), (0.4, 1.70), (0.5, 2.20), (0.6, 2.80), (0.7, 
3.85), (0.8, 4.90), (0.9, 7.10), (1, 10.0) 
OUTFLOWS: 
red_time_for_dec_making = GRAPH(if(time_req_for_dec_making)<5then(0) 
else(comm*mgmt_unders*deg_of_flex*(1-lev_of_mgmt))) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.1, 2.75), (0.2, 4.20), (0.3, 5.35), (0.4, 6.35), (0.5, 7.20), (0.6, 7.95), (0.7, 
8.85), (0.8, 9.30), (0.9, 9.70), (1, 10.0) 
mgmt_unders = 0.5 
dec_mak_eff_on_prog = GRAPH(time_req_for_dec_making) 
(0.00, 0.995), (5.00, 0.97), (10.0, 0.925), (15.0, 0.865), (20.0, 0.8), (25.0, 0.725), (30.0, 
0.63), (35.0, 0.5), (40.0, 0.355), (45.0, 0.175), (50.0, 0.015) 
deg_of_flex = GRAPH(align) 
(0.00, 0.005), (0.1, 0.105), (0.2, 0.195), (0.3, 0.3), (0.4, 0.395), (0.5, 0.485), (0.6, 0.59), 
(0.7, 0.685), (0.8, 0.785), (0.9, 0.895), (1, 1.00) 
lev_of_mgmt = GRAPH(align) 
(0.00, 0.99), (0.1, 0.92), (0.2, 0.84), (0.3, 0.77), (0.4, 0.705), (0.5, 0.635), (0.6, 0.555), 
(0.7, 0.45), (0.8, 0.355), (0.9, 0.275), (1, 0.195) 
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Problem Solving 
prob_to_be_solved(t) = prob_to_be_solved(t - dt) + (rate_of_prob__add - 
rate_of_prob_sol) * dt 
INIT prob_to_be_solved = 0 
 
INFLOWS: 
rate_of_prob__add = GRAPH(ext_factors+sch_slipp+quality_problems) 
(0.00, 0.00), (10.0, 7.50), (20.0, 16.0), (30.0, 25.0), (40.0, 35.5), (50.0, 46.5), (60.0, 57.0), 
(70.0, 67.0), (80.0, 78.5), (90.0, 88.5), (100, 99.5) 
OUTFLOWS: 
rate_of_prob_sol = GRAPH(time_req_for_dec_making) 
(0.00, 98.0), (10.0, 96.5), (20.0, 93.5), (30.0, 89.0), (40.0, 82.0), (50.0, 74.5), (60.0, 68.5), 
(70.0, 58.5), (80.0, 40.0), (90.0, 25.5), (100, 0.00) 
ext_factors = RANDOM(0,100) 
quality_problems = GRAPH(quality) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.1, 4.00), (0.2, 8.75), (0.3, 12.8), (0.4, 16.8), (0.5, 23.0), (0.6, 28.3), (0.7, 
32.8), (0.8, 37.8), (0.9, 44.3), (1, 50.0) 
 
Progress- Rework 
review (t) = review(t - dt) + (work_per_to_be_rev - rev_badwork - rev_goodwork) * dt 
INIT review = 0 
 
INFLOWS: 
work_per_to_be_rev = (work_with_pot_errors*frac_work_to_be_rev)/inf_trans_dur 
OUTFLOWS: 
rev_badwork = (review*(1-quality))/dur_rev 
rev_goodwork = (review*quality)/dur_rev 
rework_lev(t) = rework_lev(t - dt) + (badwork + inf_transf_rate - rework_rate) * dt 
INIT rework_lev = 0 
 
INFLOWS: 
badwork = (work_with_pot_errors*(1-quality))/dur_progress 
inf_transf_rate = rework_rev/inf_trans_dur 
OUTFLOWS: 
rework_rate = rework_lev/rew_dur 
rework_rev(t) = rework_rev(t - dt) + (rev_badwork - inf_transf_rate) * dt 
INIT rework_rev = 0 
 
INFLOWS: 
rev_badwork = (review*(1-quality))/dur_rev 
OUTFLOWS: 
inf_transf_rate = rework_rev/inf_trans_dur 
work_done(t) = work_done(t - dt) + (goodwork + rev_goodwork) * dt 
INIT work_done = 0 
 
330
INFLOWS: 
goodwork = (work_with_pot_errors*quality)/dur_progress 
rev_goodwork = (review*quality)/dur_rev 
work_to_be_done(t) = work_to_be_done(t - dt) + (- progress) * dt 
INIT work_to_be_done = 100 
 
OUTFLOWS: 
progress = 
(work_to_be_done/dur_progress)*frac_of_work_req_feedback*dec_mak_eff_on_prog+(
work_to_be_done/dur_progress)*(1-frac_of_work_req_feedback) 
work_with_pot_errors(t) = work_with_pot_errors(t - dt) + (progress + rework_rate - 
badwork - goodwork - work_per_to_be_rev) * dt 
INIT work_with_pot_errors = 0 
 
INFLOWS: 
progress = 
(work_to_be_done/dur_progress)*frac_of_work_req_feedback*dec_mak_eff_on_prog+(
work_to_be_done/dur_progress)*(1-frac_of_work_req_feedback) 
rework_rate = rework_lev/rew_dur 
OUTFLOWS: 
badwork = (work_with_pot_errors*(1-quality))/dur_progress 
goodwork = (work_with_pot_errors*quality)/dur_progress 
work_per_to_be_rev = (work_with_pot_errors*frac_work_to_be_rev)/inf_trans_dur 
frac_of_work_req_feedback =  0.5 
frac_work_to_be_rev = 0.5 
inf_trans_dur = 3 
quality = 0.5 
dur_progress = GRAPH(effort) 
(0.00, 4.90), (2.00, 4.15), (4.00, 3.53), (6.00, 2.88), (8.00, 2.43), (10.0, 2.13), (12.0, 1.88), 
(14.0, 1.68), (16.0, 1.63), (18.0, 1.63), (20.0, 1.65) 
dur_rev = GRAPH(p_team_eff_rev) 
(0.00, 4.93), (1.00, 4.10), (2.00, 3.35), (3.00, 2.90), (4.00, 2.63), (5.00, 2.38), (6.00, 2.13), 
(7.00, 1.85), (8.00, 1.63), (9.00, 1.53), (10.0, 1.53) 
rew_dur = GRAPH(effort_rew) 
(0.00, 5.00), (1.00, 4.45), (2.00, 3.75), (3.00, 3.35), (4.00, 2.88), (5.00, 2.58), (6.00, 2.27), 
(7.00, 2.02), (8.00, 1.80), (9.00, 1.58), (10.0, 1.53) 
 
Trust-Communication 
knowabout1(t) = knowabout1(t - dt) + (know1form) * dt 
INIT knowabout1 = 0.5 
 
INFLOWS: 
know1form = GRAPH(comm) 
(0.00, 0.005), (0.1, 0.07), (0.2, 0.13), (0.3, 0.2), (0.4, 0.295), (0.5, 0.39), (0.6, 0.485), (0.7, 
0.59), (0.8, 0.69), (0.9, 0.805), (1, 1.00) 
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knowabout2(t) = knowabout2(t - dt) + (know2form) * dt 
INIT knowabout2 = 0.5 
 
INFLOWS: 
know2form = GRAPH(comm) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.1, 0.055), (0.2, 0.155), (0.3, 0.245), (0.4, 0.34), (0.5, 0.425), (0.6, 0.54), 
(0.7, 0.64), (0.8, 0.775), (0.9, 0.885), (1, 0.98) 
align = 0.5 
comm = inicomm*efftrsuton_comm2*efftrustoncomm1 
inicomm = 0.9 
initialtrustin2 = 0.5 
intialtrustin1 = 0.5 
trustin1 = intialtrustin1*(1-
(if(knowabout1)>1then(1)ELSE(knowabout1)))+(if(knowabout1)>1then(1)ELSE(knowa
bout1))*align 
trustin2 = initialtrustin2*(1-
(if(knowabout2)>1then(1)ELSE(knowabout2)))+(if(knowabout2)>1then(1)ELSE(knowa
bout2))*align 
efftrsuton_comm2 = GRAPH(trustin1) 
(0.00, 0.025), (0.1, 0.255), (0.2, 0.405), (0.3, 0.55), (0.4, 0.685), (0.5, 0.78), (0.6, 0.845), 
(0.7, 0.9), (0.8, 0.945), (0.9, 0.975), (1, 0.995) 
efftrustoncomm1 = GRAPH(trustin2) 
(0.00, 0.025), (0.1, 0.18), (0.2, 0.345), (0.3, 0.495), (0.4, 0.655), (0.5, 0.74), (0.6, 0.84), 
(0.7, 0.905), (0.8, 0.955), (0.9, 0.99), (1, 1.00) 
 
Effort 
effort = add_eff+plan_effort-effort_rew 
sch_slipp = IF(exp_work_done-work_done)<=0THEN(0)ELSE(exp_work_done-
work_done) 
tot_effort = add_eff+effort_rew+plan_effort 
add_eff = GRAPH(eff_time_super_add_eff*eff_sch_slipp_add_eff) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.1, 1.05), (0.2, 2.05), (0.3, 2.80), (0.4, 3.75), (0.5, 4.70), (0.6, 5.50), (0.7, 
6.50), (0.8, 7.55), (0.9, 8.80), (1, 10.0) 
effort_rew = GRAPH(per_req_rew_eff) 
(0.00, 0.075), (0.1, 0.8), (0.2, 1.70), (0.3, 2.45), (0.4, 3.20), (0.5, 4.00), (0.6, 5.15), (0.7, 
6.50), (0.8, 7.45), (0.9, 8.60), (1, 10.0) 
eff_sch_slipp_add_eff = GRAPH(sch_slipp) 
(0.00, 0.00), (1.00, 0.26), (2.00, 0.445), (3.00, 0.595), (4.00, 0.72), (5.00, 0.83), (6.00, 
0.875), (7.00, 0.93), (8.00, 0.98), (9.00, 1.00), (10.0, 1.00) 
eff_time_super_add_eff = GRAPH(time_ava_for_super) 
(0.00, 0.00), (5.00, 0.19), (10.0, 0.35), (15.0, 0.475), (20.0, 0.61), (25.0, 0.72), (30.0, 
0.83), (35.0, 0.9), (40.0, 0.955), (45.0, 0.99), (50.0, 0.99) 
exp_work_done = GRAPH(TIME) 
(1.00, 0.00), (2.00, 7.50), (3.00, 19.0), (4.00, 34.5), (5.00, 49.0), (6.00, 70.0), (7.00, 82.0), 
(8.00, 90.5), (9.00, 94.5), (10.0, 97.5), (11.0, 98.5), (12.0, 99.0), (13.0, 100) 
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per_req_rew_eff = GRAPH(rework_lev) 
(0.00, 0.00), (1.00, 0.095), (2.00, 0.17), (3.00, 0.265), (4.00, 0.395), (5.00, 0.5), (6.00, 
0.62), (7.00, 0.72), (8.00, 0.82), (9.00, 0.89), (10.0, 1.00) 
plan_effort = GRAPH(TIME) 
(1.00, 9.90), (2.00, 9.95), (3.00, 9.95), (4.00, 9.75), (5.00, 9.60), (6.00, 9.40), (7.00, 9.15), 
(8.00, 8.90), (9.00, 8.40), (10.0, 8.00), (11.0, 7.35), (12.0, 6.80), (13.0, 6.30) 
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